Reforms in Lisbon Strategy Implementation: Economic and Social Dimension by Samardzija, Visnja et al.
www.ssoar.info
Reforms in Lisbon Strategy Implementation:
Economic and Social Dimension
Samardzija, Visnja (Ed.)
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Konferenzband / collection
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Samardzija, V. (Ed.). (2006). Reforms in Lisbon Strategy Implementation: Economic and Social Dimension. Zagreb:
Institute for International Relations; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-58584
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
REFORMS IN LISBON STRATEGY 
IMPLEMENTATION: 
Economic and Social Dimensions
Proceedings
CIP zapis dostupanuracunalnomkatalogu 
Nacionalne i sveucilisne knjiznice u Zagrebu 
podbrojem 622331
ISBN 953-6096-41-2 (IMO) 
ISBN953-7043-23-1 (FES)
REFORMS IN LISBON STRATEGY 
IMPLEMENTATION: 
Economic and Social Dimensions
Proceedings of the International Conference
Edited by 
Visnja Samardzija
Institute for International Relations - IMO 




Institute for International Relations, Zagreb - IMO 






















THE LISBON STRATEGY IN THE WIDER EUROPEAN CONTEXT.. 7
Will Europe win the Lisbon Strategy?......................................................  9
The Lisbon Strategy as a challenge for the new candidates................... 17
The Lisbon Strategy and Croatia................................................................ 19
Conclusions...................................................................................................  31
Christa Randzio-Plath
THE LISBON STRATEGY: FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL REFORM
AGENDA IN THE EU...................................................................................... 35
The Lisbon Strategy - challenges and expectations................................  37
Lisbon Strategy and key policies............................................................... 45
European economic governance................................................................ 49
Conclusions...................................................................................................  52
Tania Zgajewski
THE LISBON STRATEGY: WHAT IS WRONG?......................................  55
Introduction...................................................................................................  57
The problem: the economic situation ofEurope.....................................  58
The answer: the Lisbon Strategy................................................................  63
The results of the Lisbon Strategy............................................................  66
The alternative paths.................................................................................... 67
General conclusion.......................................................................................  70
V
Marius-Jan Radio
THE LISBON PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
LESSONS FOR CROATIA..............................................................................  73
Introduction...................................................................................................  76
Causes of reform..........................................................................................  77
Lisabon failures and its sources..................................................................  82
Limited mid-term renewal?......................................................................... 83
Conclusions for Croatia...............................................................................  87
Matevz Hribernik
LISBON AGENDA IMPLEMENTATION:
THE EXAMPLE OF SLOVENIA..................................................................  91
Introduction...................................................................................................  94
The renewal of the Lisbon Strategy..........................................................  94
Macroeconomic and social policy framework in Slovenia.................... 98
Lisbon Strategy and Slovenia.....................................................................  99
Conclusions...................................................................................................  I l l
Tamas Szemler
REFORM PROGRAMMES IN HUNGARY: LISBON MATTERS?....... 115
Introduction...................................................................................................  117
Three issues - three programmes................................................................ 118
The “environment.” and the chances of the NRP.....................................  127
Epilogue from six months later..................................................................  129
Martin Potucek
DOES THE LISBON STRATEGY MATTER?
THE CZECH EXPERIENCE........................................................................... 133
The Lisbon Strategy as one of the factors of
post-communist societal transformation................................................... 135
Changing public policies.............................................................................  139
Conclusions...................................................................................................  144
Neven Mimica
THE LISBON AGENDA AND THE RELOCATION OF ECONOMIC
ACTIVITIES ABROAD: SERVICES AND THE LABOUR MARKET.. 147
Introduction and background.....................................................................  150
An upward relocation trend in the services sector..................................  150
Impacts........................................................................................................... 154
VI




Notes on the Contributors................................................................................. ..185
Programme of the Conference............................................................................191
VII

E d i t o r i a l
The international conference on “Reforms in Lisbon Strategy Implementation: 
Economic and Social Dimensions” was held on 3 May 2006 at the Regent 
Esplanade Hotel in Zagreb. The conference was jointly organised by the 
Institute for International Relations from Zagreb and the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation. The main goal was to contribute to better understanding of the 
Lisbon Strategy, seen as a reform framework for EU member states and an 
important guideline for the countries that aspire to membership.
The conference brought together distinguished panellists, academics and 
politicians from Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, 
Poland and Slovenia. It was attended by a number of representatives from 
Croatian public administration bodies, academia and non-governmental 
institutions and was well covered by the media.
The debates were organised within three panels. The first one analysed the 
Lisbon Strategy as a framework for reforms at the EU level. The second and 
third panels were dedicated to the implementation of Lisbon goals in the new EU 
member states and to Croatia's preparations as a candidate country for meeting 
the goals of this agenda.
The conference provided a useful exchange of experience concerning the 
overall effects of the initial and revised Lisbon Strategy together with its 
implementing mechanisms and the debates were a form of reaction to the spring 
European Council conclusions. Furthermore, it contributed to raising awareness 
of the relevance of the strategy goals for countries in the accession process, 
bearing in mind the fact that the Lisbon goals were not a highly debated issue in 
Croatia.
On behalf of the Institute for International Relations, I would like to thank the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung for their successful cooperation during the ten years of 
their presence in Croatia. I am particularly grateful to Mirko Hempel, head of the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung office in Zagreb, and his staff, as well as to Nenad 
Zakosek for their inputs during the organisation of the conference and 
preparation of the book.
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Furthermore, I would like to thank all the panellists and chairpersons for their 
extremely useful presentations and interventions at the conference as well as for 
their contributions to the book. I would also like to thank all the participants for 
their active involvement during the meeting, reviewers for their useful 
comments and suggestions as well as the language editor for the improvements 
to the material. Finally, my thanks go to all those who were involved in finalising 
the material, particularly Hrvoje Butkovic, thus making this editorial effort 
possible.
The publication resulted from the IMO long term research activities supported 
by the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports.





F o r e w o r d
The European Economic and Social Model (EESM) is undoubtedly one of the 
most controversial areas within the European Union - especially when it comes 
to the question: is there a unique “one-for-all-and-all-for-one approach” or are 
there many different mini-EESMs depending on the definition of how to 
delegate welfare-state responsibilities?
Being part of a basket of common strategies, policies and pacts, the EESM can 
be described as a permanent “work in progress”. The very restrictive Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) and the European Employment Strategy (EES) have to a 
large extent influenced the discussion about the Lisbon Strategy since the year 
2000.
With the inclusion of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers, commonly known as the Social Charter, into the Treaty of Amsterdam 
in 1997, the EU gave itself a political instrument, that contains moral obligations 
to guarantee the respect of a variety of social rights such as labour market 
relations and the working environment, gender issues and equal opportunities, 
reducing unemployment and creating better qualityjobs, as well as improving 
training.
Since then we have witnessed two major factors of influence: on the one hand, 
with the accession of 10 new EU member states in 2004, the overall extent of 
heterogeneous approaches and policies within the EU is on the increase. On the 
other hand, the deepening and further integration of the European Union 
produced new structures and institutions of multinational character which need 
to be dealt with through adequately designed common frameworks.
Consequently, in spring 2005 the EU Commission carried out a “mid-term 
review” regarding the achievements of the Lisbon Strategy and came to the 
conclusion that aims and objectives are still valid, but implementation is lagging 
behind. It became obvious that moral obligations and the chosen Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) are not efficient enough by a long way to produce 
results if  there are no tougher instruments of governance in place.
When the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the Institute for International 
Relations (IMO) in Zagreb organised the international conference “Reforms in 
Lisbon Strategy Implementation: Economic and Social Dimensions” on 3 May
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2006, in Zagreb, Croatia, there could not have been a better time chosen to 
discuss the entire framework of developments since the mid-term review in
2005 and the current situation regarding the implementation of the Lisbon 
Strategy, particularly in Croatia, most likely the 28th member state of the EU. 
The EESM is still a new area of discussion in Croatia and there exist only a few 
relevant papers and abstracts on the issue that specialise in the Croatian case.
As a result of the conference we decided to produce this publication to provide 
a useful contribution to public debate in Croatia and within the countries of the 
European Union.
Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all those who contri­
buted to this project, in particular Visnja Samardzija from the Institute for Inter­
national Relations in Zagreb, the editor of the book, for her contributions and the 
good cooperation with the IMO, the reviewers Ana Maria Boromisa from the 
Institute for International Relations in Zagreb and Paul Stubbs from the 
Economic Institute in Zagreb for their valuable advice, Charlotte Huntly for 
outstanding assistance in language editing of the contributions, Vesna 
Ibrisimovic for an excellent layout and Blanka Smoljan from the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung for all the assistance in tackling the unavoidable administration duties 
during the conference and in preparation for this publication.
Mirko Hempel 
Director 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
Office for Croatia and Slovenia
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A b b r e v i a t i o n s
APR Annual Progress Report
BEPGs Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
CAE Conseil d'Analyse Economique,
Council for Economic Analysis (in France)
CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies
CLP Community Lisbon Programme
CODEF Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination 
of EU Funds (in Croatia)
CP Convergence Programme
CSEE Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe
DIW Deutsches Institutfur Wirtschaftsforschung, 
German Institute for Economic Research
EC European Community
ECB European Central Bank
ECE Economic Commission for Europe
EEA European Economic Area
EEG European Economic Guidelines
EES European Employment Strategy
EESM European Economic and Social Model
EESC European Economic and Social Committee
EGs Employment Guidelines
EMU European Monetary Union
EMS European Monetary System
EPC European Policy Centre
ERM European Exchange Rate Mechanism
EU European Union
EU SDS EU Sustainable Development Strategy
FDI foreign direct investment
FT Financial Times
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GDP gross domestic product
GEM Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
GERD Gross Expenditure on Research and Development
ICT information and communication technology
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IGs Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs
IGP Integrated Guidelines Package
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IT information technology
JIM Joint Inclusion Memorandum
JAPs Joint AssessmentPapers
MS member state
NAPs National Action Plans
NBER National Bureau ofEconomic Research (in US)
NCC National Competitiveness Council (in Croatia)
NGO non-governmental organisation
NMS new member state
NPRs National Progress Reports
NRPs National Reform Programmes
NSRF National Strategic Reference Framework
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMC Open Method of Coordination
PEP Pre-accession Economic Programme
PHARE Pre-accession Fund (abbreviation initially derived from: 
Poland and Hungary Action for Restructuring of the 
Economy)
PPP purchasing power parity
PPS purchasing power standard
R&D research and development
RIA regulatory impact assessment
SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SAP Stabilisation and Association Process
SEE South-Eastern Europe
SGEI services of general economic interest
SGI services of general interest
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SME small and medium-sized enterprises
SPRU Science and Technology Policy Research
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
VAT value-added tax
WB World Bank
WTO World Trade Organization
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SUMMARY
The paper presents an overview o f  key focuses in papers presented at the 
international conference “Reforms in Lisbon Strategy Implementation: Eco­
nomic and Social Dimensions Its aim is to give an introduction to authors' 
contributions, putting them into the context o f  the overall debates that were held 
during the conference. The key message is that the initial Lisbon Strategy has 
not been a success due to the lack o f  political leadership, commitment and 
ownership on the part o f  member states, but also due to bad governance and lack 
o f  prioritisation. Hopefully the reformsfollowing the mid-term review will result 
in improved delivery and better results thanks to the morefocused objectives, 
clearerplanning and stronger ownership o f  theprocess in member states. The 
experiences and achievements in implementation o f  the strategy in E U  member 
states show that the situation differsfrom country to country. Good practice in 
new member states isparticularly useful fo r  Croatia. Although not obligatory, 
the Lisbon Agenda objectives are relevant fo r  Croatia in the pre-accession 
stage. The Lisbon Strategy does not introduce additional E U  membership 
criteria but, as was announced in the Commission documents, its objectives will 
be reflected in the EU'spolicies towards the whole South-East European region 
in the areas that can be consideredprioritiesfor the countries' overall reforms. 
This paper continues with the key points from the authors' contributions, 
including an assessment o f  Croatia's progress in approaching the Lisbon goals.
WILL EUROPE WIN THE LISBON STRATEGY?
Due to inefficient implementation in many areas in its first stage, the Lisbon 
Strategy was seen as a synonym for failure in the EU. Its widely set goal to reach
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world primacy by 2010, which could be expressed in several key words - 
competitiveness, dynamism, knowledge-based economy, sustainable economic 
growth,jobs, social cohesion - was far from being reached within the first five 
years of implementation.
The Lisbon Strategy was initially intended to improve Europe's economy and 
boost employment through approaching certain goals, such as creating an 
internal market for services, decreasing administrative burdens, improving 
human capital, reaching the target of raising the level of expenditure on R&D to 
3% of GDP, raising the level of the employment rate to 70%. To meet the 
targeted employment rate, an average annual growth rate of 1.5% until 2010 
would be needed, from the difference of 0.7% per year achieved in 2000-2003. 
The expected growth and investment to boost productivity was missing. 
Productivity is growing in the US twice as fast as in Europe, due to insufficient 
expenditure on R&D and low levels of investment (the average annual 
investment growth in the EU is 1.7% compared to 5.4% in the US).
In spite of the fact that Europe represented 20% of world trade, 30% of global 
GDP and 45% of FDI, it could not mobilise enough resources to further 
strengthen its competitiveness. Sustainable growth, full employment and social 
inclusion were needed to increase competitiveness. European productivity was 
in decline, as compared to the early 1990s (European Commission, 2005d).
The mid-term review showed that the results were below expectations and that 
the Lisbon Strategy was not a success. The glass was half empty, not half full. 
The envisaged reforms were comprehensive, but targets had been set too wide, 
with an overloaded agenda, and conflicting priorities, poor coordination and 
mechanisms that were too weak. There was an evident lack of strong leadership 
based on principles and European values. Although there were positive 
achievements in some areas, insufficient progress was made in reaching the 
overall Lisbon goals. The “delivery” was disappointing. Alack of clear division 
of responsibilities between national and EU levels resulted in limited ownership 
of the process in member states. The economic integration needed coordinated 
national policy measures which were not achieved. Close partnership between 
member states and the Community was needed. The results of the first stage of 
the Lisbon Agenda were limited - economic growth was moderate, R&D did not 
increase significantly, structural reforms were slow (Randzio-Plath)1.
The EU is facing the combination of two phenomena: globalisation and the 
information society. Their mutual combination might increase their particular
1. The references to the authors/contributors made in this introductory paper relate to their articles 
published in this book, unless otherwise stated.
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effects and even accelerate the trends. The EU is thus entering a new era, quite 
different from what Europe has experienced so far (Zgajewski).
Globalisation itself is still a challenge bearing in mind the pressure of growing 
competition not only from industrialised, but also from developing countries. 
Initially, the key challenge of the Lisbon Strategy was to catch up with EU 
competitors such as the US and Japan. However, the real (nowadays perhaps 
even more important) challenges are fast-growing competitors like China, 
moving quickly from imitating to inventing, and India, developing its services 
sector efficiently. Emerging developing economies are not only competing 
through lower costs but also through steadily increasing research and innovation 
capacities. It became clear that the emerging “new” Asian growth dynamics 
were overlooked in the global update of the Lisbon Strategy, which initially 
focused on the competition between the traditional triad (US-EU-Japan), while 
restructuring the “new international division of labour” was to a great extent 
underestimated. These new competitors are becoming more and more important 
and “weigh” more in the longer run, while the technological and innovation gap 
remains a cause of concern with the US, as well.
Furthermore, Europe is facing other challenges of the modem global 
economy, particularly the constant and accelerating change - not only in 
technologies, but in markets, social conditions and business models. Therefore 
the Lisbon Strategy needs to act as the basis for reaching ambitious objectives 
through innovation strategy and by investing in the knowledge society. It needs 
to further the progress of the European internal market (Randzio-Plath).
Even the areas where Europe has been better performing, reforms were need, 
including the European social model. The social dimension of Europe was seen 
as fundamental for citizens, and comprehensive and integrated social and 
market reforms were needed to create a Europe of excellence. The link between 
the employment rate, social inclusion and the sustainability of the European 
model is one of the elements o f the Lisbon objectives intended to achieve higher 
employment rates. The northern flexicurity model, as a mix of flexibility and 
social security, combiningjob security, an active labour market, social policies 
and the skills needed for a knowledge economy, is a case of good practice, 
bearing in mind the fact that social protection must be given high importance. It 
is a policy strategy aiming to enhance flexibility of labour markets, work 
organisation and social security. However, this area needs to be further 
addressed in the National Reform Programmes of member states. The social 
dimension of the Lisbon Strategy, even if  somewhat virtual, is seen as a 
blueprint for the future.
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Based on the mid-term review recommendations, the renewed Lisbon 
Strategy was launched at the spring European Council in 2005, placing the main 
emphasis on knowledge, innovation and the optimisation of human capital. The 
key issues of the renewed strategy are growth and employment. Apart from this, 
the renewed strategy is directed towards enhanced ownership and greater 
coherence. Implementation is based on a partnership between the Commission 
and the member states, with the important role given to the Council and the other 
EU institutions. The programme for reforms was developed at the European 
level (the Community Lisbon Programme - CLP) and national levels (National 
Reform Programmes - NRPs). National Lisbon coordinators were appointed 
and the reporting system was simplified. National reform programmes are 
evaluated on a yearly basis, thus leading to recommendations for further 
development.
The renewed Lisbon Strategy aims to increase the EU's ability to createjobs, 
to raise the capacity for growth through more investment into human resources 
and to ensure that Europe remains an attractive location for employment and 
investment.
There are at least two ways to present the current reality of Europe - the black 
and the pink scenario. The black scenario could be summarised in a few 
elements, such as the ageing of the population due to the fact that Europe is 
becoming a “grey society”, old producers facing the challenge of adjusting and 
catching up with new world competitors, long-term unemployment, particularly 
for lower qualified people, and weak adaptation to ICT. On the other hand, the 
pink scenario is the other way of presenting the reality of the European economy. 
Its starting points are the positive elements in European reality, particularly in 
the areas where Europe is not performing badly, such as growth per working 
hour and multifactor productivity, the public debt, environmental situation, etc. 
Based on this, it could be concluded that the Lisbon Strategy is directed 
correctly, at least at the level of its diagnosis, which might bring the added value 
- the transformation into the knowledge-based society.
On the other hand, the present economic situation in Europe has its positive 
and negative aspects. The message of the European institutions is unbalanced, 
and mostly negative. Black description with emphasis on disadvantages only 
has negative implications for public opinion, which needs not only a vision, but 
a positive perspective. In the history of European integration since 1950, the 
European institutions have never committed themselves to so many deep 
reforms. However, the action programme of the Lisbon Strategy is to a great 
extent insufficient. Resources are too limited, targets on non-economic aspects
12
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have been dropped, while initiatives at the European Community level have not 
been developed enough. The Lisbon Strategy is the first programme of action 
based mainly on national measures. However, there is a discrepancy between 
the big ambitions and the limited means of implementation, and this should not 
be underestimated. These contradictions open a resources problem of 
instruments and processes, as well as a communication problem, since citizens 
want to see clear social and environmental perspectives as the outcome of 
reforms. As a final outcome of limited resources and incentives, results 
remained weak, and it seems that the EU has delivered results while the 
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy in member states has still been poor 
(Zgajewski).
There is an opinion that, following the mid-term review, the reforms will, 
hopefully, bring better results because of enhanced ownership, greater 
coherence, clearer and more focused objectives with growth andjobs defined as 
top priorities, and key areas of action, three-year plans and improved 
implementation instruments. The evaluation in autumn 2006 will reflect the 
reform capacities and performance of member states. However, increased 
ownership of the Lisbon Agenda is not addressed by the European institutions 
and the governments of member states - through participation of national 
parliaments, social partners and civil society in order to secure effective 
implementation and credibility (Randzio-Plath).
To cope with the challenges of the renewed Lisbon Agenda, Europe will need a 
lot of new products, new services and new capabilities, the latter being the most 
crucial element in the new approach.
What is the outcome of the revised strategy? How are the reforms seen by the 
Commission? How are reactions from the Commission perceived by EU 
member states, particularly the new members? What experiences should be 
learned by the present and potential candidates for EU membership? Where is 
Croatia in this new environment? These are the main questions that were 
discussed at the conference and in the papers of presenters.
After the fifth EU enlargement the Lisbon goals became even more difficult to 
reach. The new member states have higher growth rates, but lower employment 
and productivity rates, while reaching the goal of 3% investment into R&D is 
more difficult, given the worse starting positions of new member states. The 
problems of cohesion are becoming more accentuated. The EU population is 
20% larger, but GDP has increased by only 5%, and the per capita output has 
decreased by 12.5%, with strong regional disparities.
13
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The Lisbon Strategy and the effectiveness of new EU member states
The new member states approached the Lisbon Strategy in different ways during 
their accession process to the EU, but after becoming EU members they all had 
similar experiences in preparing the National Reform Programmes (NRPs). 
Namely, the relaunched strategy called for member states to produce 
comprehensive national reform programmes by November 2005, based on the 
Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (IGs). It is still too early to estimate 
to what extent progress has been achieved at national level, and in which 
particular areas. Although the approach was basically the same in all the 
member states, the preparation process (consultation procedures), the extent to 
which the IGs were used, the exposition of new policies and the degree to which 
the NRPs concentrate on analysis and have realistic starting assumptions shows 
that NRPs differ to a great extent (Begg, 2006), even within the new member 
states.
However, experiences that are relevant for Croatia as a candidate country for 
EU membership are notjust the most recent attempts to prepare and effectively 
implement the NRPs. It is useful to get insight into the overall preparations of 
new member states to cope with the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, 
including the development and main focus of their national strategic documents, 
and the organisational structures for implementation and monitoring of the 
process. Therefore the experiences of the new member states are particularly 
relevant, and the situation in three new member states was analysed (Slovenia, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic).
Slovenia is an interesting example for Croatia. Similar to other EU new 
member states, Slovenia has had to cope with a double challenge. After entering 
the Union, it had to accept equally all the challenges that apply to the whole EU, 
and, on the other hand, as a part of the less developed part of the EU, the country 
must also achieve the goal of bringing the economy to the level of the more 
developed countries.
From an economic point of view, Slovenia has narrowed its development gap 
relative to the EU (81% of the average GDP per capita in PPS in the EU, 
according to Eurostat's estimate for 2005), but catching up has been too slow 
with respect to set objectives. Macroeconomic stability and economic growth 
provided good conditions for development and Slovenia recorded positive 
results in the area of the modem welfare state and employment. In order to 
achieve the Lisbon Strategy, Slovenia had to continue with structural reforms 
that will strengthen its competitiveness and raise employment levels, meaning
14
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that a change to the previous development pattern was needed. The key question 
was not whether or not to reform, but when and how.
Development strategies in Slovenia have been an instructive model for other 
countries since the early stages of its accession process. Furthermore, the 
framework for implementing the economic and social reforms is instructive, 
including the bodies responsible, the consultation procedures, the process of 
implementing and monitoring of the Lisbon Strategy in Slovenia, as well as the 
mechanisms developed in order to get nationwide support for reforms.
There are several lessons that could be learnt from Slovenia's case. The first 
one is to have better focus and prioritisation, meaning that it is necessary to focus 
on proper priorities, in spite of pressure from special interests and political risks. 
The second one is that improved ownership is needed, which in practice means 
that the success of any national strategies is not possible without the 
involvement and full participation of interested stakeholders. This is a way of 
achieving national ownership of reforms, together with involvement of special 
institutional arrangements which need to be established. The third conclusion 
from the Slovenian experience is that it is necessary to establish the best possible 
communication with citizens. The last one is the need to achieve the best use of 
the EU, through improving the administrative and absorption capacity for EU 
funds, which is crucial for approaching the Lisbon goals.
The Czech Republic is another example of a new member state's attempt to 
respond to the challenges of the Lisbon Agenda. This case underlines the same 
problem that most new member states faced - entering the EU with health, social 
and employment policies that are not sufficiently developed to cope with the EU 
specific policy document demands. This means that there was an urgent need to 
solve the discrepancy between the enormous public tasks of high employment, 
capacity building in health and social services, alleviation of poverty, and 
strengthening social cohesion in the new member states, and their insufficient 
social, economic and administrative implementation capacities. The EU 
incentives regarding institution building and transfer of skills around the year 
2000 were helpful, but national initiatives of the new member states (one 
example being the Czech programmatic document on social doctrine) could be 
seen as an added value to this EU-centred effort (Hribernik).
The case of Hungary shows that new member states face the problem of 
overlapping (and sometimes even conflicting) reform programmes. There is a 
certain overlap between the NRPs and some other documents that were prepared 
previously, because they cover a lot of aspects that were already present in other 
programmes or plans and have overlapping time frames.
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For example, in Hungary some of the priorities and planned measures of the 
NRP were already drawn up in a period when the catching-up process of the 
economy and macroeconomic stabilisation were high ranking priorities. These 
goals were drawn up in two strategic documents, the National Strategic 
Reference Framework (NSRF) that identified main development objectives and 
was a basis for the efficient use of EU and domestic financial resources, and the 
Convergence Programme (CP), the fulfilment of which was crucial for 
preparing the ground for the introduction of the euro.
The objectives of the above-mentioned documents overlapped to a certain 
extent with the Lisbon objectives. In some areas they could create synergy 
which could help with the realisation of objectives, but in some aspects they 
even contradicted each other. All three programmes take into account the actual 
situation and the mid-term prospects of the economy. However, the 
Convergence Programme is quite different to the other two programmes, but it 
could have the effect of strengthening the other two programmes (the successful 
public sector reform and the reform of territorial units could also help make the 
use of EU funds more efficient, and thus stimulate the business environment, to 
change towards the Lisbon goals).
At the same time, the NRP contributes to introducing “continuous planning”. 
Different programmes are built on each other, and provide several reference 
points and benchmarks in order to check their success. This is valid not only for 
Hungary, but for all the new and future EU members, which passed the 
transitional experience where “planning” had a negative connotation for a 
certain period in the 1990s, and was again positively perceived at the end of that 
decade, due to the prospect and the pre-conditions ofEU accession.
The experience of Hungary shows that, although the Lisbon objectives are 
important to the country, the primary objective remains the most efficient use of 
development transfers (the task of the NSRF) and stabilisation of public 
finances (CP). Until there are no conflicts between the NRP and the two other 
programmes, the NRP objectives will probably be consistently followed. 
However, it seems that the NRP will not be the one that matters most, meaning 
that it could be expected that the Lisbon Agenda is not an issue that will have the 
highest priority (Szemler).
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THE LISBON STRATEGY
AS A CHALLENGE FOR THE NEW CANDIDATES
The Lisbon Strategy objectives are relevant for candidate countries during the 
pre-accession stage. It was also the case with former candidates of the fifth 
enlargement, remembering the fact that the Barcelona Summit. (2002) already 
highlighted the Lisbon Strategy “as an incentive fo r  candidate countries to 
adopt and implement key economic and social environment objectives as a two­
way learning process”1. However, the negotiations within the fifth round of 
enlargement were completed in time before the mid-term review of the Lisbon 
Strategy, meaning that the importance of the whole Lisbon Process was not so 
stressed even within the old member states.
The relevance of the Lisbon Agenda for the Western Balkan countries became 
an issue in 2006. Three years after the Thessaloniki Summit, progress in 
implementing the Thessaloniki instruments was evaluated and certain new 
issues were introduced. The Lisbon Agenda was one of them, as it was clearly 
stated that “ ... its objectives are also relevant fo r  the Western Balkans. The 
region should be involved gradually to achieving these objectives, taking into 
account the level o f  development o f  the economies and the individual stage o f  
rapprochement to the EU. The Lisbon objectives will not constitute additional 
criteria or economic objectives, but the Commission will ensure that its policies 
towards the region also reflect Lisbon activities that can be considered priorities 
under the European/Accession Partnerships. The Western Balkan countries 
should thus start taking into account the Union's Lisbon objectives in their 
reforms” (European Commission, 2006a, p.7).
The Lisbon objectives became even more important in the negotiations 
process due to the fact that these objectives are deeply embedded in many EU 
policies and thus represent an overall horizontal policy for adjustment. They are 
not an obligation or new criteria, but many of the instruments of the Lisbon 
Strategy are a reference point during screening in many areas. Furthermore, it 
was for the first time that the Lisbon Agenda, as a horizontal policy, was 
introduced into the screening process for Croatia and Turkey3. The strategy is 
being implemented in partnership between the EU institutions and the member 
states, while the candidates are involved in various consultative mechanisms 
during the pre-accession stage.
2. Presidency Conclusions, Barcelona European Council, 15 and 16 March 2002.
3. Multilateral Screening on Lisbon Strategy was held for Croatia and Turkey in Brussels, 23 July 
2006. It covered policy aims and instruments for implementing the Lisbon goals.
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Figure 1: Revised Lisbon Strategy and candidate countries
Naturally, the countries that are involved in the screening process or have 
started negotiations have more possibilities and better chances to introduce the 
Lisbon goals into their policies and thus to approach the envisaged targets more 
effectively. This is due to the fact that they are involved in different kinds of 
(economic and other) consultation mechanisms that are, among other things, a 
process o f learning. At the moment this is the case with Croatia and Turkey. The 
other present and potential candidates (Macedonia and the remaining SAP 
countries) are gradually introducing the Lisbon goals in the areas covered by 
European partnerships, at a speed that is in accordance with their own needs and 
possibilities.
Based on the experiences of new member countries, a recommendation for 
candidate countries is to take into account the Lisbon Process in the preparation 
of their reform programme. During the process of harmonising their economies 
to EU requirements, countries in transition like Croatia should aim towards the 
economic models and solutions that have to be implemented in current EU 
member states in order to restore the vitality of their economies. This, however, 
does mean that candidates should avoid simple imitating the economic policy 
solutions developed and still present in many EU member states. They should
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rather combine the Lisbon experiences with the reform framework they have to 
undertake. There are good examples in some old (Ireland, after 1986) and new 
EU member states (Slovakia after Meciar, or the Baltic countries) that 
implemented deep reforms which were usually difficult at the beginning but 
proved fruitful in the long run. These states, already EU members or aiming to 
achieve it, put efforts into creating flexible and entrepreneurship-friendly 
economies with a limited role of the government. The Lisbon Process, while not 
ideal in its essence and method, can be used as a stimulus for such a policy. 
However, the effectiveness of the Lisbon Strategy cannot be overestimated, 
because the most important economic reforms have to be accepted and 
implemented at the national level, not the EU one {Radio).
THE LISBON STRATEGY AND CROATIA
Croatia has the status of EU candidate and negotiating country. Reaching the 
level of internal readiness for EU integration by the end of 2007 and full 
membership in 2009 is a target of the Croatian Government.
To summarise, Croatia applied for EU membership in February 2003 and 
received positive avis in April 2004. The main findings of the avis (European 
Commission, 2004) underlined that Croatia was a functioning democracy with 
stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, and had a functioning market 
economy which should be able to cope with competitive pressure within the 
Union in the medium term, with a precondition that it continues implementing 
reforms. It was noted that Croatia should be in a position to undertake the other 
obligations of membership in the medium term, if  considerable efforts are made 
to align its legislation with the acquis and ensure implementation and 
enforcement4. The avis was accompanied by a European Partnership for Croatia 
which identified the short- and medium-term priorities during the preparation 
for accession. In June 2004, the European Council confirmed Croatia as having 
candidate status for EU membership and made a decision on opening 
negotiations on full membership in due time. The pre-accession strategy for 
Croatia (October 2004) opened the door for access to pre-accession funds in 
2005. The European Council (June 2005) adopted the negotiation framework
4. Similar statement was repeted in the Progress Reports for Croatia published by European 
Commission in the years that followed.
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with Croatia while negotiations were opened at the intergovernmental 
conference in Brussels on 4 November 2004. By November 2006, the 
multilateral and bilateral screening was completed and one chapter (Science and 
Research) was opened and provisionally closed.
As a candidate country for EU accession, Croatia has already undergone 
comprehensive and demanding reforms. Implementing the Lisbon Strategy and 
its goals for Croatia is of at least three-fold advantage. It means overcoming 
transition hardships, assisting in meeting Copenhagen accession criteria, and 
catching up with the EU competitiveness level that would bring long-term 
prosperity. Therefore, upgrading of its engagement in all activities related to the 
Lisbon Agenda is needed. It will not be a process of sequencing, but rather a 
parallel process to our accession negotiations. This includes embarking on the 
Lisbon implementation even before Croatia becomes an EU member, though it 
is not expected to constitute additional criteria or economic objectives for 
accession.
All candidate countries face the unique opportunity to combine their efforts to 
meet the Copenhagen economic criteria in full with their efforts to meet the 
goals of the Lisbon Agenda. In this interrelated endeavour they have 
substantially increased their interest, contribution and understanding of the 
Lisbon Process. It is no longerjust the business of member states - it is becoming 
a substantial part of the economic policy of the candidate countries themselves 
(Mimica).
The strategic approach
Being a candidate country, Croatia does not share the same responsibilities 
regarding the Lisbon Strategy objectives as the EU member states. However, by 
entering into negotiations on full membership with the EU, Croatia committed 
itself to accepting the acquis communautaire, but also to harmonising policies 
with EU programmes and strategic documents. Croatia is therefore facing the 
challenge of (voluntarily) approaching the Lisbon goals together with the basic 
obligation to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, although both challenges are not an 
obligation at this stage5.
As was already mentioned, the acquis under the Lisbon Strategy consists 
largely of policy principles and policy recommendations which are reflected in
5. Unless otherwise stated, the continuation of this paper brings the main issues underlined in the 
conference presentation by Visnja Samardzija, which have not been presented in a separate 
paper in this publication for technical reasons.
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communications, recommendations and other sources of “soft law ”. It is also 
the subject of consultation fora and exchange of good practice measures. The 
screening process highlighted some of the areas in which Croatia should start 
with preparations to implement Lisbon Strategy goals. Primarily these “soft” 
obligations start with the need to adopt horizontally the Lisbon Agenda 
instruments, in order to be able to implement policy measures practically.
At the beginning, it means introducing the Lisbon principles into the country's 
strategic documents. Different to many new member states or acceding 
countries, Croatia did not prepare “in advance” an action programme to 
implement the Lisbon Strategy goals in the period before membership was 
achieved6. However, some of the aims and the activities leading to its 
implementation have been introduced in different strategic documents that were 
prepared during previous years, after 20 007.
The most recent Croatian Government strategic document prepared by the 
Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU Funds 
(CODEF), the Strategic Development Framework 2006-2013* to a great extent 
introduced Lisbon goals. The document starts from the assumption that 
economic openness, competitiveness, change in the traditional role of the state, 
inclusion of all social strata in the results of economic growth and prosperity are 
basic premises for the completion of Croatia's main strategic goal in the next 
seven years: growth and employment in a competitive market economy acting 
within a European welfare state9. This strategic goal, according to the document 
mentioned, is envisaged to be achieved through harmonised and simultaneous
6. There are many examples among new member states showing that the initial Lisbon Strategy 
action plans were prepared in the pre-accession stage, either by the government bodies (Slo­
venia) ornon-govemmental organisations (Romania).
7. For example, the Croatian Government prepared a number of sectoral strategic documents 
under the common title “Croatia in the 21st Century”, and some of them are very much in line 
with Lisbon goals. This particularly relates to strategy covering science and research, which 
approaches the issues of the knowledge-based society, and catching up with innovation andnew 
technologies (Croatian Government, 2003). Key Lisbon goals are introduced in 55 recommen­
dations of the National Competitiveness Council, covering all the areas relevant for raising the 
level of competitiveness in Croatia, including education, innovation and technology develop­
ment, strengthening of SMEs, creating leadership, etc. (National Competitiveness Council, 
2004).
8. The Strategic Development Framework 2006-2013 was adopted at the government session on 3 
August 2006.
9. The government expects that successful implementation of the Strategic Development Fra­
mework 2006-2013 might result in the increased GDP growth rate of about 5% in the period 
until 2010 and above 7% after 2010. In 2013, average income per capita is expected to reach 
75% of the EU average (measured by GDP per capita according to PPP).
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action in ten strategic areas. These are: people; knowledge and education; 
infrastructure; information inter-connectedness; social cohesion; macroeco­
nomic stability; an efficient financial market; sustainable development; and 
uniform regional development, accompanied by the new role of the state 
transformed into an efficient and effective service acting for its citizens and 
entrepreneurs. Each strategic area identified specific goals as well as measures 
and actions to be undertaken. This document is part and parcel of our pre­
accession commitments. Human resources development is in one of the key 
issues of the Strategy. Therefore, although the primary goal of the Strategic 
Development Framework is not focused on the Lisbon Strategy as such, it will 
be based on its approach and it is to a great extent encompassing its goals and 
methods.
The above-mentioned document is one of the first documents of its kind that 
was prepared in consultation with almost all relevant stakeholders in Croatia 
(government bodies, public institutes, National Competitiveness Council, eco­
nomic and social partners, civil society) and was followed by public debates10.
However, bearing in mind the fact that the document does not have an 
implementation character, there is an urgent need to develop an action plan or 
other implementation instruments with clear obligations, defined responsi­
bilities, deadlines and reporting system, in order to be able to implement it 
successfully and in time. Therefore, it will be necessary to prepare an action plan 
aimed at implementing specific Lisbon reforms. The Croatian Parliament 
announced that it will maintain a high level of public awareness of this matter 
and will hold the government accountable for engaging all relevant stakeholders 
in preparing the future National Reform Programme (Mimica).
It was announced by the government that mechanisms for monitoring the 
implementation of the goals envisaged by the Strategic Development Frame­
work will be defined in a separate document soon. The control mechanisms will 
include benchmarks for measuring the level of implementation of the strategy.
Apart from the above-mentioned new strategy, Croatia has prepared a number 
of other economic policy and strategy documents, such as the National 
Programme ofE U  Integration, the Pre-accession Economic Programme, Nati­
onal Development Programme, Economic and Fiscal Policy Guidelines, etc. 
They are all emerging from or driven by the EU accession process.
10. The Strategic Development Framework 2006-2013 was extensively presented on the Lisbon 
Strategy Conference on 3 May by Martina Dalic, State Secretary in the Central Office for 
Development Strategy and Coordination of EU Funds (CODEF).
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The third Pre-accession Economic Programme (PEP) is under preparation, 
covering the period 2007-200911. The PEP is a document prepared by each can­
didate country with the objective to define the economic policies and reforms 
necessary for European Union accession. Its aim is also to develop the 
institutional and analytical capacity necessary to participate in multilateral 
surveillance procedures of the European Monetary Union (EMU). In this 
context, the PEP is seen by the government as a precursor of the Convergence 
Programmes and of the national reports on economic reforms, which member 
states have to submit on an annual basis.
The current Croatian Pre-accession Economic Programme 2006-2008 
showed that the Croatian economy has achieved a considerable degree of 
macroeconomic stability with low inflation. The PEP was the answer to the 
reform agenda developed within the European/Accession Partnership, focused 
on the most important economic issues, including macroeconomic 
development, public finances, structural reforms and other areas. According to 
it, the expected macroeconomic indicators for 2008 are the following: the GDP 
real growth is expected to rise by 4.3% (3.8% in 2004), GDPper capita reaching 
8.342 euros, while inflation is expected to increase to 2.6% (as compared to 
2.1% in 2004). The public debt is expected to decrease to 47.7% of GDP (51.3% 
in 2005), the budget deficit is expected to be reduced from 4.5% of GDP in 2004 
to 2.9% (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2005).
It shows that the areas in which Croatia is facing difficulties are high budget 
deficit and increasing public debt. At the same time, it is extremely important to 
translate the existing macroeconomic stability into sustainable development of 
the real economy sector, by particularly accentuating faster progress in 
structural reforms, privatisation and restructuring. The result of this should be 
visible in a growing standard of living for Croatian citizens. However, the 
progress in this area is still slow meaning that there is a need for a more efficient 
economic reform programme and its proper implementation.
Implementing Lisbon instruments
The practical way of approaching the Lisbon Strategy goals is through 
participation in its implementing and coordinating mechanisms.
In the economic sphere it means the coordination of economic policy, which in 
the EU is being implemented through the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and
11. The PEP 2007-09 is envisaged to be submitted to the Commission in December 2006.
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Jobs (IGs)12 as well as through the Stability and Growth Pact. The acquis which 
regulates the area of economic coordination and fiscal rules enters into force for 
a country like Croatia with the day of entry into the EU.
The IGs refer to the EU member states only. They include macroeconomic, 
microeconomic and employment guidelines. However, they are relevant for 
Croatia as a candidate country, remembering that some of the issues covered by 
IGs are also underlined (in a less demanding shape) in the Accession Partnership 
for Croatia. IGs are more demanding, but the priorities in the Accession 
Partnership could be understood as a first stage in approaching the IG targets. 
Furthermore, it should be stressed that Croatia is taking part in multilateral and 
bilateral economic dialogues with representatives of the Economic Commission 
and is included in the EC economic prognoses documents (covering EU 
member states and candidates). During the process of negotiations, Croatia has 
to continue with reforms and adopt, still on a non-obligatory basis, some of the 
basic principles covered by the EU macro- and microeconomic integrated 
guidelines.
Therefore it could be said that the macroeconomic guidelines are in some 
areas complementary to both the short- and medium-term economic priorities 
stated in the Accession Partnership for Croatia. More precisely, the Accession 
Partnership could be understood as a preparation for IG implementation. 
Namely, in the short term, Croatia is expected to implement prudent, stability- 
oriented macroeconomic policies, including the development of market-based 
monetary instruments to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy; to 
strengthen fiscal consolidation, in particular in the area of subsidies and social 
spending; and to continue structural reforms.
The microeconomic guidelines are also to a certain extent in relationship with 
the Accession Partnership, bearing in mind that Croatia is expected to accelerate 
and speed up restructuring and privatisation; to further improve the business 
environment, further simplify and accelerate company registration procedures; 
introduce on-line access to selected government facilities for SMEs, further 
develop impact assessments, and continue the implementation of the European 
Charter for Small Enterprises. In the area of the internal market, Croatia is 
expected to make preconditions for the acquis-compliant market structures 
which are the basic step towards the preconditions for a successful entry to the 
internal market, while the microeconomic guidelines are more demanding.
12. The integrated guidelines for the period 2005-2008 were presented by the Commission in 
April 2005, and they brought together the broad economic policy guidelines (BEPG, Treaty 
art. 128) and employment guidelines (EG, Treaty art. 99).
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Regarding employment, according to the Accession Partnership, Croatia has 
first to concentrate on alignment with the acquis in the areas of labour law, 
health and safety, gender equality and anti-discrimination, as well as to 
strengthen administrative and enforcement structures and inter-ministerial 
coordination, while in the medium-term it has to continue labour market and 
education reform with a view to increasing labour force participation and 
employment rates (European Council, 2006, different paragraphs).
Finally, one of the important priorities in the Accession Partnership is the need 
to implement public administration andjudiciary reforms, to promote training 
and to improve human resource management in order to ensure accountability, 
efficiency, openness, transparency, depoliticisation and a high level of 
professionalism in the public service. This is one of the basic preconditions for 
the efficient implementation of the Lisbon Strategy goals.
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC), as a tool for implementing the 
European soft law and Lisbon Strategy in particular, is an instrument relevant for 
Croatia, as a means of spreading best practice and achieving greater 
convergence towards the main EU goals. This method involves fixing 
guidelines combined with specific timetables, benchmarking, sharing best 
practice, periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer reviews and similar 
practices. Various types of consultation mechanisms are present in the 
procedures for developing policies or enacting laws in Croatia. In the procedure 
for preparing new economic laws, the consultation mechanisms are directed 
towards economic associations and trade unions, through the Government 
Economic and Social Committee. Within it, consultations are held with some 
other partners as well, such as chambers, employers' associations, and external 
bodies of the Croatian Parliament.
However, some are of the opinion that social partners are not included in the 
consultation procedures to the extent that they should be, particularly when 
dealing with the social issues which are highly sensitive for citizens. The view 
expressed by the trade unions at the conference underlined that there was a need 
for establishing deeper social dialogue in the process of creating integrated 
policies in Croatia. Investment in economic development needs to be 
accompanied by relevant social instruments. Employment policy should be 
integrated together with education, regional development and other relevant 
policies. Social issues are very much underlined in the Lisbon Agenda and they 
cannot be underestimated when considering national economic reforms. The 
view expressed by the trade unions was that the economic reforms carried out in 
Croatia following the World Rank model do not take into consideration their
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social implications to the extent that is necessary. The economic reform process 
very often demands sacrifices from its citizens and it is necessary to give them a 
clear vision of what the benefits are that they will gain in return {Pezelj13).
Preparations for Croatia's participation in the OMC in the social area are under 
way through the elaboration of the Joint Inclusion Memorandum (JIM). Such a 
document is obligatory for the EU candidates, which have to prepare it before 
the accession with the European Commission14. For Croatia, the JIM is one of 
the activities envisaged in the area of poverty and the reduction of social 
exclusion within the framework of the Accession Partnership. It was finalised in 
October 2006 and should be followed by a concrete action plan. It focuses on 
key challenges related to poverty and the reduction of social exclusion and 
defines key measures Croatia will have to undertake within its social policy. 
Preparation of documents included consultation procedures with a wider team 
of experts through targeted seminars, workshops and conferences15 which were 
also presented to the public.
Another document which is in the process of preparation is Joint Assessment 
Paper (JAP) on employment priorities16. It will present a joint analysis by 
Croatia and the Commission of the key challenges in labour market reform and 
for employment policies, focusing on the need to promote and manage structural 
changes in order to establish flexible and adaptable labour market.
13. Ana Milicevic Pezelj represented the Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia at the 
conference, and gave the presentation in the form of a speech only.
14. The JIM outlines the principal challenges in relation to tackling poverty and social exclusion, 
presents the major policy measures taken in the light of the agreement to start translating the 
EU's common objectives into national policies and identifies the key policy issues for mo­
nitoring and revue. The JIM provided a basis for the new member states to prepare their first 
NAP/inclusion after accession.
15. The TAIEX seminar on the Joint Inclusion Memorandum was organised in Zagreb on 26 June 
2006 while the conference on the occasion of finalising the JIM was held in Zagreb on October 
23 with participation of the representatives of the European Commission.
16. The Joint Assessment Papers on employment priorities (JAPs) was the first step of the co­
operation process on employment that the Commission/Directorate-General for Employment 
and Social Affairs initiated in 1999 with candidate countries. The objective was to ensure that 
candidate countries define employment policies that will prepare them for membership and 
progressively adjust institutions and policies to allow them to fully participate in the EU-wide 
employment policy co-ordination as from accession. It also aimed at ensuring that both the EU 
financial support for accession and the preparations for the implementation of the European 
Social Fund would focus on supporting the identified employment policy priorities.
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Benchmarking
Comparative positioning, updated analysis, prioritisation of goals and 
comparing performance in different key areas and factors that determine 
economic success (benchmarking), as well as exchange of information on best 
practice have crucial importance for strengthening competitiveness. In Croatia 
the activities of collecting and monitoring information for the purpose of 
benchmarking are being developed within the activities of the National Bureau 
of Statistics, as well as within the activities of other relevant bodies, such as the 
National Competitiveness Council (NCC).
The “National Report on Competitiveness” and the “Competitiveness 
Barometer” are examples showing that Croatia has introduced the system of 
benchmarks for some areas which gives the possibility of evaluating its position 
compared to other countries. Croatia has been presented comparatively in the 
“Global Competitiveness Report” since 2003. The NCC regularly reports on the 
comparative position of Croatia as regards other more developed world 
economies and gives recommendations and measures to improve the country's 
position. The “Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007” presented by the 
NCC17 indicates that Croatia has significantly improved its position on the 
global competitiveness scale, and has been shifted from 64th position to 51st, 
among 125 countries. This shows that it has come closer to advanced 
transitional countries (Slovakia is ranked 37, Hungary 41, Poland 48), is ranked 
better than acceding countries (Bulgaria 72, Romania 68) and far beyond the 
SAP countries (which are positioned around 80). In the context of the Lisbon 
Strategy implementation, it is important to stress that Croatia has been 
performing best in three areas - higher education, innovation and technological 
readiness (which are the key Lisbon Agenda priorities), while it is positioned 
below average in the areas of macro-economy, market efficiency, health, 
primary education and institutions. These areas represent the key challenges for 
the next period.
This is the first year that Croatia has been included in the rankings of the IMD 
“World Competitiveness Yearbook”18. According to the IMD report, the main 
competitiveness challenges facing Croatia in 2006 are: the new government role
17. The National Competitiveness Council, as a partner of the World Economic Forum, presents 
the “Global Competitiveness Report” on a yearly basis, including indicators for Croatia. The 
last one (2006-2007) was presented in Zagreb on 27 September 2006.
18. This year the report encompassed 61 countries, and Croatia was ranked in 59th place. Croatia 
is in a group of countries Bulgaria (47th place) and Romania (57th place) that are candidates 
for membership of the European Union, and behind the EU member countries.
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(reform of the judiciary and public administration, reduction of public ex­
penditure, deficit and taxes); strengthening innovation and technological 
development; improving cooperation between R&D institutions and business; 
increasing (public and private) investment in R&D and education; accelerating 
the process of privatisation; and the restructuring of state and local public 
enterprises. They correspond quite well with the Lisbon goals, but also with 
priorities underlined in the government's strategic development document.
Furthermore, Croatia is comparatively positioned through benchmarks in a 
number of recent comparative international studies, such as the “Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor” (GEM, 2006). It shows that Croatia's position has 
risen from 32nd place in 2002 to 19th place in 2005 when measuring several 
composite indicators of entrepreneurship development and competitiveness of 
the enterprise sector.
Another example is the area of education and training. The Commission report 
on progress towards the Lisbon objectives in education and training (European 
Commission, 2006b) gives comparative indicators for 30 European countries 
(EU 15, the acceding countries, candidate countries, and EEA countries). 
Croatia is not comparatively positioned according to all indicators (due to 
insufficient statistics) but is presented in most of the areas. In higher education, 
one of the European benchmarks is that 85% of 22 year-olds in the EU should 
have completed upper secondary education by 2010. A high level of general 
educational attainment among the working population is a prerequisite for a 
dynamic and competitive economy. In this respect, Croatia is highly positioned 
as compared to EU member states. Many of the new member states already 
perform above the EU benchmark set for 2010, while three of them (Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia) have shares over 90%. According to the EU 
report, this is the case of Croatia as well, although the position is not so good 
according to national statistics. In any case, this confirms that significant 
improvement has been achieved, although it opens up the question of the 
compatibility of the statistical methodology applied.
Achievements and challenges
Croatia is making progress in different areas covered by the revised Lisbon 
Strategy, but is still facing many challenges to catch up with the new EU member 
states. Some practical examples that are mentioned in the continuation of the 
paper might give an indication of the positioning of Croatia in approaching the 
Lisbon goals (Boromisa and Samardzija, 2006).
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In accepting the acquis communautaire, Croatia will share the goals 
envisaged in the Lisbon Strategy in numerous communications and action 
plans. One of the areas is raising the level of R&D expenditure in the GDP of the 
country. The European benchmark is 3% of GDP expenditure on R&D, with two 
thirds coming from the private sector. With a level of 1.14% gross expenditure 
on R&D (GERD), Croatia is far below the EU average (1.9%) but not 
significantly lagging behind the new member states, and is well above the 
average of SEE countries. However, instead of two thirds of the expenditure 
coming from the private sector, Croatia has the opposite proportion. The action 
plan aiming to increase expenditure in the R&D sector is under preparation and 
it will set goals complementary to the EU Lisbon goals, but based on Croatian 
possibilities and needs. The goals should be defined based on realistic 
estimations of Croatian potentials and should include all the necessary fiscal and 
other measures that are likely to be needed to achieve them, together with 
mechanisms for monitoring the implementation.
Croatia has established a national innovation system through fostering 
cooperation between science and industry, as well as introducing a wider 
national scientific and technological policy. A number of innovation initiatives 
are under way. In this context, the first innovation policy programme entitled 
“The Croatian Programme for Innovative Technological Development 
(HITRA)” should be mentioned, aimed at building up an efficient national 
innovation system through fostering cooperation between science and industry; 
revitalising industrial R&D; and encouraging commercialisation of research 
results19. However, statistics on innovation hardly exist in Croatia; the country is 
lacking benchmarks in innovation capacities to be positioned comparatively 
with EU countries nor are these included in the innovation databases20.
The Croatian Institute for Technology has recently been established aiming to 
strengthen the “knowledge triangle” - education, research and innovation - with 
the intention of becoming the leading institution in Croatia for creating and 
developing technological policy as a precondition for the growth of the 
knowledge-based society. Its activities are closely linked to the Lisbon Agenda 
goals and harmonised with the future role of the European Institute for 
Technology.
The concept “one-stop-shop” has been introduced already in 2004 as a part of 
the programme HITRO.HR, while the EU set it as a goal to be achieved by 2007.
19. HITRA was initiated by the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports and accepted by the 
Government of Croatia in April 2001.
20. An example of such EU databases is the European Innovation Scoreboard.
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It simplified the administrative procedures for starting a business in Croatia. 
Instead of the several weeks that were previously needed to set up a business, it 
is possible to do this now in one week. HITRO.HR has been developed as a 
government service of wider scope, intended to enable citizens and 
entrepreneurs to get quicker, simpler access to information and services in one 
location.
The better regulation process recently started aims to introduce regulatory 
impact assessments (RIA) into legislative procedures. The intention is to get a 
clear insight into the expected costs and overall impacts of new legal acts, 
particularly those that are being harmonised with the acquis. This is an initial 
step in a long-term process which will lead to better regulation but needs 
strengthened overall efforts to give results. The reform project HITROREZ 
(regulatory guillotine) was launched in 2006 with the aim of analysing and 
simplifying existing legislation, as well as to reducing administrative barriers in 
the business sector. Its final goal is to improve the quality of the existing legal 
framework by reducing and simplifying it.
Croatia is implementing the principles of the EU Charter for Small Enterprises 
and, according to the EU report (European Commission, 2006e), has made the 
most significant progress in the region in achieving the charter's objectives. It 
was ranked in the highest position among eight countries in the following areas: 
education and training for entrepreneurship, cheaper and faster start-up, 
availability of skills, taxation and financial matters, successful e-business 
models and top-class small business support (European Commission, 2006e).
There is a need to further develop the system of collecting and monitoring 
qualitative and quantitative indicators in Croatia in different areas. This system 
should be linked in the future to the EU system of indicators (Eurostat) and will 
enable Croatia to be compared on an equal basis with the EU member states and 
other candidates.
Although the above-mentioned examples are chosen from different areas, 
they show that there is some progress towards implementing the Lisbon goals, 
but the approach and coverage is still not coherent enough. Therefore 
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy remains the challenge for Croatia in the 
accession period.
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CONCLUSIONS
The first phase of implementation of the Lisbon Strategy has not been a success 
due to the lack of political leadership, commitment and ownership on the part of 
member states, but also due to bad governance and lack of prioritisation. It was 
initially intended to improve Europe's economy and boost employment through 
achieving certain objectives, such as creating an internal market for services, 
decreasing administrative burdens, improving human capital, reaching the 
target of raising the level of expenditure on research, development and 
innovation, raising the level of the overall employment rate, etc. Even in the 
areas where Europe has been better performing there is a need for reforms, 
including the European social model. The reforms following the mid-term 
review are expected to lead to improved delivery and better results thanks to the 
more focused objectives, clearer planning and stronger ownership of the process 
in member states.
The experiences and achievements in implementation of the strategy in some 
of the new EU member states show that the situation differs from country to 
country. Their good practice is particularly useful for Croatia.
There are several lessons that could be learnt from Slovenia's case. It is 
important to focus on proper priorities, in spite of pressure from special interests 
and political risks, as well as to involve and ensure full participation of 
interested stakeholders. Furthermore, there is the need to establish the best 
possible communication with citizens and to achieve the best use of the EU, 
through improving the administrative and absorption capacity for EU funds. 
The Czech Republic experience underlines the problem of solving the 
discrepancy between the enormous public tasks ofhigh employment, capacity 
building in health and social services, alleviation of poverty, and strengthening 
social cohesion in the new member states, and their insufficient social, 
economic and administrative implementation capacities. The EU incentives 
regarding institution building and transfer of skills were helpful, but national 
initiatives of the new member states could be seen as an added value to this EU- 
centred effort. The case of Hungary shows that new member states face the 
problem of overlapping (and sometimes even conflicting) reform programmes. 
This relates to the NRPs and some other documents that were prepared 
previously, because they cover a lot of aspects that were already present in other 
programmes or plans and have overlapping time frames.
Although not obligatory, the Lisbon Strategy objectives are relevant for 
Croatia in the pre-accession stage. The strategy does not introduce additional
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EU membership criteria but its objectives will be reflected in the EU's policies 
towards the whole South-East European region in the areas that could be 
considered priorities forthe countries' overall reforms.
Being a candidate country, Croatia does not share the same responsibilities 
regarding the Lisbon Strategy objectives as the EU member states. However, by 
entering into negotiations on EU membership, Croatia committed itself to 
accepting the acquis and to harmonising policies with EU programmes and 
strategic documents. The country is therefore facing the challenge of 
approaching the Lisbon goals together with the basic obligation to fulfil the 
Copenhagen criteria, although both challenges are not an obligation at this 
stage. The screening process highlighted some of the areas in which Croatia 
should start with preparations to implement Lisbon Strategy goals. Primarily 
these “soft” obligations start with the need to horizontally adopt the Lisbon 
instruments, in order to be able to implement policy measures practically. The 
integrated guidelines are also relevant for Croatia as a candidate country, 
remembering that some of the issues covered by IGs are also underlined (in a 
less demanding shape) in the Accession Partnership for Croatia. IGs are more 
demanding, but the priorities of the Accession Partnership could be understood 
as a first stage in approaching the IG targets.
Croatia needs to prioritise the Lisbon goals, bearing in mind the specific 
situation in the country. Its starting position in different areas covered by the 
strategy, and it must realistically assess its own possibilities of implementation. 
Some progress has been made in achieving the Lisbon goals, but this has lacked 
a coherent approach and is insufficient in coverage. It is necessary to raise 
awareness that approaching the Lisbon Strategy goals is crucial not only for 
being able to successfully undertake the obligations of a future member state, 
but also for achieving the Copenhagen criteria and overall implementation of 
reforms. It is also necessary to raise awareness and the level of understanding of 
the Lisbon Agenda implementation mechanisms and their relevance for the 
process of approaching the EU. The strategy will remain the principal reform 
framework for the EU during the period of Croatia's accession, meaning that it 
will lead to raising overall EU standards and thus will make Croatia's adjustment 
to EU requirements even more demanding than was the case with previous 
candidates.
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The Lisbon Strategy: a Framework for Social Reform Agenda in the EU
THE LISBON STRATEGY: A FRAMEWORK FOR 





The Lisbon Strategy so fa r  has not been a success due to the lack o f  political 
leadership and ownership o f  the whole process. The reformsfollowing the mid­
term review in 2005 introduced three-yearplanning, watered-down objectives 
and instruments, and clearer cut orientation with the national reform 
programmes. These new elements hopefully will enable the strategy to produce 
better results. The Lisbon Strategy has often been reduced to “competitiveness ” 
without understanding that deregulation, privatisation and other reforms can 
serve as a successful enginefor growth only ifthe  macroeconomic, social and 
employment conditions are not neglected. Macroeconomic reform is an 
essential component o f  any European-wide efforts towards sustainable growth 
andfull employment. However, structural reforms will only result in morejobs 
and growth i f  improvements on the supply side o f  the economy are being 
matched with similar developments on the side ofthe aggregate demand.
THE LISBON STRATEGY - CHALLENGES AND EXPECTATIONS
The objectives of the Lisbon Strategy uphold the European social model 
reflecting 60 years of common values in making social development one of the 
pillars of sustainable development. The European social systems contain the 
common values of equality and solidarity as well as distribution-equity as 
fundamentals. Thus the difference between the European model and the US 
model is, as the American academic and bestseller author Jeremy Rifkin puts it 
in his book The European Dream (2004): “Public goods and universal,free and 
cheap accessfor all citizens is crucialfor a successful modern economy and a 
fa ir  society. The objective is combining economic performance and competi-
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tiveness with socialjustice despite the differences in the level and quality o f  
protection and implementing instruments”.
Six years have passed since the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 set 
out its strategic goals for Europe: “to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable o f  sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion Sustainable 
growth remains at the heart of the Lisbon Strategy. Its essence is the inter­
dependence of economic, social and environmental progress. Europe's competi­
tiveness in the 21sl century and the nature of European society itself depend upon 
how Europe responds to the three central challenges of the modem global 
economy:
• Globalisation itself, with the pressure of growing competition from both 
industrialised and some developing nations.
• Constant, and accelerating, change - not only in technologies, but in markets, 
in social conditions and in business models.
• Economic and political instability.
Europe's choice is to combine a competitive strategy of excellence, of high 
quality of infrastructure,jobs, public service, welfare system, workforce, labour 
markets, companies and environment.
The Lisbon Agenda is opting for a strategy of innovation and high producti­
vity/good qualityjobs, and not for cutting wages and competing in deteriorating 
working conditions in order to make Europe the most competitive region in the 
world.
The 2005 mid-term review has led to the rebirth of the Lisbon Agenda with its 
economic goal priorities of “growth andjobs” and a new system of governance 
with a special European programme, and also through National Reform 
Programmes drawn up by the member states on the basis of 24 EU guidelines 
about macro- and microeconomic policies and employment. Ownership and 
responsibility are to be strengthened within those member states that have been 
responsible for the poor implementation of the Lisbon Agenda from 2000 to 
2005. The LisbonAgenda contains a catalogue of goals for member states.
Boosting growth and jobs in Europe
The 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact gave back more budget flexi­
bility to governments in order to promote public investments. The clearly 
needed growth and investment which boosts productivity is missing. As 90% of
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EU trade takes place in the European home market, this economic interde­
pendence has to be leveraged for the purpose of stronger economic growth and 
job creation. The economic integration needs coordinated national policy 
measures and also use of all European tools such as the Lisbon Strategy, broad 
economic and employment guidelines and the Stability and Growth Pact. But 
effective economic policy coordination has not yet been achieved despite the 
fact that everybody knows about positive spill-over effects because of economic 
integration and interdependence.
The Lisbon Strategy was launched to reinvigorate Europe's economy and to 
boost employment by especially addressing the following important Lisbon 
goals: the creation of an internal market for services, the reduction of 
administrative burdens, goals on improving human capital, the target of 3% of 
GDP on research and development expenditures, and the 70% target on the 
employment rate in order to achieve an 11% increase in employment and a GDP 
growth by 12% to 23%.
The credibility of European integration is at stake with 19 million unemployed 
and 70 million poor people. European integration was for decades not only a 
success story for the establishment and maintenance of peace but also for 
economic growth and an increase in living standards but this has to gain mo­
mentum as far as investment-led, employment-intensive growth is concerned. 
To meet the target of a 70% employment rate, an average annual growth rate of 
1.5% is needed until 2010 compared to only 0.7% per year growth achieved in 
2000-2003. Demand and supply measures have to be integrated into an 
appropriate policy-mix so that internal demand is becoming more dynamic, thus 
leading to higher investment and consumption.
The European Union's drive for economic modernisation cannot deny the 
interdependence of economic, social and environmental progress and the fact 
that Europe has no future trying to compete as a low-cost producer in a 
globalised world. The source of the Union's competitive edge in the 21st century 
will be excellence, a knowledge-based economy with the participation of all, 
universal access to public goods and services, good universities and research 
centres, efficient public administration, social peace, a high quality of life, a 
highly skilled work force, investment in human resources, life-long learning, 
and dynamic labour markets and companies. A strong social policy is also 
needed, but social policies have not only to be looked upon as an expense factor 
but also to become a productive factor in economic performance. Social policies 
actually not only help to reduce social exclusion but also contribute to a better 
economic performance by increasing the capacity of the economy to adapt
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through investment especially in human resources for economic, social and 
industrial change. Social policies, aside from their redistributive functions, 
allow an efficient combination of flexibility and security in the workplace and in 
the labour market. Even social protection does not undermine competitiveness 
as has been demonstrated by the Nordic countries and the Netherlands holding 
top positions in the World Economic Forum's competitiveness ranking.
The relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy and the mid-term review
The evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy is disappointing: the glass is half empty 
not half full as foreseen by the mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy. The 
Lisbon Strategy so far has not been a success. The lack of political leadership 
and ownership of the whole process is to be blamed. Hopefully the reforms 
following the mid-term review in 2005 will bring about better results because of 
the three-year planning, because of the watered-down objectives and instm- 
ments, because of the clearer cut orientation of the national reform programmes 
on the basis of the 24 guidelines, and the European policies for streamlining, 
concentration and financing. Success will not only depend on the ownership 
question but also on political leadership and economic governance. Success 
depends on how the structural reforms are accompanied by progressive 
macroeconomic policies and not just stability-oriented policy-making 
approaches. Despite the fact that Europe represents 20% of world trade, 30% of 
global GDP and 45% of foreign direct investment (FDI), it does not mobilise 
enough resources to create prosperity in Europe. An appropriate 
macroeconomic investment-led employment-creating policy mix is needed for 
Europe's recovery.
Growth rates currently remain too low and do not correspond to the agreed 
annual GDP growth rate of 3%. Employment rates are stagnating and 
unemployment and poverty are still unacceptably high. The average quality of 
jobs has not been improved and social inequality in Europe has increased not 
only within the enlarged EU because of enlargement but also within the member 
states. Europe has undergone deep structural reforms and put its weight on a 
reduced definition of competitiveness instead of complementing structural 
reforms by coordinated macroeconomic policies bringing an added value. 
Growth, which is needed in order to foster employment and social inclusion, 
cannot, be generated by exports to third countries or by reforms solely. Since the 
degree of exports to third countries is relatively low, especially in Europe's big 
economies like Germany, there is a need for a higher degree of internal demand
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in order to generate growth. Because of a lack of confidence and the feeling of 
insecurity, private investment and consumer demand have been too low, real 
wages decreased, particularly in Germany, and unemployment has not dimi­
nished.
Reforms have to be accompanied by investment and internal demand. Figures 
show that despite reforms in the last years, productivity was half of productivity 
rates in 1990-1996. Europe is also lagging behind the US (Table 1).
Table 1: Comparison of the EU and the US (GDP growth, unemployment and 
inflation; 1994-2003)
EU US




So Europe has homework to do as far as growth is concerned in order to 
safeguard and create more and betterjobs and to secure the social dimension of 
European integration. Economic growth depends on available inputs such as 
investment in human resources, capital investment, as well as growth in 
productivity. Because of ageing societies, economic growth will more and more 
depend on higher productivity and thus also on higher employment rates.
There is, of course, still a long list of reforms Europe has to tackle, from the 
completion of the single market to ICTs penetrating every part of our 
economies. Structural reforms are keys to improving productivity in order to 
stimulate economic growth and prosperity. But, despite reforms, Europe has not 
achieved productivity gains. Europe had a productivity growth of 2.6% from 
1990 to 1995. This figure went down to 1.3% in the period from 1996-2006 
according to Deutsche Bank research. This is difficult to explain. It is clear that 
macroeconomic policy support for structural reforms has been too weak. The 
time for just calling for structural reforms is over. Very rightly the Council 
Conclusions 2005 insist on appropriate macroeconomic policies and improving 




Europe has financial room and labour resources for more investment and 
growth-oriented macroeconomic policies but was not able to design a more 
investment-oriented macroeconomic policy. The “stupid” Stability and Growth 
Pact, as referred to by Mr Prodi in one of his speeches, is now reformed; the lack 
of confidence due to unforeseen sluggish growth, and economic and employ­
ment insecurity were seen as the heart of the problem.
Europe's macroeconomic policy regime is responsible for its actual perfor­
mance. Positive structural reforms are needed but they will only result in more 
jobs and growth if  improvements on the supply side of the economy are being 
matched with similar developments on the side of aggregate demand.
The big and buoyant single market is the indispensable basis for the business 
confidence that generates investment, growth and jobs. It is also a powerful 
advantage in international competition, envied by some of the EU's biggest 
trading competitors, such as the US, Japan, China and India. In current circum­
stances, with the strong euro, the role of domestic demand is becoming even 
more crucial. There is a need to stimulate this demand by boosting investment. 
This relies on strong consumption, which depends in turn on the defence of the 
purchasing power of employees.
Lisbon renewed
The Lisbon Strategy has been renewed. Rightly the mid-term review has de­
monstrated that the strategy had the right complex objectives. Results however 
were missing especially because of the low degree of implementation by 
member states and the lack of ownership and leadership needed. The Lisbon 
Agenda on sustainable growth, full employment and social inclusion wanted to 
increase the competitiveness of Europe. Competitiveness is a key to creating 
and securingjobs and to sustaining the European social model. As the strategy 
has not improved European economic performance and the EU has fallen even 
further in global competitiveness, it is necessary to unlock European potential 
and change the manner in which Europe is pursuing the Lisbon Strategy, to 
become more efficient, more coherent, more concentrated and more decentra­
lised. In the last decade, the EU economy has grown well below its potential, 
with the result that millions of potential jobs have failed to be created. Both 
public and private investments have been inadequate to generate growth. From 
4% of GDP in the early 1970s, gross public investment has fallen to 2.4% in the 
euro area, while private investment has also fallen. New challenges, such as the 
ageing of the population, the growing pressures on the natural environment and
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the growing competition from Japan, China, India and others, means that 
Europe faces more intense pressure than ever before and that it needs to raise its 
game. Investment in physical and human capital is the essential transition 
mechanism from a stabilisation policy to long-term economic growth. Macro­
economic reform is therefore an essential component of any Europe-wide 
efforts towards sustainable growth and full employment.
The assessment rightly calls for increasing the EU's ability to create jobs, 
raising the capacity to grow through more investment in human resources 
especially, and ensuring that Europe is and remains an attractive location for 
employment and investment. The Lisbon Agenda never concentrated unilate­
rally on the economic goals of European integration but always followed a 
combined strategy orientated towards sustainable growth, quality jobs and 
social cohesion. Europe was seen as the answer to the challenges of globa­
lisation not as a part of the problem, and it could thus tame the “globalisers” in 
the markets. In Europe there should be competition between firms and not 
between states. Active public policies are needed in order to procure public 
goods and services but also to generate public revenues in order to invest in 
intelligent policies, modem social protection and social services.
The closest possible partnership between the member states and the Commu­
nity is needed. Commonly adopted objectives and measures like the 24 guide­
lines for growth andjobs have to be followed by the EU but also by the member 
states in their own national reform programmes and in cohesion policies and 
other common policies. The evaluation of the first implementation in autumn
2006 willjudge the capacity of the EU and the member states to achieve sub­
stantial progress and to do better also from a democratic perspective because 
parliaments and civil society will participate in the exercise.
The renewed Strategy for Growth and Jobs calls for enhanced ownership, 
greater coherence, and a stronger focus on growth and employment:
• Enhanced ownership: since the policies addressed by the Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs cut across many areas, it is important to have a clear 
definition of the responsibilities. The member states pursue reforms at the 
national level and present them in their National Reform Programmes. 
Measures taken at Community level, on the other hand, belong to the 
Community Lisbon Programme.
• Greater coherence: the revised Strategy for Growth and Jobs rests on an 
integrated set of guidelines which cover macroeconomic, microeconomic 
and employment policies. These guidelines were adopted by the Council for
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a three-year period last summer. They are the basis on which the member 
states prepare their National Reform Programmes. Actions and policies are 
still too vague and broad, but reporting and the range of actions have been 
rightly reduced.
• Abetter focus on growth andjobs: the new guidelines and the large majority 
of the National Reform Programmes reflect a strong focus on selected key 
actions to promote growth andjobs.
• Three dimensions of NRPs: the National Reform Programmes consist of 
three parts covering macroeconomic, microeconomic and employment 
policies. Macroeconomic issues mainly concern public finances, price 
developments, overall unemployment, and for the countries of the euro area 
and countries wanting to join, the respective stability and convergence 
indicators. Naturally, employment policies deal with all issues related to the 
labour market, including wage formation, pensions and related social issues. 
Microeconomic policies deal with the structural reforms necessary to 
enhance the overall growth potential and competitiveness of the economy in 
the medium and long term.
• Implementation: member states have already started putting into practice 
their programmes. In autumn 2006, they will issue national reports on 
progress made with implementation. The Commission will then assess the 
overall situation in its Annual Progress Report in preparation for the spring 
summit in 2007.
• Key areas for action: the Commission itself identified four key areas for 
action which would deserve priority this year and the following one: know­
ledge and innovation; unlocking business potential, including promoting 
SMEs; response to globalisation and ageing; and common EU energy policy 
and efficient energy market.
These priority action areas will contribute to a successful implementation 
process. The spring summit. 2006 has emphasised the need for more efforts. 
Only two objectives may certainly be achieved by 2010: a higher employment 
rate also for women (as foreseen) and an investment into research and deve­
lopment by 2.6% to 2.7% of GDP (3% foreseen, 1% public investment and 2% 
private investment).
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LISBON STRATEGY AND KEY POLICIES 
Monetary policy is not neutral for growth potential
Monetary policies actually are missing out on an important opportunity. Despite 
the fact that the current oil crisis is not showing the negative side-effects of the 
crisis in the 1970s, interest rates have been raised and will be raised further. The 
possibility of boosting activity andjobs without endangering inflation prospects 
is being neglected. It is worrying that the output gap is not a component of the 
European Central Bank's (ECB) concept of monetary policy because the man­
date of the ECB clearly demands the support of economic policies in the Union 
(Treaty art. 105). At the same time it is up to the member states to pursue an 
annual improvement in their cyclically adjusted budget deficits and ensure 
higher adjustment efforts in an economically prosperous time. As growth in the 
euro area is picking up to its potential some member states are in danger of 
repeating the mistakes of the 1990s and not making sufficient use of “good” 
times to reduce deficits and consolidate further. Also, wage increases should be 
consistent with the trend in productivity over the medium term which will 
stimulate internal demand as an engine of growth.
Lisbon and social policies
For Europeans, the battle to achieve greater productivity is inseparable from the 
battle to ensure fairer distribution of the fruits of growth, greater social cohesion 
and effective protection of the natural environment. It is no coincidence that the 
Nordic countries provide the highest level of social protection and environ­
mental protection. The high public spending this involves has not prevented 
their economies from continuing to improve their world ranking in terms of 
performance and innovation. Europe and also the EU social model(s) need 
reforms as policies are not only an expense factor but also a means to stimulate 
productivity and internal demand. Therefore the social agenda is important for 
the further implementation of the Lisbon Strategy. Europe must not give up its 
ambitious social policies, but should make full use of their potential contribution 
to economic performance and quality of life. Europe must enhance efficiency of 
social policies, eliminate poverty traps and other disincentives to work, must 
invest in developing (education, vocational training), sustaining (health) and 
activating human resources (through active labour market policies) and must 
ensure that the modalities of the financing of social policies contribute to 
employment and growth while maintaining the principle of mutual support and 
intergenerational solidarity. The Lisbon Strategy addressed the need for com­
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prehensive and integrated social and market reforms in order to create a “Europe 
of excellence”. The social dimension of Europe is seen as fundamental to 
citizen's support for the European Union project. In order to avoid social dump­
ing within the European Union clear rules with clear standards have to be 
applied, for example also to the services' sector and the posting of workers. The 
revised Directive on Services and decent levels for minimum wages could help.
Lisbon and employment
In a world of ever more mobile capital, the most durable source of competitive 
advantage is the labour force. Europe's most precious competitive asset is 
therefore a workforce which is well educated and trained, and has the autonomy 
and motivation to respond to constant change. This, and the need to overcome 
the barriers which keep so many Europeans out of the workforce, should be the 
guiding principles of European workplace and labour marketpolicies.
It is not by accident that the Scandinavian countries, which have most aggres­
sively pursued the Lisbon Strategy of social excellence, are now also among the 
EU's highest economic achievers. They have sought to provide the kind of real 
job security that rests on human abilities being kept up-to-date so that they can 
remain and progress in the labour market. Scandinavian governments have 
invested heavily in active labour market and social policies and the skills needed 
for the knowledge economy, including the transfer of skills to older and female 
workers who might otherwise be excluded from the labour market. That way, 
labour markets can evolve, as long as there is healthy social dialogue, systems 
for vocational training andjob matching and a social security system that does 
not leave anybody behind.
There is rare unanimity among economic and political actors and analysts that 
raising Europe's employment rate is one of the most urgent tasks of the Lisbon 
Strategy. To compensate for a declining workforce and ageing population, 
Europe needs to draw on all the resources Europe has. This means, above all, 
addressing the issue of economic inactivity, particularly among elderly workers, 
the unskilled, immigrants and ethnic minorities - so policies against social 
exclusion turn out not to be a hindrance, but a vital element in meeting a core 
Lisbon objective.
The strong link between the employment rate, the social inclusion objective 
and the sustainability of the European model is one of the elements of the Lisbon 
objectives that will help to achieve a 70% employment rate for the year 2015, 
including an employment rate of 60% for women and 50% for elderly workers.
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Modem competitive conditions require a revision of the concept of flexibility. 
In a fast-moving global economy the most successful companies will be the 
most agile. To create a faster-moving European economy - and anew confidence 
among Europe's workforce that change is not a threat but an opportunity - 
requires a modem work organisation and active labour market policies. “Flexi- 
curity”, the Nordic model is a good answer to the challenges. Flexicurity 
describes the particular Danish mix of flexibility and social security.
The model of flexicurity gives the employer the right to hire and fire according 
to need so that dismissal protection is very low. On the other hand the dismissed 
employee gets 80% of their former salary as unemployment benefit and has the 
right and obligation to take part in training. With this model agreed by the 
government and the social partners the Danish unemployment rate dropped 
from 10.2% (1993) to 4% in 2002.
This is a policy strategy attempting to enhance the flexibility of labour 
markets, work organisation and labour relations as well as security - employ­
ment security and social security - notably for weaker groups in and outside the 
labour market. Europe is here at the start of a new departure, given the challen­
ges of globalisation and market developments. The objective is to move from 
job security to employment security.
The role of social protection will be crucial. That is why the 2006 Brussels 
European Council insisted rightly that a high level of social protection was 
central to the Lisbon Strategy and called for the reinforcement of policies to 
combat poverty and social exclusion. This link must be dealt with more in the 
National Reform Programmes of member states.
A workforce for the knowledge economy needs to put education and training 
at the heart of the Lisbon Strategy. Public investment in the knowledge society 
remains insufficient. Options such as better use of EU structural funds and 
education and training funds should be examined. There is also a big gap in 
private funding compared to the private sector in the US which invests five times 
as much in human resources as in the EU. Education is an essential ingredient in 
sustainable growth. Raising average educational attainment by one year repre­
sents a 5% increase in productivity and growth in the short term and a further 
2.5% in the long term. Higher levels of education and training mean better life 
chances, social inclusion, a better job and active citizenship. A sound basic 
education must go hand-in-hand with lifelong learning, accessible to all. Surely 
a “Europe of excellence” is needed but a knowledge-based society must invest 
in education for all.
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Modem economies are characterised by sophisticated technologies, by more 
mobile - and often more short-lived - companies, and by rapid change in the 
knowledge and skills needed. That is why training and qualifications need to 
shift towards the concept oflifelong learning. Member states are not investing 
enough in this important component of competitiveness.
Gender equality is crucial
Gender equality is central to economic growth. The Nordic countries 
demonstrate that investment in social infrastructure goes hand in hand with 
raised competitiveness. It is preposterous to waste the talents and experience of 
half of the population. So the integration of women into the labour market is 
crucial. Europe needs an increased level of employment among both women and 
men. Therefore, very rightly, the Lisbon Strategy points to the need to provide 
for available, affordable, good quality childcare and care of the elderly. The now 
agreed Gender Pact of the EU symbolises a new understanding of this 
perspective which needs more commitment by member states in order to 
improve the reconciliation of professional and family life, to encourage female 
entrepreneurship and to overcome gender segregation in the labour market and 
professional training.
Public goods are needed
Public goods and services are a key element of the European social model. The 
EU Treaty as well as the EU draft constitution pay respect to that engagement. 
Services of general interest (SGIs) and services of general economic interest 
(SGEIs) are fundamental to the universal delivery of public goods such as 
health, education, culture, public transport, water, energy supplies, childcare 
and eldercare to all citizens. It is essential that in reforming the European social 
systems SGIs and SGEIs are respected given their key role not only in delivering 
a better quality of life to citizens, but also in enhancing businesses' capacity for 
efficiency and their access to a healthy and well-educated adaptable labour 
force. A European framework directive is needed.
Taxation and Lisbon
Taxation should serve to generate finances for public goods, services and social 
security and contribute to a fair distribution of wealth and income. Unfair tax 
competition is a threat to the cohesion of the EU. Public finances are reduced 
because of tax erosion and avoidance, and the tax burden is shifted to the least 
mobile factor of production - labour - which is bad for employment, a central
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Lisbon objective. In the “race to the bottom” model of competitiveness tax 
competition is good. But in the Lisbon model, which depends on excellence, on 
a highly educated and skilled workforce, on high quality public services, on 
world class universities - in this model, healthy public finances are an essential 
element, and the erosion of the tax base is a threat which must be tackled. That is 
one reason why the single market needs a coordinated approach to corporate 
taxation and a progressive coordination of corporate tax bases, leading eventu­
ally to an approximation of European corporate tax rates - possibly following the 
model ofVAT and excise duties' coordination, introducing minimum tax rates.
Relating funds to the renewed Lisbon Strategy is necessary, but there has to be 
a balance between political objectives and structural funds spending. Fair 
taxation policies in the EU are also necessary to finance public goods and ser­
vices and social security. “Beggar-thy-neighbour” policies in the field of tax­
ation have no place in the single market.
Social dialogue and modern decision-making
Social dialogue is an essential element in the traditions of the member states and 
the European Union. Any successful reform of the social systems needs invol­
vement of all stakeholders, in particular the social partners and civil society. The 
development of a greater role for the trilogue at European level is necessary. 
Those policies should be echoed by active EU policies concerning corporate 
governance.
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
Europe has an economy and a social and environmental model which is among 
the best and stands comparison with any in the world. But Europe needs to do 
better. Europe still lags behind not only in economic growth, but also in employ­
ment levels and some key indicators of economic dynamism, such as rates of 
innovation cohesion.
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), completed in 1999, displays a 
novel and sui generis economic policy framework, but the proper functioning of 
EMU still requires a well-developed economic coordination framework in 
Europe. Since 1993, the Council has annually adopted Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPGs), on the basis of a Commission recommendation. The 
BEPGs are at the heart of the economic coordination process. The BEPGs are 
politically but not legally binding; no sanction mechanisms are foreseen.
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Compliance is voluntary and based on peer pressure. The BEPGs must be given 
the same legislative status as the employment guidelines with formal partici­
pation in the decision-making of the Parliament and the Commission in order to 
reach a common position on macroeconomic decision-making at least between 
these three EU institutions.
It must be stressed at the outset that in the EU and EMU “economic policy 
coordination” encompasses an entire spectrum of interactions among policy 
actors, including monetary and fiscal actors. The range of methods used 
includes directives, community programmes, information exchange, discussion 
of best practices, policy dialogue, peer review as well as commonly agreed 
policy rules and objectives andjointly determined actions. Nevertheless the mix 
of policy instruments is different in each policy field: the single market policy is 
more based on directives, the research policy on a Community programme, and 
the social protection policy on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). 
Priority should now go to improving the consistency and synergy of the instm- 
mentmix in each policy field.
The OMC has been introduced in 11 policy fields. It is also important to 
improve the coordination of the policies included in the Lisbon Strategy at both 
European and national levels. Nevertheless, with the exception of binding rules 
on deficits, macroeconomic coordination within the euro area is still generally 
based on dialogue and consensus. Coordination is needed to take account of 
economic interdependence and direct cross-border spill-over of national polici­
es onto neighbouring countries and onto the worldwide economy.
Economic coordination and governance is needed more than ever in order to 
stimulate positive spill-over effects from state to state, from region to region. 
There are instruments for economic governance like the Stability and Growth 
Pact, the BEPGs and the Employment Guidelines (EGs). Since 1994 the 
Maastricht Treaty offers good conditions for economic governance. But the only 
institutional innovation is the macroeconomic dialogue on the political and 
technical level (Cologne Summit. 1996) which has been from the start a failed 
opportunity because the monetary policy is the only supranationalised EU 
policy that does not participate in an ex-a«te-coordination. The ECB rejected 
any progress of governance in order to defend its independence.
Too often the Lisbon Strategy has been reduced to “competitiveness” without 
understanding that deregulation, privatisation and other reforms can only be a 
successful engine for growth if the macroeconomic, social and employment 
conditions for dynamic growth are not neglected. Pure supply-side measures of
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a modernisation strategy are not helpful. A sound and balanced appropriate 
policy mix is needed taking into account supply- and demand-orientations.
The so-called “Europe of excellence” calls for social and ecological sustain­
able growth, qualitative growth and coordination of policies in order to gua­
rantee betterjobs and quality of life, but it also needs structural reforms to be 
accompanied by quick and smart growth-oriented measures.
The new cycle of economic governance is based on a three-year cycle starting 
in 2005 and has to be renewed in 2008. The intergovernmental policies combine 
the former BEPGs and the Employment Guidelines (EGs) and include the 
following policy areas:
• Macroeconomic priorities, describing the policy responses to the macroeco­
nomic challenges which have been identified by member states. This part 
will cover the issues that are discussed in more detail in the stability and 
convergence programmes which will be submitted in the autumn in parallel 
with the national progress reports as a separate document.
• Microeconomic priorities describing the policy responses to the microeco­
nomic challenges which have been identified by member states. This part 
replaces the earlier Cardiff reports.
• Employment priorities describing the policy response under the employment 
challenges which have been identified by member states. This part replaces 
the existing national employment action plan.
Based on these guidelines, which should encompass the economic, social and 
environmental dimensions, member states will draw up their National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs), which should be conceived as forward-looking political 
documents setting out their three-year strategy to deliver growth andjobs. These 
programmes will also allow the Commission to assess the policies and progress 
identified by member states. On the basis of the assessment of the NRPs, the 
Commission will in January adopt its Annual Progress Report and may propose 
updates to the integrated guidelines and possibly country-specific recommen­
dations as the basis for the continuation of the cycle.
In this context the procedural changes introduced by the Commission to 
economic and employment policy coordination, by making it mid-term oriented 
and mutually supportive are helpful but should be further enhanced by more 
concrete country and sector-specific recommendations and by aggregating 
fiscal policies and supply policies.
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Consideration should also be given to the problem of transparency and 
broader participation in the decision-making process for economic coordination 
and employment policy (policy mix) at national and European level. It is 
necessary that through more systematic involvement of national parliaments 
and social partners the parliaments and civil society fully participate in the 
further development of the integrated guidelines package and national progress 
reports.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper leads to the following main conclusions:
(i) The Lisbon Process should aim to reach its ambitious objectives in the 
economic, social and sustainability dimensions through a strategy of inno­
vation and by investing in a knowledge society.
(ii) All attempts to narrow the Lisbon Agenda to the sole pillar of competiti­
veness and to forget about the social and environmental dimension should 
be rejected. European integration is based on the social market economy, 
competition and solidarity, economic and social cohesion. European 
integration is not about competition between member states. The Lisbon 
Strategy is not a pure market strategy.
(iii) The Lisbon Strategy needs further progress in the European internal mar­
ket. Better regulation is needed with social minimum standards. The latest 
example is the Directive on Services. A single market cannot, be realised 
without strict conditions.
(iv) Agrowth-friendly investment-led and employment intensive macroecono­
mic policy regime is needed. Efforts have to be organised. To repeat an old 
idea from the 1990s: 1% of GDP EU-wide should be spent on a European 
growth and employment pact in addition to national initiatives in order to 
bring the European economy to the fore. The poor outcomes have nothing 
to do with structural weakness and rigidities which existed in Europe when 
growth was good and reaching between 2.5% and 3% (1995-2000). The 
investment plan should not only focus on infrastructure in general but also 
on investment in social infrastructure from lifelong learning to childcare 
and care for the elderly, a special plan on gender.
(v) Increasing ownership of the Lisbon Agenda does not only address the 
European institutions and the governments of the member states. The
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participation of all parliaments at all levels, of social partners and of civil 
society is needed in order to contribute to democratic structures and 
credibility.
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The paper analyses problems o f the Lisbon Strategy by dealing with different 
aspects o f that topic. It analyses basic aspects ofthe present economic problems 
in the European Union and reviews the outline o f the Lisbon Strategy adopted in 
2000 and corrected in 2005. It further looks into results which have been 
obtained at the level o f  the European Community and also o f the member states. 
Finally the paper proposes some alternative paths that could be envisaged. The 
diagnosis o f  the Lisbon Strategy regarding the situation o f the European 
economy is correct. Nevertheless, the message o f the European institutions is 
unbalanced, because it seems that only the “black scenario ” is used in commu­
nicating the Lisbon Strategy to the public. The action programme o f the Lisbon 
Strategy is insufficient since its means are too limited. Furthermore, targets on 
non-economic aspects have been dropped, while initiatives at the Community 
level are not developed enough. There is an urgent need to reintegrate social and 
environmental objectives in the Lisbon Strategy.
INTRODUCTION
The Lisbon Strategy is an important topic for two main reasons. These reasons in 
themselves form a paradox. Firstly, for the first time in the history of European 
integration, we have a European project which is clearly not only an economic 
project but also a society project. The common market in the 1960s was mainly 
an economic project, same as the single market in the 1980s and the single 
currency in the 1990s. The Lisbon Strategy is much broader in scope. This is 
made obvious by the variety of the themes covered and the policies envisaged. 
Secondly, this highly ambitious project has been until now the least successful
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of the European projects in decades. Certainly, it has not had the expected 
mobilising effect on society.
In fact, the basic design of the Lisbon Strategy has always been contradictory. 
Basically, it arose from a will to make Europe more popular, but the way it was 
done has not led to success in this. In fact, there was a mistake in the original 
design, and it has been compounded later by a second mistake in 
communication. The diagnosis at the basis of the Lisbon Strategy was, in my 
opinion, quite clever. It stated that the programme of action was unbalanced, and 
that the communication was worse.
The defects of the Lisbon Strategy have, in my opinion, a direct link with the 
growing unpopularity of the European institutions. This unpopularity was 
confirmed in 2005 by two negative referendum procedures in two member 
states traditionally in favour of European integration. Consequently, this 
presentation has a direct link, not with the way countries can win a referendum, 
but with the way countries can lose a referendum. The extent of the problem is 
revealed by the fact that a lot of European politicians precisely do not see this 
link.
To give a proper analysis of the problem, it is necessary to deal progressively 
with the different aspects of the topic. We shall thus see: a few basic aspects of 
the present economic problems of the European Union; the outline of the 
strategy adopted in Lisbon in 2000 and corrected partly in 2005; the results 
which have been obtained at the level of the European Community and also of 
the member states; and finally some alternative paths that could be envisaged.
THE PROBLEM: THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF EUROPE 
The dawn of a new era
It is easy, in these times of exacerbated marketing, to overemphasise the changes 
in our economic system. Nonetheless, one can only be struck by the depth and 
the scope of these recent changes. Essentially, we face the combination of two 
phenomena: the information society and globalisation. Their combination tends 
to increase their repercussions, and accelerate the trend. We are thus entering 
into a new economic era, largely different from what we have known so far.
It is important to have an idea of the scope of this mutation. This is not a 
revolution, in the sense that our world does not change in one night. On the other 
hand, it is a permanent pressure, which guarantees very important changes over
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ten years. Let's take a look at the information society. In the sector of information 
and communications technologies (ICT), one has seen an increase in produc­
tivity o f400% over ten years. This means that you must either reduce personnel 
by 75% or keep personnel and increase the volume of production by 400% 
(which means developing a lot of new products and services). Now let's take a 
look at globalisation. It has been estimated that the US will outsource 4 million 
jobs to the developing countries in the next five years. This represents a lot of ré­
adaptation for a lot of people (OECD, 2005; Levy and Mumane, 2004).
One of the strengths of the Lisbon Strategy is precisely its analytical subtlety. 
It underlines the depth of the present economic mutation, the structural nature of 
many evolutions. To cope with the challenges that I havejust mentioned, we will 
need a lot of new products, new services and new capabilities. These capabilities 
are the most crucial element. Without them, we shall not have the new products 
and services. The present changes rely on short-term and long-term cycles, of 
course, but also on heavy structural evolution. The solutions cannot be based 
only on macroeconomic measures. This explains the accent on the emergence of 
the information economy and the knowledge society. From this point of view, 
one can only admire the technical preparation of the Lisbon Strategy 
(Rodrigues, 2003).
Two possible presentations
This being said, one can only be struck by the darkness of the public commu­
nication related to the Lisbon Strategy. Of course, the present economic 
situation presents challenges. But is the situation so catastrophic? There are 
permanent gloomy comparisons with the United States. Do we live in such a 
poor, dependent, arthritic continent? In fact, there are (at least) two ways to 
present the current reality of Europe. One could imagine the shooting of two 
movies. One movie has a “black scenario”. The other one has a “pink scenario”. 
My suggestion is that the reality probably lies in the middle.
The black scenario
The black scenario can be summarised in a few elements:
Old age
First, we are becoming a grey society. This is a worrying trend, in the sense that, 
being demographic, it cannot be corrected for at least a generation. Our 
European countries are composed of more and more old people for (at least) two 
reasons: average life expectancy is increasing continuously and average fertility
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has fallen below replacement levels so that natural population growth has now 
turned negative. This constitutes a real challenge for our social protection 
systems, more specifically for the pension and healthcare systems. Indeed, an 
increasing proportion of elderly people implies permanent increases in pension 
and health expenditure.
There are discrepancies. In France, for example, the trend is more limited. But 
in other countries, the population is purely and simply decreasing very quickly, 
because migration strongly accentuates the tendency. Thus, in 2004, the French 
population increased by 6/1000, but Hungary decreased by nearly 2/1000, 
Estonia by 3/1000, and Lithuania by 6/1000 (Eurostat, 2005). In synthesis, there 
is more or less no population growth in Europe, and 80% of any growth is based 
on immigration. This is absolutely essential when one compares the various 
growth percentages in the world.
Old productions
Second, new competitors, strong and quickly growing, such as China and India, 
have appeared. These emerging economic powers have more and more 
influence. In a few years, China could become the second biggest economy in 
the world. In many sectors, it has already become the first exporter. The EU 
textile and clothing sector (especially clothing) has become a symbol of this 
evolution. For clothing, between 2001 and 2004 in the EU, imports increased by 
9% on a yearly basis, and exports decreased by 5.4%. During the same period, 
the share of China in EU textile imports increased by 43.6%, and in EU clothing 
imports by 37.6%. Finally, in one single year, between 2003 and 2004, the 
amount of jobs in the EU textile and clothing sector decreased by 7.4%.
EU enterprises (and more particularly those of the old member states) are thus 
obliged to adjust. They need to develop new products and cut their costs 
otherwise they risk running out of business. This is particularly true in sectors 
that are dominated by price competition.
Long-term unemployment
Unemployment remains too high - and too long - in many places especially for 
low qualified people. In the European Union, “in 2004 the inactive population of 
working age (15-64) in the EU-25, i.e. those that are neither working nor 
actively seeking and immediately available for work, amounted to some 92 
million people, corresponding to an average inactivity rate (the residual of the 
activity rate) of 30.3%” (ECC, 2005). This is very far from glorious.
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Weak adaptation to ICT
Adaptation to the information society remains so far too limited in the countries 
of the European Union. From this point of view, it is interesting to notice that a 
good deal of limited productivity increases are linked to a very timid 
introduction of ICT in EU corporations (Gros, 2005). This seems connected to 
the weightier difficulty of introducing organisational changes in EU 
corporations (ECC, 2005).
On the basis of these elements, there thus exists a fear that Europe will become 
a sort of museum for the economic experiences of the past. One could conclude 
that the countries which launched the Industrial Revolution do not know any 
more how to manage the next one. And this engenders the fear that Europe will 
become a sort of “Jurassic Europe”.
The pink scenario
This said, there is another way to present the reality of the European economy. 
This more hopeful way could be called “the pink scenario”. It reveals that things 
are not that dramatic. Indeed, in the present economic situation of Europe we can 
find positive elements (see Highlights from the Centre for European Reform 
Conference on the Future of the European Economy, 2005; Buhigas and 
Bouzon, 2005). This is particularly true in a more in-depth comparison with the 
US. Ageneral negative comparison with the US has indeed become the motto of 
all official presentations of the Lisbon Strategy.
Growth per working hour is not that bad
It has often been said that growth has been stronger in the United States, and that 
is true. But which growth are we speaking about? During the last census in the 
United States, millions of people who had not been officially registered have 
suddenly been discovered. In fact, there has been a strong population growth in 
the United States, which explains a good part of the economic growth. When we 
compare the growth per inhabitant, the difference between the two zones (EU 
andUS) diminishes strongly.
This difference becomes still smaller if we take into consideration working 
hours on a yearly basis. From this point of view, the difference between 
Europeans and Americans is striking (Blanchard, 2005).
Finally, we could also speak about productivity. In this case, we need to take 
into consideration multifactor productivity. From this point of view, according 
to the OECD Factbook 2006, there are much more important differences within 
the European Union than between the EU and the US. French people, for 
example, would be very surprised to learn that between 1991 and 2003 there has
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been absolutely no difference at all between France and the United States. This 
is certainly not what you can presently hear in the French media.
The debt situation is not that bad
Even if we accepted the idea that growth is substantially higher in the United 
States, we must compare comparable things. The American growth has been fed 
by an orgy of debt. Regarding the public debt, deficit went from +1.6% to -4.6% 
between 2000 and 2004. Domestic saving is now more or less at 0%, which is 
rather low. The current payments deficit in the same period (2000-2004) went 
from 4.26% to 5.72% or even 6% of GNP, and is still growing (Truman, 2005). 
With such financial firepower, one needs to be very clumsy not to provoke some 
kind of additional growth. From that perspective, what is amazing indeed is that 
the difference between the US and the EU is not stronger.
We have survived a strong petrol shock
One must also not forget that the price of petrol has tremendously increased in 
the period 2004-2006. Between 2001 and 2005, the nominal oil price went from 
$18 to $68. Of course, the real increase is a little bit more limited. Nevertheless, 
this created very heavy pressure on businesses. It is noteworthy that EU growth 
was not strongly reduced.
The environmental situation has improved
Finally, one must see that the EU corporations have to take into consideration 
quite a heavy load of environmental regulations. By this, I do not mean to 
contest these regulations in anyway, as they are absolutely necessary to improve 
prospects for sustainable development. Nevertheless, being a lighthouse can 
cost a lot, and to appreciate the extent of EU competitiveness, we must also take 
that into consideration.
We can find another element of comparison from that point of view in the price 
of oil. The level of taxes on oil consumption is on average ten times higher in the 
countries of the euro zone than in the United States. This explains why energy 
intensity of production is higher in Europe. This is also a competitive 
disadvantage.
Conclusion
With regard to the analysis we have just made through the black and pink 
scenario of the present economic situation of Europe, one can conclude that, on 
the one hand, the Lisbon Strategy goes in the right direction at least at the level of 
its diagnosis which is strong and which brings an added value. We are clearly
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going towards a new information economy, which leads us surely to another 
society: the knowledge-based society. This situation requires structural changes 
and these structural changes call for structural initiatives. So it is crystal clear 
that various reforms have to be implemented.
On the other hand, however, we have seen that the present economic situation 
of Europe has positive and negative aspects. Nevertheless, it seems that only the 
black scenario is used to sell the Lisbon Strategy to the public. It considers that 
Europe had only disadvantages in comparison with the US. This is, in my 
opinion, simply not true.
This permanently black description of the present economic situation of 
Europe has a negative effect. It intensifies the neurasthenic character of public 
opinion. You know like me that people are often worried (see the polls before 
referenda). That is why the “European speech” should offer a perspective, and 
not only compound the problem!
THE ANSWER: THE LISBON STRATEGY
On this part, we can be quicker. Firstly, the Lisbon Strategy process in itself is a 
well-known topic. Secondly, it is better to focus on the most important problems 
andnotto lose ourselves in bureaucratic details.
In fact, there are two versions of the Lisbon Strategy: the original version and 
the revised version. The original version was adopted at the European Council in 
2000 with much hype. The revised version, presented as a more humble one, was 
adopted in 2005 (Bailly, 2005). Unfortunately, in my opinion, the revised 
version is worse than the original one.
The original version (2000)
What was basically the original version of the Lisbon Strategy?
First, various objectives were defined: economic, social and environmental. 
They aim at creating an “information society for all”. The economic objective 
implies the creation of a research and innovation area, the achievement of the 
internal market and the coordination of the macroeconomic policies. The social 
objective aims at investing in training and education and at leading an active 
policy for employment, including the prolongation of professional activity, the 
modernisation of social protection and the fighting of exclusion. In addition, it 
has been declared that the change to the knowledge-based society must be done
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on the basis of the European social model (EPC, 2004). The environmental 
objective aims mainly at tackling climatic change and at dissociating economic 
growth from the use of resources.
One needs to measure the depth of these ambitions. Never in the history of 
European integration since the 1950s had the European institutions committed 
themselves to so many deep reforms. The common market, the single market, 
and the single currency were mainly economic programmes (with, of course, 
strong collateral implications for society). Here, they commit themselves to the 
global reform of the welfare state. There is a tremendous difference in scope, 
which was not correctly underlined at the time.
This new element has of course an evident link with the instruments which 
have been foreseen. There is a relation between the nature of the ambitions and 
the nature of the instruments which have been chosen.
Second, to reach these various objectives, various instruments at different 
levels were to be used. They encompass both European Community (EC) 
measures (regulations and directives) and national measures for the most 
important part through the Open Method of Coordination (Dehousse, 2004; 
Pochet, 2002)1. This is, from a political point of view, one of the most important 
innovations of the Lisbon Strategy. The previous EC programmes of action (the 
common market, the single market, the single currency) were based exclusively 
or mainly (for the single currency) on EC measures. The Lisbon Strategy is the 
first programme of action based mainly on national measures. The 
consequences of this new element should not be underestimated.
This said, at first sight, one contradiction arises. The Lisbon Strategy has very 
big ambitions - in fact more than the single market or the single currency. This is 
all very well, but there are very limited resources to fulfil them. For the most 
important part of the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, the resources are 
national measures. At the EC level, there are no serious legal constraints and no 
budgetary outlays. So there is an obvious discrepancy between the ambitions 
and the means. This constitutes a problem. Europe is in charge of things that it 
cannot, control (and about which the member states are not eager to act as we will 
see later) and for which very limited resources are available. This does not look 
like a good recipe for success.
1. There are already libraries of comments dedicated to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).
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The revised version (2005)
In 2005, it would have been wise to correct this deficit between the ambitions 
and the means, but one must recognise that it has not been done. There were 
corrections but these corrections did not aim at increasing the resources. These 
corrections aimed at decreasing the ambitions, and, surprisingly, at reducing the 
means.
So what has the revised version of the Lisbon Strategy brought in 2005?
• Fewer objectives: the priority is from now on given to the economy. This 
means that the EC institutions will concentrate on policies that boost growth 
and employment. Social and environmental objectives are largely abandon­
ed. They are now at the bottom of the priority list.
• Less coordination: the European Commission had to point out member states 
which were successful in the reforms and those which were not successful, 
but even this has been given up.
• Less appropriation by the EU: the member states are more than ever respon­
sible for finding most of the resources.
So one must wonder: where now is the added value of the European approach 
(Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2006)?
We can now see, in this revised version, two contradictions. Firstly, there 
remains a strong discrepancy between the ambitions and the means. Secondly, it 
has become more difficult to convince public opinion. We want to convince 
people to accept difficult reforms, but at the same time we have reduced the 
perspectives that we offer them.
In conclusion there are two problems. There is a means problem (instruments 
and process). If the problem is so fundamental, means should logically be 
increased. There is also a communication problem. A lot of people do not feel 
committed to a programme which has no social and environmental perspectives. 
This creates a communication problem. People want a positive perspective. The 
revision of the Lisbon Strategy has reinforced the “doom and gloom” aspect of 
the strategy and reduces the involvement of average citizens in the reforms.
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THE RESULTS OF THE LISBON STRATEGY 
Globally limited results
How much has been achieved so far? Here, we need to look first at the global 
results and then distinguish between the results at the EC level and the results at 
the level of the member states.
Globally, the results are limited. Economic growth has not been impressive. 
R&D remains more or less constant. Structural reforms remain limited.
Nothing in these limited results is surprising. We have a basic equation with no 
unknown element:
fewer ambitions +fewer means + no positive perspectives — limited results.
However, if the results are limited, they are not completely negative. Europe 
has begun a phase of structural adjustment to the ICT, to globalisation, to the rise 
of energy costs, to the rise of social security costs. There remains some modest 
growth.
The huge difference between the EC and national levels
At the EC and at the member state levels, there is a strong difference in the 
delivery of the results. At the EC level, a lot of the measures which were 
announced in 2000 were adopted between 2000 and 2005. So there are results. 
They concern more specifically sectors which were opened late to competition. 
These are the transport, electronic communications and energy sectors. The 
market opening has been broadened for railways and airlines, as well as for gas 
and electricity thanks to the adoption of new instruments. A new regulatory 
framework has been adopted and implemented for electronic communications. 
No need to say how much telecommunications and the Internet are essential for 
the expansion of ICT and thus for productivity. So at the EC level, the appraisal 
is not bad since some things have changed.
At the member states level, the results are obviously not as good as at the EC 
level. Structural reforms on employment, pensions and training have only 
started (particularly in the smaller countries). Concerning R&D, member states 
are no better than the EC. There is not much improvement. On the OMC, one 
could say that the method is so open that there is not much coordination 
(Collignon, Dehousse, Gabolde, Jouen et al., 2005; Georgopoulos, 2005; 
Goetschy, 2004; Pochet, 2001). For example, in Belgium we had a debate on 
“prépensions” (early retirement). The question concerned the increase of the 
age of early retirement from 58 to 60 years old. This debate was held without any
66
The Lisbon Strategy: What is Wrong?
reference to what happened or was happening in other member states. Belgium 
acted as it was the Galapagos Islands - without any contact with the outside 
world. This being said, there are strong variations between member states. Big 
member states are generally bad performers. Small member states are generally 
better. This is true for structural reforms, and also for public deficits. So Croatia 
could have reason to entertain hopes about its future participation in EC 
processes.
In conclusion on this third part, there are two main lessons. First, the results 
remain weak, which is quite normal with limited means and limited incentives to 
participate. Secondly, basically the EC has delivered results and the member 
states have not. Their implementation of the Lisbon Strategy has been poor.
The fundamental question then becomes: what should be done to improve the 
delivery?
THE ALTERNATIVE PATHS
We have seen that from the beginning the Lisbon Strategy has had a deficit 
between its ambitions, even if they have been reduced, and the means to attain 
them. This situation has transformed the EC into a kind of bureaucratic talking 
shop which does not produce much, except endless speeches. This is not good.
In addition, a message has been delivered saying “something must be done to 
improve the economic situation of Europe” and at the same time almost, no 
action is taken. Simulating action is the worst communication strategy. It 
inevitably brings communication problems with the public.
To suppress such a deficit, which begins to undermine the credibility of the 
Lisbon Strategy, and of the EC itself, there are two alternative paths. They are 
much more logical and they bring simplification.
The first one consists in reducing once again the level of the ambitions. If 
governments do not want to add supplementary resources, then it would be 
better to reduce the ambitions and send back the responsibility of almost, 
everything to the member states. This solution would mean “more 
decentralisation”.
The second one consists in increasing the means. If governments want to keep 
strong ambitions, they have to add additional means. This solution would mean 
“more integration”. Personally, this is the solution I find the most convincing 
one. The challenge of the Lisbon Strategy remains essential for our future and 




On this alternative, we can afford to remain modest, since the approach is very 
modest itself. More decentralisation would basically imply two elements. All 
the single market aspects (and maybe some parts of the environment) are the 
responsibility of the EC and the rest is the responsibility of the member states. So 
telecommunications, energy, services and transport go to the EC. Social 
problems, most of the environment and structural reforms go to the member 
states.
The strong advantage of this approach lies in its transparency. It then becomes 
very clear that the EU institutions are not responsible for the essentials of the 
programme of action. Inaction or bad results can thus not be considered as their 
responsibility.
More integration
It would of course be too ambitious to try to design a full alternative programme 
of action. There are nevertheless a few elements which seem relatively obvious.
First, the EC legislative level must deal with the single market and the 
environment regulation (energy taxes, infrastructure charges). If we want to 
support sustainable development, we need to increase energy efficiency. In that 
perspective, measures should be taken to harmonise taxes for the use of energy 
resources and for the use of transport infrastructures. Here, there is a void in the 
present Lisbon Strategy. A rebalancing of taxes (and thus no global rise) would 
allow reducing financial charges on employment, and especially low qualified 
jobs.
Second, there should be an EC macroeconomic level that increases the 
coordination of national economic policies and creates a stabilisation fund (at 
least for the euro zone). In the present situation, the EMU is unbalanced because 
we have a fully fledged European monetary policy and no correspondent 
European economic policy. This situation puts too much responsibility or 
pressure on the monetary instrument. Governments in the euro zone often say 
that they want to cooperate but, in practice, they do not and this lack of 
cooperation is costly (Aghion, Cohen and Pisani-Ferry, 2006).
Macroeconomic interdependence is strong in the EU and still much stronger 
in the euro zone. We are dependent on a daily basis on what happens in the 
member states. That is why, for example, it would be much better if the 
budgetary policies on structural reforms were seriously coordinated, at least in 
the euro zone.
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Third, an effort should be made to increase the EC budget. We must put our 
money where our mouth is (ICT, networks, environment, and corporate 
restructuring). We thus need to increase the EC budget but with new priorities. 
From that point of view, the financial perspectives adopted for 2007-2013 by the 
European Council hesitate between the scandalous and the ridiculous. The 
sacrifice of research spending is nonsense.
In 2003, the Sapir Report, ordered by the Prodi Commission proposed a strong 
reorientation of the EU budget. This was meant to increase significantly the 
outlays for employment, networks, training and research. This should have been 
accompanied by an increase of global outlays.
Fourth, member states must have environmental and social targets (softer thus 
than regulations) in order to fight the fear of change. I come back to my original 
point. People will get involved into EU programmes if they feel they have an 
interest. In 2005 two objectives were abandoned for the sake of concentration on 
more efficiency. I did not see where the efficiency argument was at that time. I 
certainly do not see it now in the results.
The subsidiary argument
Some people could say here that such a programme of action (the solution for 
more integration) would violate the subsidiary principle. It is an important 
argument, and it is necessary to deal with it.
As we know, the subsidiary principle is enshrined into Article 3.b of the EC 
Treaty. It concerns the exercise of shared (meaning not exclusive) competences 
by the European Community. It requires proving that an EC initiative will be 
more efficient than a national initiative.
Concerning the first element of a more integrated strategy, we could say that 
energy taxation and better infrastructure costs have already been proposed by 
the Commission and discussed by the member states. It was not said that it was 
against the subsidiary principle. There was a disagreement between the member 
states regarding the best level of taxation. In fact, because of the single market, 
the only way of having such measures adopted is precisely to adopt them at the 
EC level. If we do not, we create distortions of concurrence between the 
transport companies.
I could be more detailed about the challenges created by the strong rise of oil 
prices during the last two years and the absolute necessity of a common answer 
from the EC, butthere is on space.
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Concerning the second element, economic cooperation was already 
mentioned in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It certainly is an EC competence since 
the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. Since the 1980s, we know very well that 
macroeconomic policies adopted by a single member state have very little 
effect. So the efficiency of a coordinated approach has been proven again and 
again.
Concerning the third element, the proposals of the Sapir report have never 
been criticised with regard to the subsidiary principle. They were criticised by 
people who wanted to maintain the present structure of spending, meaning 
firstly in favour of the agricultural sector. Furthermore, outlays like research or 
networks have certainly an added efficiency if they are done at the EC level. 
Where is the use of financing five different systems of electronic localisation of 
goods or helicopters?
Concerning the fourth element, we must see here that it represents only a 
political commitment of the member states. This does not concern the adoption 
of EC measures at all. And consequently it has nothing to do with Article 3.b of 
the EC Treaty.
This solution of more integration has thus a clear added value. It is a pity that 
member states do not see it in the present context.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
It is difficult to summarise in such a complex domain. Nevertheless, in a nut­
shell:
• The diagnosis of the Lisbon Strategy regarding the situation of the European 
economy is basically correct, and even quite subtle on some aspects.
• Nevertheless, the message of the European institutions is unbalanced, 
because it is excessively negative.
• On the reverse, the action programme of the Lisbon Strategy is basically 
insufficient. Firstly, means are too limited. Secondly, targets on non­
economic aspects have been dropped. Thirdly, initiatives at the EC level are 
not sufficiently developed.
• Furthermore, on this point also, the message of the European institutions is 
also unbalanced, because it does not underline this structural weakness.
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All this is a very dangerous for the communication strategy. Many things that 
have happened during the last years entertain some kind of connection with 
these contradictions. Some will say that the EU is unpopular because it deals 
with too many things. But others could say that it is unpopular because it does 
not deal enough with the basic problems of the citizen (which cannot be dealt 
with by the member states anyway).
In my opinion, there is thus an urgent need to reintegrate social and 
environmental objectives in the strategy, and also to show the link with the other 
parts. This would make the message more positive and give back a perspective 
to people. Unfortunately, we have done precisely the reverse. There is also a 
need to develop EC initiatives.
Finally, I'd like to come back to the present debates about the legitimacy of the 
EU institutions. We can adopt the most magnificent communications about plan 
B, C, D or even Z. We can print torrents of speeches. We can adopt the most 
seductive press releases. Nevertheless, basically, the bottom line remains the 
same. Reciprocity is a fundamental principle of human affairs. So, if you want 
people to invest in Europe, Europe must first show that it invests in people.
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LESSONS FOR CROATIA
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SUMMARY1
The paper analyses the Lisbon Process taking into account both the challenges 
faced by the economies o f the EU member states and the Lisbon Strategy that 
was expected to address these challenges. The startingpoint is the analysis o f 
the GDP per capita gap between the EU15 and the US and the indicated sources 
o f this gap. The Lisbon Strategy o f2000-2005 is analysed as well as the renewed 
Lisbon Strategy accepted in 2005. In this analysis both the weaknesses and 
strengths o f the Lisbon Process are indicated as a tool fostering structural 
reforms in the member states. Finally conclusions are drawn from the Lisbon 
Process for EU acceding countries like Croatia. Recommendations fo r  the 
candidates are that the Lisbon Process as a reform programme should be taken 
into account. There are good examples o f some old and new EU member states 
that implemented deep reforms, often difficult at the beginning butfruitful in the 
long term. The Lisbon Process, while not ideal in its essence and method, can be 
used as a stimulus fo r  such a policy, although the effectiveness o f the Lisbon 
Strategy cannot be overestimated, because the most important economic 
reforms have to be accepted and implemented at the national level, not the EU  
one.
1. This article is partially based on my paper “Economic Reform in the European Union: Will the 
'Lisbon' EU Catch Up with the US?” (published in: Bienkowski W., Brada J., Radio M-J. eds 
(2006), Reaganomics Goes Global. What Can the EU, Russia and Transition Countries Learn 
from the USA?, Palgrave Macmillan, London) as well as on the report “National Reform 





The Lisbon Strategy was accepted in March 2000 and became the most 
comprehensive growth-supporting economic programme in the history of the 
EU, covering reforms in several areas, including product and labour markets, 
research and development, investment in human capital, improving the business 
environment, social security systems and the like. The strategy started at the 
same time as the European Union entered into the final stage of its eastern 
enlargement and it has meant that economic reforms are another fundamental 
challenge - alongside enlargement -to be faced by the Union.
The initial aim of the Lisbon Process was to make the Union “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010. 
Nonetheless, a few years after its adoption, right after enlargement, the strategy 
did not seem to have been a success. There were many weaknesses in the 
strategy that were identified early on. Among the most commonly indicated 
were that there was too wide a range of inconsistent priorities resulting in a lack 
of clear priorities; soft methods of implementation resulting in a lack of 
implementation; and the omission or watering down of guidelines as to how 
desirable reforms were to be implemented. The strategy's shortcomings caused 
the EU leaders to launch a mid-term review and to renew the strategy in early 
2005. As a result, at present, the Lisbon Process is anchored among the main 
instruments of the economic policy coordination system in the European Union 
aimed at fostering structural and regulatory reforms in member states. It also 
concerns not only 15 member states, as in the first stage of the Lisbon Process, 
but 25. The accession countries, such as Croatia, while encouraged, are not 
obliged to take part in the Lisbon Process. However, it is useful for these 
countries to study the successes and failures of the European Union in fostering 
structural “Lisbon” reforms. Such a critical study seems to be essential for those 
looking for economic policy guidelines that can help to manage the transition to 
the market economy and becoming a part of the single market. From this 
perspective, adjustment to EU requirements, as stipulated in the Copenhagen 
criteria or the acquis communautaire, can only partially serve as a good 
guideline. The inefficiencies of some of the European social and economic 
models as well as the failures of the Lisbon Process show that accession 
countries, when trying to adjust their economic models to those of the EU, 
should go beyond the current European status quo in order to avoid falling into 
the trap of Eurosclerosis. Critical assessment of the Lisbon reforms enables us to 
look at the Union and the adjustment process without rosy glasses, because not 
only do the transition-accession countries need to reform their economies but
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also the EU member states' old market economies need to adjust themselves to 
the competitive forces of the global economy.
CAUSES OF REFORM
A crucial reason that made the EU implement the Lisbon Strategy was the fact 
that in 2000 the GDP per capita gap between the EU and the US economies was 
larger than it had been since the beginning of the 1970s. The real GDP gap was 
even larger than that suggested by per capita indicators, because of the higher 
population growth in the US. Particularly interesting observations can be drawn 
from the analysis of this gap. The GDP per capita of the EU15 in 2000 
represented about 70% of the US GDP per capita. But labour productivity per 
hours worked in the EU15 was very close to the US level, about 93%. 
Furthermore, labour productivity per person employed in the EU15 was also 
much closer than GDP per capita, representing about 85% (Eurostat, 2004). 
These differences were due to a shorter average working time in the EU in 
comparison to the US, lower employment rates and differences in demographic 
structures. There were also substantial differences in employment rates between 
the EU and the US (the employment rate in the EU was only about 64% while in 
theUS it was over 73%, OECD, 2002a).
Therefore lower labour utilisation in the EU in comparison to the US can be 
seen as a crucial source of the GDP gap between these two economies. 
According to some economists (for example, Turner, 2003), the systematic 
shortening of working time and falling employment rates in Europe reflects a 
preference for leisure. Another explanation is proposed by Freeman and 
Schettkat (2005), who hypothesise that the greater time worked and the higher 
employment rates in the US are due to the greater marketisation of traditional 
household production in the US. These explanations are interesting, but there 
are important reasons why the bulk of the blame should fall on labour and 
product market regulations as well as on welfare state benefits for the relatively 
short working time and low employment rates in many European countries.
The lower employment rate in the EU, to some extent, may, however, result 
from a relatively low level of human capital. Only 21% of the people of working 
age in the EU15 have a tertiary education, while in the US the figure is almost 
37%. These figures are very important when you take into account the fact that 
the employment rates of people with tertiary education in the EU are similar to 
the US rates, and only the rates of employment of less educated people are lower.
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These data show that the lower level of human capital is a source of lower 
utilisation of human resources in the EU economies. But these data also 
indirectly show that it is likely that institutional solutions present in the EU do 
not support job creation for employees with low qualifications. Institutional 
problems are also indirectly confirmed by the fact that the Union faces much 
more serious employment problems than does the US, including also long-term 
and structural unemployment, although these problems are also connected with 
a lower level of human capital.
Figure 1. Average working time vs. income transfers and tax rate on low wage 
earners2
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Source: Author's calculation using: OECD, 2002c and Eurostat, 2004
As Figure 1 shows, the shorter average working time in many European 
countries can be explained by the fact that more sources of income other than 
salary are available for EU employees. Countries in which, in 2000, spending on 
income transfers represented a larger part of GDP had, at that time, a much 
shorter working time than the countries that spent less on these transfers. The 
correlation coefficient between these two variables amounts to -0.58, 
calculated on the basis of the data for EU member states, the US, Japan, Norway,
2. The tax rate on low wage earners calculates the income tax on gross earnings + the employee's 
and employer's social security contributions and then expresses this sum as a % of the total 
labour cost for this low-wage earner. Tax rates are calculated for a single person without 
children. When in work, this person earns 67% of the average wages of full-time production 
workers in manufacturing.
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Iceland, Australia and New Zealand. This means that there is an inverse 
relationship between the availability of income other than salary and the 
tendency to lengthen working time. Like income transfers, the level of income 
taxes also influences the reduction of working time. EU member states, in 
comparison to the US, have a relatively high level of taxes imposed on labour. 
The correlation coefficient, -0.55, between the level of taxes imposed on labour 
and the average working time also confirms a negative relationship between 
taxes and average working time.
Institutional conditions influence not only average working time in the EU, 
but also employment. In Figure 2 we show the relation between the levels of 
product market regulation and the degree of protection of the labour markets on 
the one side, and employment rates on the other. The data show that the higher 
the level of employment protection and the more severe the product market 
regulation, the lower the employment rates in the economy. EU member states 
with the highest levels of product market regulation and the highest employment 
protection rates, such as Italy, Greece, Belgium, Spain and France, have at the 
same time the lowest employment rates. And vice versa, countries with lower 
product market regulation levels such as Great Britain, the US or Denmark, have 
the highest employment rates.
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This is reflected in a substantial positive relationship between the level of 
product market regulation and employment protection and unemployment. A 
similar analysis prepared using the same data for regulation and rates of 
unemployment shows that the level of unemployment in the analysed EU
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member states, the US and Japan is positively correlated with both the level of 
product market regulation and the employment protection level. The highest 
unemployment in 2000 could be observed in EU countries with the highest 
levels of regulation: Spain, Greece, Italy and France. Countries with the lowest 
regulation and protection levels - Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark and the US - 
had low unemployment rates.
Table 1. Changes in the structure of public spending in the EU, period 1963­
2000 (%GDP)3
1963 1975 1985 1989 1993 2000 Change 1963-2000
(% of GDP)
Government consumption 15.09 18.36 20.23 19.46 21.08 19.90 +4.81
Government investment 3.80 3.83 3.12 3.10 3.06 2.54 -1.26
Subsidies 1.44 1.97 2.24 1.96 1.84 1.42 -0.02
Income transfers 11.58 17.45 19.29 18.68 21.39 20.67 +9.09
Total government disbursements 33.01 43.51 49.45 47.80 53.09 47.16 +14.15
Source: Author's calculation using: OECD, 2003a










EU15 19.9 2.54 1.42 20.67 47.16
US 14.57 3.26 0.35 13.8 33.62
Difference: EU-US 5.33 -0.72 1.07 6.87 13.54
Source: Author's calculation using: OECD, 2003a
These relationships have already been demonstrated in analyses carried out by 
Nickell (1999) and Blanchard (2000). Their findings are generally consistent 
with the earlier observations made by Siebert (1997), who analysed institutional 
and regulatory change in labour markets in EU member states over the last four 
decades.
3. Social benefits paid by government and other current transfers paid by government.
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The difference between the EU and the US economies concerns not only 
regulations and institutions but also the role of government in the economy. In 
the most general way, the government's role in the economy is described by 
indices showing public spending values in relation to GDP, and by the structure 
of this spending. The data presented in Table 1 show that the difference in the 
levels of public spending in the EU and the US amounted to almost. 13% of GDP. 
Over 12.2% of this was due to much higher spending by the EU on income 
transfers, 6.87 percentage points, and higher spending on public consumption, 
5.33 percentage points. An additional percentage point, which practically closes 
the entire public spending gap, comes from subsidies, which were higher in the 
EU than in the US. What is more, a specific feature of the difference in the 
structure of public expenditure in the EU and the US was that the only item in 
2000 on which the EU spent less than the US in relation to its GDP was public 
investment outlays. In addition, the structure of spending in EU countries in 
1963 was very similar to that of the United States in 2000 (see Figure 2). In this 
context, what is worthy of note is that, in the 1960s, the EU countries developed 
faster than the United States. A continuous increase in income transfers and 
public consumption spending, which can be observed in European countries 
since the 1960s, was connected to the creation of the welfare state. It was based 
on extensive social aid and a far-reaching public redistribution of income. These 
processes had, however, a very severe impact on labour markets. Growing 
access to income other than wages, measured by the value of income transfers, 
resulted in growing unemployment underpinned by a lack of incentives for 
looking for a job. Therefore, the unemployment rate since the beginning of 
1970s grew at the same pace as income transfers, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Unemployment and income transfers in the EU15(1970-2000)
Source: Author's calculation using: OECD, 2003a ¡»come transfers (% gdp)
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The correlation between unemployment and income transfer levels in the time 
series from 1970 to 2000 shows that there is almost a linear relationship between 
these two variables, and the correlation coefficient is 0.92. In this context, Engen 
and Skinner (1992) investigated the impact of the growth of budget spending 
and tax revenue on the pace of GDP changes in 107 countries in the period from 
1970-1985. These authors showed that there is an inverse relationship between 
changes in the levels of the states' intervention in their economies and the pace of 
growth of their economies. They found that an increase in public spending and 
tax revenue of 10% of GDP with a stable budget results in an average decrease in 
the pace of long-term economic growth by 1.5 percentage points. This 
relationship is confirmed by an analysis of changes in public spending and the 
pace of economic growth in the 1990s in the EU member states and the US and 
Japan, which shows that the pace of economic growth in the second half of the 
1990s increased considerably in those EU countries that managed to 
significantly cut their public spending. Among them can be found not only low- 
spending countries such as Ireland but also traditionally high-spending ones 
such as Finland or Sweden.
To sum up, we emphasise that low labour utilisation in the EU in relation to the 
US is the main reason for almost 75% of the GDP per capita gap. This cannot be 
qualified as a consequence of a preference for leisure in the EU but rather of 
several institutional and regulatory features present in many European 
countries. As was shown, most EU member states still have both high levels of 
product market regulation and high labour protection. In addition, excessive 
regulation and low effectiveness of product markets and labour markets in the 
EU are integral to the social models of many EU countries. This model assumes 
excessive government expenditures, including, in particular, income transfers 
and public consumption spending. This is accompanied by the higher taxes 
imposed on labour. These factors discourage Europeans from taking up work or 
lengthening their working time and European companies from creating more 
jobs. All those conditions lead to a lower level of employment and lower 
working time in the EU economies than in the US.
LISBON FAILURES AND ITS SOURCES
The Lisbon Strategy was adopted in 2000,just before the dot-com bubble burst, 
but still at the time of a bit of naive enthusiasm for the so-called “new economy” 
or “knowledge-based economy”. Consequently it was full of uncritical state­
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ments and opinions on the origins of economic growth, usually praising the 
development of the information and communication technologies (ICT) and the 
Internet, which were acknowledged to have been essential for economic growth 
in the second half of 1990s. This context had remarkable influence on the 
priorities of the Lisbon Strategy as well as on its rhetoric. For this reason the 
development of the most competitive “knowledge-based economy” and 
“information society” were among its main objectives. After 2000 the strategy 
was widened including many additional - and sometimes competing - goals and 
assumptions and it was expected to cover three dimensions, economic, social 
and environmental. Such a multidimensional approach demonstrated the EU's 
admiration for social cohesion and environmentally sustainable development. 
As a result, the strategy, since its beginnings, became both ambitious and 
difficult to be implemented. Moreover, many key reforms fostered by the EU 
were successfully blocked by domestic political pressure and the influence of 
vested interests.
The strategy o f2000 put the greatest emphasis on those factors connected with 
limited diffusion of ICT and innovation. It presented a relatively good account 
of the weak points of the EU economy caused by incomplete internal market 
development and particularly by strong barriers to product market functioning. 
Deficiencies in the functioning of financial markets were also presented quite 
successfully. But it addressed labour market weaknesses in only very general 
terms. On the one hand, it laid a great emphasis on the low level of human capital 
as a reason for the poor functioning of EU labour markets, but on the other hand, 
it failed to adequately discuss and address the institutional problems and tight 
regulations underlying labour market deficiencies, indicating only the high 
taxes deducted from salaries and making some suggestions concerning the role 
of a passive employment policy. Moreover the strategy produced only 
generalisations about the role of “the European social model” and evaded the 
question of its responsibility for providing ineffective solutions to labour market 
issues and making labour inflexible. Finally the strategy entirely omitted the 
issue of the negative influence of the level of employment protection on the level 
of unemployment, including structural unemployment, in the EU member 
states.
The same pattern reappeared in the schedule for action planned by the strategy 
o f2000. The actions concerning support for ICT diffusion and reinforcement of 
inventiveness were well planned, while the reform aimed at improving the 
business environment, was less satisfactory. Deregulation of network industries 
and financial market integration were successfully designed. Unfortunately, the
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issues of reforming labour markets and social security systems were only 
mentioned in the strategy, but reform was not planned. Although they were 
included in the document, the actual formulated recommendations were very 
general and involved more consulting than reforming. Such a state of affairs was 
supported by political declarations cherishing the idea of a welfare state with an 
extensively developed social security system. These declarations precisely 
defined the limits of the reforms proposed in this field.
These weaknesses, together with too many priorities and soft methods of 
implementation, made the Lisbon Strategy ineffective. Before the mid-term 
review of the Lisbon Strategy it became obvious that without deep reforms of 
labour markets and social security systems, it will be impossible to raise labour 
utilisation in the EU.
LIMITED MID-TERM RENEWAL?
The review of the strategy took place during the European Council's Brussels 
summit, on 22 and 23 March 2005 (European Council, 2005). It was not, 
however, a turning point in the EU's socioeconomic policy-making, but it 
nonetheless produced some positive effects. During the summit, support for 
growth and employment was defined as a crucial priority for the next five years 
of economic reform in the EU. While not questioning the three dimensions of the 
strategy, the economic dimension - aimed at fostering growth and jobs - was 
prioritised.
Despite several reservations, there are some positive features of the renewed 
Lisbon Strategy. One of the most important is the fact that all EU member 
countries had to write down their own Lisbon strategies - National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs) - taking into account their specific economic problems but 
at the same time in line with integrated guidelines prepared for all countries. The 
NRPs became a part of broader reconstruction of the economic policy 
coordination system. The new economic policy coordination system - for 
reforms - was accepted and based on a three-year cycle. It started in 2005 and 
will have to be renewed in 2008. The new economic reform governance started 
with preparation of the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs in accordance 
with the procedures laid down in Articles 99 and 128 of the EC Treaty and on the 
basis of the European Council conclusions. This means that implementation of 
the revised Lisbon Strategy was anchored in two existing Treaty-based 
instruments of economic policy coordination. The guidelines were prepared by
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the Commission in April 2005 and accepted by the Council in June 2005. There 
are 24 guidelines six of which (Nos. 1 to 6) are devoted to macroeconomic 
policy, ten of which (Nos. 7 to 16) to microeconomic policy and eight of which 
(Nos. 17 to 24) to employment policy. These three areas were to provide a 
framework for the establishment of National Reform Programmes. The 
macroeconomic guidelines focus on growth - supporting reforms of public 
spending supported by structural reforms. The microeconomic guidelines 
include product market reforms and some actions based on facilitating ICT 
diffusion and investments in research and development. The employment 
guidelines focus not only on investments in human capital and active labour 
policy, but also on promoting flexibility of labour markets and reform of social 
security so as to supportjob creation.
Member states were expected to draw up their own National Reform 
Programmes in line with both the integrated guidelines and their own needs and 
specific situation. The NRPs were expected to include three core chapters 
(macroeconomic policy, microeconomic policy and employment policy). 
Moreover, the Council encouraged member Countries to appoint their national 
Lisbon coordinators - so called Mr or Ms Lisbon. The national dimension of the 
renewed Lisbon Process is accompanied by a supranational one. It is based on 
the Community Lisbon Programme prepared by the Commission and devoted to 
all actions to be taken at Community level.
Within the renewed Lisbon Process a new monitoring system was launched, 
within which, every year starting from autumn 2006, member states will have to 
prepare reports on follow-up to the Lisbon Strategy. After submission of the 
reports, the Council and Commission will analyze the implementation reports 
and the European Commission will then issue an annual progress report 
assessing the National Reform Programmes issued by the member states. This 
may contain country-specific recommendations. The first progress report was 
issued in January 2006. On the basis of the Commission's assessment, the 
European Council reviews progress every spring and decides on any necessary 
adjustments to the integrated guidelines.
Thus, the new approach to the Lisbon Process reduces the number of targets 
and focuses the strategy on the two strategic goals of growth and employment, 
reducing, at the same time, inconsistencies between the Lisbon goals. It also 
improved the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and strengthened national 
ownership of the Lisbon Strategy. Moreover, while nationalising the Lisbon 
Strategy, it drew member states into a reform coordination system in which the 
Commission plays the role of an independent monitoring agency, with the
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ability to assess progress of reforms as well as to present detailed national 
recommendations on what and/or how to reform. The monitoring system was 
equipped with an informal sanction system based on peer pressure created by a 
set of short-listed comparable economic indicators playing the role of official 
scoreboard, a national reporting system and the Commission's 
recommendations, as well as on an official review of the implementation 
process to be done by the March European Council.
All the above mechanisms are aimed at strengthening national ownership of 
the Lisbon Process and forcing national governments to implement necessary 
reforms. All the same, economic reform governance in the EU still has quite 
clear limits, especially if we take into account its ability to foster structural 
reforms. These usually take time, and often cause short-term costs that inhibit 
consistent policy and are politically unpopular. In such a perspective a crucial 
question is whether new supranational reform coordination measures are able to 
influence governments more than their internal political, social and economic 
environment. From this perspective, the prospects for the relaunched Lisbon 
Strategy are not optimistic. The rationale for Lisbon as a coordination process is 
still poorly articulated and until the conditions in a member state are conducive 
to reform, the likelihood of rapid progress will be very limited. Some comfort 
can be taken from the very fact that there is such diverse experience across 
Europe in trajectories of structural change, as it shows that good strategic policy 
choices can make a difference, with the smaller countries generally in the lead. 
Moreover, diversity affords the opportunity for one country to learn from 
another and thus to develop new solutions. Above scepticism was partially 
confirmed when analysing selected NRPs. These show considerable diversity in 
a number of respects (Radio and Bates, 2006).
What all these observations suggest is that it will be difficult to raise the 
importance of the Lisbon Strategy in national political debate. As a 
consequence, the expectation that national accountability mechanisms will 
provide an incentive to governments to pursue hard choices may prove to be 
exaggerated. All the above lead us to the conclusion that we should not be too 
overly optimistic regarding the ability of the new economic reform coordination 
system to produce the results it promises. Again it becomes obvious that forcing 
governments to implement painful reforms can be very difficult.
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CONCLUSIONS FOR CROATIA
Trying to summarise all that has been written above and to draw conclusions for 
EU accession countries like Croatia we have to stress that the Lisbon Process 
should be taken into account, as it is a reform programme that is expected to 
improve the functioning of markets in the European Union (i.e. labour and 
product markets) as well as to improve the effectiveness of market institutions 
and the effectiveness of the growth supporting economic policies. Several 
reforms stipulated in the strategy clearly show the direction the European 
economic model is evolving in. An even more important lesson can be drawn 
from the analysis of causes that made the EU prepare, accept and try to 
implement the Lisbon reforms. Such an analysis shows that regulatory 
environments present in several EU member states, even those most 
economically developed, are not friendly enough to support the effective 
functioning of markets. Moreover, several economic policies developed in these 
countries, for example social policies, also inhibit economic growth and draw 
people out of employment and, as a result, undermine social cohesion.
Due to the above, countries in transition from communism to the market 
economy, such as Croatia, while adjusting their economies to the requirements 
of membership in the EU, should aim at economic models and solutions that 
have to be implemented in current EU member states in order to restore the 
vitality of their economies. This, however, means that Croatia should avoid 
simply imitating economic policy solutions still present in many EU member 
states. Moreover, it should rather follow the examples of those brave European 
societies that decided to implement deep reforms that were often difficult at the 
beginning but fruitful in the long run. Such examples can be found in both the 
old and the new EU member states, that is. Ireland (after 1986), Slovakia (after 
Meciar) or the Baltic countries. These states, while being in the EU or aiming 
towards membership, decided to create flexible and entrepreneurship friendly 
economies with a limited role for the government. The Lisbon Process, while 
not ideal in its essence and method, can be used as a stimulus for such a policy 
and as a panacea for falling into the trap of Eurosclerosis. However, the 
effectiveness of the Lisbon Strategy cannot, be overestimated, because the most 
important economic reforms have to be accepted and implemented at national 
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SUMMARY
In order to achieve the Lisbon Strategy objectives, Slovenia must carry out 
structural reforms that will strengthen the competitiveness o f its economy and 
raise its employment levels. The answers to questions concerning Slovenian 
development and the Lisbon Strategy have been provided by the 2005 Slovenia's 
Development Strategy, whichfocuses not only on economic issues but also on 
social, environmental, political, legal and cultural matters. The Slovenia's 
Development Strategy initiated adoption o f several additional documents fo ­
cusing on the Lisbon Strategy implementation. “The Frameworkfor Economic 
and Social Reforms ” is a document consisting o f 67 measures covering mainly 
thefirstfour priority areas o f the Slovenia's Development Strategy, while “The 
Reform Programme for Achieving Lisbon Strategy Goals ” identifies five de­
velopment priorities: a knowledge-based society; an efficient state; a modern 
social state; higher employment; and sustainable development. Preparation o f  
strategic documents in Slovenia shows that involvement ofstakeholders in the 
process ofpreparation o f strategic documents and goals is crucial. The orga­
nisation o f stakeholders' involvement implies the establishment o f special 
institutional arrangements.
1. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those 




Reforms are a reality for Europe. In 2000, the spring European Council 
recognised the need to pursue economic reform: to capture the benefits of the 
new knowledge-based society, to strengthen the European social system by 
investing in people and to prepare for challenges ahead. Change and 
modernisation of European policies are required, so that the values such as a 
high level of welfare, social cohesion and solidarity, high quality of life, 
accessibility of education and health care, participation of citizens in decision 
making, and sustainable development may be upheld in today's ever more 
dynamic and globalised world.
The world economy is experiencing a period of rapid and significant 
economic change characterised by substantial growth in world trade and capital 
flows, and driven by the increased integration of emerging market economies 
into the global economic system, trade and investment liberalisation and 
technological change. Today, globalisation is not merely an outflow of low-paid 
jobs and profits into countries with lower social standards. Just the opposite, 
new competition threatens Europe in areas that have until recently had the 
incontestable comparative advantage of the developed world. Every year, 
universities in India educate and introduce into the world market a quarter of 
million new engineers and,judging by the amount of money spent on research, 
China could catch up with the EU by the end of the decade. China and India are 
expected to increase their share of world output in future years with important 
consequences for the geographical distribution of EU trade and investment.
Slovenia is adapting its economic structure to the new European and global 
trends. A competitive economy requires well-structured public finance, market 
liberalisation and stimulation of market competitiveness, as well as a suitable 
environment, for the development of entrepreneurship. Being a member state of 
the EU, Slovenia is thus building its national vision and basic strategic 
objectives based on the Lisbon development strategy targets: higher 
competitiveness, employment growth, and balanced social and environmental 
development.
THE RENEWAL OF THE LISBON STRATEGY
The Lisbon Strategy has set a goal that the EU will become “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable o f
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sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion”. Later, the strategy was also complemented by environment-related 
goals. Effective implementation of the Lisbon Strategy called for a 
comprehensive approach, a combination of different and harmonised 
instruments and policy measures, both macro- and microeconomic, as well as 
the achieved level of social consensus.
The findings ofWim Kok's report showed that the EU is not on course to meet 
its goals. Actually, it recognised that EU cannot be satisfied with the results 
achieved in relation to the Lisbon Strategy in the first five years. Implementation 
of the reform package agreed in Lisbon made progress in some fields both at the 
national and EU levels. However, the EU was way behind the set goals. The 
disappointing delivery was ascribed to an overloaded agenda and to 
shortcomings in governance. In other words, “Lisbon is about everything and 
thus about nothing. Everybody is responsible and thus no-one” (Pisani-Ferry 
and Sapir, 2006). We can conclude that Lisbon failed due to a lack of 
prioritisation, to bad governance and a lack of political commitment and 
ownership from the part of the member states.
The spring 2005 European Council approved the proposal for a new start to the 
Lisbon Strategy put forward by the European Commission earlier in the year. In 
line with the Commission proposal, the European Council refocused the 
strategy on growth and employment.
With the aim of improving the governance of the Lisbon Process, member 
states had to prepare three-year National Reform Programmes by mid-October, 
backed by concrete measures and targets for achieving higher and sustainable 
economic growth and greater employment. Identifying their own challenges 
and shaping priorities was a key to member states' greater national commitment 
to implementing structural reforms as well as an additional impetus for 
achieving a consensus and attracting other stakeholders to co-create reforms 
(national parliaments, social partners). National ownership is regarded as a key 
to the success of the renewed Lisbon Process.
Preparation of the National Reform Programmes wasjust a first phase of the 
renewed Lisbon Process. Now, the political will is needed to translate 
commitments, measures and announced reforms into real results for growth and 
jobs.
Five main challenges can be identified regarding the National Reform 
Programmes:
• better functioning of the labour market;
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• promoting R&D and innovation, including greater investment in research;
• increasing the quality and sustainability of public finances;
• improving the business environment; and
• improving and encouraging education and professional training.
Table 1. National Reform Programmes for the Lisbon Strategy: identified goals 
of member states for 2010
Total employment rate, in % Expenditures for R&D, as % of GDP
2004 2008 2010 2004 2010
Austria 67.8 / 70.0 2.26 3.00
Belgium 60.3 / 70.0 1.93 3.00
Cyprus 69.1 / 71.0 0.37 1.00
Czech Republic 64.2 66.4 no data 1.27 2.06 (public 1.00)
Germany 65.0 / no data 2.49 3.00
Denmark 75.7 / Rise by 2% 2.64 >3.00
Estonia 63.0 65.8 67.2 0.91 1.90
Greece 59.4 62.5 64.1 0.58 1.50
Spain 61.1 / 66.0 1.07 2.00
Finland 67.6 / 70.0 3.51 4.00
France 63.1 / no data 2.16 3.00
Hungary 56.8 59.0 (2006) 63.0 0.89 1.80
Ireland 66.3 / 70.0 1.20 2.50 (2013)
Italy 57.6 / no data 1.14 2.50
Lithuania 61.2 / 68.8 0.76 2.00
Luxembourg 61.6 / no data 1.78 3.00
Latvia 62.3 65.0 67.0 0.42 1.50
Malta 54.1 / 57.0 0.273 0.75
Netherlands 73.1 / no data 1.77 3.00
Poland 51.7 / 55.0 0.58 1.65 (2008)
Portugal 67.8 69.0 70.0 0.78 1.80
Sweden 72.1 / 80.0 3.74 4.00
Slovenia 65.3 67.0 70.0 1.61 3.00
Slovakia 57.0 / no data 0.53 1.80
UK 71.6 / 80.0 long-term 1.79 2.50 (2014)
EU-25 63.3 / 70.0 1.93 3.00
Source: National Reform Programmes, EPC Report, springEuropean Council 2006
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Most countries set out the goal of achieving a common employment rate. 
These goals on average exceed the current employment rates by 2 to 3 
percentage points, which would mean around 10 million additional jobs by 
2008. The Danish “flexicurity” approach was pointed to as a case of good prac­
tice, combining flexible rules for hiring and firing workers with high un­
employment benefits and efficient active employment policies as well as 
incentives for additional education and training.
Member states indicated the goal of high growth in total expenditures for 
R&D by 2010. However, it remains uncertain whether an all-European goal of 
having 3% of GDP earmarked for R&D can be attained by 2010; currently it is 
exceeded only in Sweden and Finland. Almost all countries foresee an increase 
in public funding of R&D. The low level of participation of the private sector 
remains a problem since there is still no clear answer as to how to create a 
business environment, encouraging, in particular, industrial enterprises to invest 
more in R&D. The foreseen 7th Research Framework Programme will no doubt 
contribute to the promotion of research and innovation.
The long-term sustainability of public finances presents a great challenge, 
with the problem of the ageing population placing a growing strain on public 
finances. In the coming decades, the share of the European population aged 
above 65 years will rise further in proportion to the size of the working-age 
population. Many member states foresee further pension and health-care 
reforms to ensure public finance sustainability. The financial sustainability of 
the pension insurance system is to be assured by gradually prolonging the 
retirement age (e.g. in Germany to 67 years), by introducing flexible forms of 
retirement encouraging longer participation in the labour market, and by 
reducing pensions upon early retirement.
Progress has been made in creating a business-friendly environment. Member 
states focused their efforts on improving the regulatory framework and reducing 
administrative barriers. A third of the countries foresee introducing a preli­
minary impact assessment of regulations and laws on the economy while as 
many as three quarters of countries quantified their goals in terms of easing 
administrative barriers. Although member states do not mention enhancing 
competition as their key goal, the strengthening roles of the competition 
protection offices in many countries is indeed a positive sign of improvement.
The measures presented in the NRPs are a good starting point for a new Lisbon 
Strategy, but obviously mere programmes are no guarantee of the goals actually 
being met. There is a need for a political commitment to structural reforms and 
their consistent delivery. The main challenge ahead is therefore to strengthen 
national strategies, notably by: stepping up the ambitions for reforms; matching
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specific policies to the ambitions; ensuring timely implementation of the mea­
sures; and properly monitoring the progress made in achieving the NRP goals.
The spring European Council in 2008 will show whether the efforts for incre­
ased ownership are enough and whether the EU will get another renewal of the 
already renewed Lisbon Strategy.
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY FRAMEWORK 
IN SLOVENIA
Slovenia has narrowed its developmental gap relative to the EU but the catching 
up has been too slow in view of the set objectives. In 2004 Slovenia achieved 
79% of the average GDP per capita in PPS in the EU (81% according to Euro" 
stat's estimate for 2005). Slovenia narrowed its development gap2 vis-a-vis the 
EU-25, by 4 percentage points in 1996-2000 and by 6 percentage points in 2000­
2004, however if it continues to develop at such a pace it will only achieve 94% 
of the European average in 2013 instead of exceeding the average development 
level of the EU as set by Slovenia's Development Strategy. The comparison of 
real GDP growth rates leads to a similar conclusion. In 2000-2005, Slovenia's 
average economic growth exceeded the average growth in the EU-15 by 1.6 
percentage points while calculations indicate that it should have exceeded it by 
almost double this rate if the set strategic objective is to be met. These results 
show that Slovenia should bring about some radical changes and reforms in 
order to achieve the goals set in Slovenia's Development Strategy and Reform 
Programme for Achieving the Lisbon Strategy Goals.
Macroeconomic stability provided good conditions for development. Accord­
ing to macroeconomic indicators (except inflation), Slovenia was ranked in the 
upper half of EU countries, scoring highest in public debt which was only lower 
in four countries (the Baltic states and Ireland). Inflation continued to decrease 
and converged with the Maastricht price stability criterion at the end of 2005. 
The adoption of the euro in 2007 will additionally stabilise the national 
macroeconomic environment. Slovenia's performance in the area of ensuring 
macroeconomic stability and employment was more favourable than the results 
regarding the competitiveness of the economy.
Economic growth also enabled a rise in employment. The employment rate is 
rising steadily and has been above the EU average since 2004. The unem­
ployment rate is slightly below the EU average, as is Slovenia's long-term
2. Measured as GDP per capita in PPS.
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unemployment, although the share of long-term unemployed is still high. The 
low employment rates of the elderly and high youth unemployment are a 
particular cause for concern. The situation in the labour market is still not 
satisfactory as regards employment although some progress has been made. 
Part-time employment represents the biggest unused potential where flexibility 
and employment could be enhanced.
Slovenia has recorded very positive developmental results in the areas of the 
modem welfare state and higher employment. Slovenia belongs to countries 
with favourable balances in the labour market and the social protection system. 
It has also performed relatively well in the areas of living standards, risk of 
poverty and income inequality. Regarding sustainable development, Slovenia 
scores around the EU average in terms of integration of environmental com­
ponents into economic development. The biggest burdens for the environment, 
are energy intensity and the high consumption of nitrate fertilisers per unit of 
agricultural land.
Table 2. Basic macroeconomic and social policy facts
• Stable growth rate of around 4% without excessive public or external deficits
• Inflation brought down below 2.5%; ready to enter euro-zone by 2007
• Moderate wage growth (below productivity increase) based on agreement between social 
partners
• Below EU-average in unemployment rate (SLO: 6.8%: EU: 8.7%), long-term 
unemployment rate (SLO: 3.4%: EU 4.7%), at-risk-of-poverty rate after transfers (SLO: 
10%: EU: 15%), inequality by income quintile share ratio (SLO: 3.1; EU: 4.6)
• Measures foreseen to lower public expenditure share (by 2 percentage points until 2008), 
to eliminate structural public deficit (by 2010);
• Goals set to increase spending on R&D (3% GDP by 2010; now 1.6% with 60% financed 
by industry) and total spending on tertiary education (2% by 2010; now 1.3%)
Source: author's compilation
LISBON STRATEGY AND SLOVENIA
In a competitive environment, Slovenia has to cope with a double challenge. On 
the one hand, as a member of the developed world and sharing in European 
development values, it has to accept to an equal extent all of the findings and 
challenges that apply to the whole of the EU. On the other hand, it belongs to the 
less developed part of the EU, which means that it has to set for itself the goal of 
bringing its economy to the level of the more developed countries.
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EU membership has placed Slovenia within a new institutional and 
development framework whereby the conditions and methods for achieving its 
national development have changed fundamentally. Slovenia as an EU member 
has to reconsider its strategic position within a broader global framework. It 
must identify its existing weaknesses and development opportunities and 
respond to them with an appropriate strategy. Slovenia must find ways to 
achieve its national goals in a sustainable way and in line with the common 
European regulations, policies and strategies, primarily the revised Lisbon 
Strategy.
In the transition period, Slovenia achieved stable economic growth while it 
avoided major macroeconomic imbalances and maintained comparatively good 
results in its social development. The chief drawbacks of the development seen 
so far include an overregulated economy, weak entrepreneurial development 
and the economy's low level of innovativeness, the modest efficiency of 
investment in research and development, a too rigid labour market and an 
insufficiently stimulative system of social transfers. In order for Slovenia to 
achieve the Lisbon Strategy objectives, it must therefore carry out structural 
reforms that will strengthen the competitiveness of its economy and raise its 
employment levels. Not least, an efficient administration that will allow 
appropriate monitoring of the development strategy and consultation with all 
relevant stakeholders is very important.
Table 3. Majormilestones in the creation ofthe development strategies
Major milestones Consulted stakeholders
• Slovenia's Development Strategy 
(June 2005, draft June 2004)
• Framework for Economic and Social 
Reforms (October - November 2005)
• Reform Programme for Achieving the 
Lisbon Strategy Goals - NRP (October 
2005)
• Office for Growth (January 2005)
• New Social Agreement negotiations 
(since January 2006)
• Partnership for Development between 
Parliamentary Parties (April 2006)
• Economic and Social Council (emplo­
yers and employees)
• Chamber of Commerce (active contri­
bution to the programme)
• Parliamentary Committees
• Council for Sustainable Development
• Workshops with NGOs of different so­
cial interests and regions
• Public awareness campaign
Source: author's compilation
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The Reform Programme for Achieving the Lisbon Strategy Goals is the 
government's response to these challenges, setting out measures aimed at 
stimulating the economy's restructuring and liberalising the economy even 
further, and measures aimed at boosting economic growth and employment. By 
the end of 2005, the NRP was publicly debated in the National Assembly and in 
the Economic and Social Council. In 2006 Slovenia will present its first progress 
report of the reform programme which will show if the reforms and measures are 
on the right track.
Approach to the Lisbon Strategy in Slovenia 
Slovenia's Development Strategy
The answers to questions concerning Slovenian development and the Lisbon 
Strategy have been provided by Slovenia's Development Strategy, a document 
adopted by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia in June 2005, setting out 
the vision and priorities of Slovenia's development. At the forefront of the new 
strategy is the overall welfare of each individual. Slovenia's Development 
Strategy therefore focuses not only on economic issues but also on social, 
environmental, political, legal and cultural matters. Due to such a prioritisation 
of objectives, Slovenia's Development Strategy also serves as Slovenia's 
strategy for sustainable development. At the same time, it integrates the Lisbon 
goals within the national setting, bearing in mind Slovenia's specific 
development opportunities and setbacks.
Slovenia's Development Strategy was adopted on the basis of a broad 
consensus and comprehensive public debate that involved public stakeholders. 
In 2005, several public discussions on the draft of Slovenia's Development 
Strategy were organised within individual organisations (consultations held by 
the President of the Republic, the Sustainable Development Council, the 
Economic and Social Council, the Chamber of Crafts, the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, non-governmental and regional organisations).
The main objectives of Slovenia's Development Strategy are the following:
• to exceed the average level of the EU's economic development (measured as 
GDP per capita in PPP) and increase employment in line with the Lisbon 
Strategy goals in the next ten years;
• to improve the quality of living and the welfare of each individual, measured 




• to enforce the sustainability principle as the fundamental quality criterion in 
all areas of development, including the goal of sustained population growth; 
and
• to develop into a globally recognisable and renowned country through a 
characteristic development pattern, cultural identity and active engagement 
in the international community.
In order for Slovenia to achieve theses ambitious goals it needs to prepare and 
deliver sweeping structural reforms and change its existing development 
pattern. The new national development model therefore combines those 
positive characteristics of the European liberal economy models and the 
partner-state model that suits Slovenia in terms of its development possibilities 
and values. If Slovenia wants to improve its position and range among the most 
developed EU countries it needs to improve its global competitiveness 
substantially. This will, however, require more radical structural reforms and a 
change to the current development model. Slovenia's new political-economy 
vision is therefore geared towards a social market economy that will combine a 
more liberal market economy with an economically more efficient and flexible 
social-partner state.
Table 4. Vision of the new development paradigm
Current development model Vision of the new development paradigm
Regulation and bureaucratisation of markets 
Restrictive entrepreneurial environment
Relatively closed financial markets
State-corporatist ownership structure
Inadequate flexibility of labour market
Collective systems of social security
Corporativism of large social partners
Bureaucratic-hierarchical system of public 
administration
Emphasis on macroeconomic and social 
balance
Deregulation and liberalisation of markets 
Promoting the establishment and growth of 
enterprises
Openness of financial markets and competi­
tion
Privatised economic sector with actual ow­
ners
Greater flexibility of labour market
Individual needs and responsibilities
Open and wide partnership cooperation
Decentralisation and public private partner­
ship
Emphasis on sustainable development based 
on structural reforms and greater social dyna­
mics
Source: Slovenia's Development Strategy, 2005
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In order to achieve its goals, Slovenia's Development Strategy envisaged five 
development priority areas:
(i) The first development priority: a competitive economy and faster eco­
nomic growth:
. foster entrepreneurial development and increase competitiveness;
. increase inflows of development-promoting domestic and foreign invest­
ment;
• support the economy's internationalisation;
. increase the competitiveness of services;
. successful participation in the exchange rate mechanism ERM II and 
adoption of the euro.
(ii) The second development priority: effective generation, two-way flow and 
application of the knowledge needed for economic development and 
qualityjobs:
. raise economic efficiency and the level of investment in research and 
technological development;
. improve the quality of education and encourage lifelong learning.
(iii) The third development priority: an efficient and less costly state:
. increase the institutional competitiveness and efficiency of the state;
• restructure public finances to enhance their developmental role;
• ensure a better operation of thejudicial system.
(iv) The fourth development priority: a modem social state and higher em­
ployment:
. improve labour market flexibility;
• modernise social protection systems;
. reduce social exclusion and poverty risk.
(v) The fifth development priority: integration of measures to achieve sus­
tainable development:
• sustained population growth;
. balanced regional development;
• ensure optimal health conditions;
. improve spatial management;
• integrate environmental standards with sectoral policies and consum­
ption patterns;
. develop the national identity and culture.
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Framework for Economic and Social Reforms to increase 'welfare in Slovenia
After adoption of the strategy the government established the Committee for 
Reforms, a task force comprising some 200 experts from universities, busines­
ses and the civil service, and commissioned it to put forth specific measures for 
implementation of Slovenia's Development Strategy in the areas of competition, 
higher economic growth and employment. The Committee's proposal, a 
Framework for Economic and Social Reforms, was then adopted in November. 
The document consists of 67 measures that cover mainly the first four priority 
areas of Slovenia's Development Strategy and it represents the government's 
position and view of negotiations on the social agreement which include all the 
main elements of the planned reforms.
The document underlined that Slovenia must establish a different relationship 
between the economic effectiveness of the market and the social responsibility 
of individuals and the partner-state. Slovenia must overcome economic and 
social paradigms that have been in effect since our gaining independence. The 
new developmental course must be conceived as a partnership agreement 
between social partners and all other spheres of Slovenian society and the state.
In order to achieve a breakthrough, it will be necessary to change the system 
parameters in such a way that they can improve the institutional development 
climate and stimulate individuals and companies towards more vigorous and 
better-quality activity.
A Framework for Economic and Social Reforms intends to influence the 
following most important mechanisms for an enhanced development climate:
. motivation for activity (transfers, remuneration of work);
• possibilities for activity (tax reform, promotion of entrepreneurship, and a 
more flexible labour market);
. incentives for productivity, productive use of knowledge and employment 
(taxes and technological subsidies);
• free economic initiative (privatisation, entrepreneurship and liberalisation);
. an efficient and less expensive state (restructuring of public finance + 
limitation of public spending + better regulation + public/private partnership 
+ drawing EU funds + national projects + elimination of court backlogs);
. an efficient welfare state (transfers + health care + pension system).
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The Reform Programme for Achieving the Lisbon Strategy Goals
The Reform Programme for Achieving the Lisbon Strategy Goals identifies, in 
line with Slovenia's Development Strategy, five development priorities: a 
competitive economy and faster growth; a knowledge-based society; an 
efficient state; a modem social state and higher employment; and sustainable 
development. These priorities are subdivided into a number of more concrete 
objectives.
Theflrst development priority: 
a competitive economy andfaster economic growth
The proposed measures are intended to stimulate the economy's compe­
titiveness and raise economic growth rates. By implementing the planned 
measures Slovenia aims to promote faster development of entrepreneurship and 
small and medium-sized enterprises, create a more business-friendly 
environment, and increase the inflows of development-supporting domestic and 
foreign investment. Public utilities and network industries should be made more 
efficient through measures that will liberalise these services and enhance their 
competitiveness. These include better utilisation of the communication 
infrastructure of all utilities, the market-oriented restructur-ing of the energy 
sector and competitive end-user energy supply, and competitive transport and 
logistical services. At the same time, these reforms must take place in a stable 
macroeconomic environment, that will enable the adoption of the euro in 2007.
The second development priority:
effective generation, two-way flow and application o f the knowledge neededfor 
economic development and qualityjobs
Through the proposed measures of the second priority the better applica-tion in 
Slovenia of domestic and foreign knowledge for the country's eco-nomic 
development should be achieved. In this way, the formation of a more 
innovative and technologically advanced economy and the opening of better 
qualityjobs to a better educated and trained workforce, are encouraged.
The fundamental change in this sphere is the strengthening of cooperation 
between the research/academic sphere and the business sector. Joint work by 
experts and entrepreneurs in the development of new technological, organi­
sational, design, marketing and other business solutions is the best way to 
greater innovation and the more rapid technological progress of the eco-nomy. 
Improvements in the functioning of universities and implementation of the 
“Bologna declaration” in our education are crucial.
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The third development priority: 
an efficient and less costly state
The fundamental change is an increase in the efficiency of the state. This will be 
achieved by raising standards of professionalism and transparency in the public 
administration, improving the quality of its services and strength-ening its 
consulting function. Slovenia plans to introduce a regulatory impact assessment 
system to screen regulations for their restrictive administrative and regulatory 
impact on competition and economic activity and take steps to remove these 
obstacles. The gap between the state's investment needs and traditional available 
sources of funding will be reduced by introducing public-private partnerships 
(PPP) to the provision, performing and financing of public services and 
investment in infrastructure.
Thefourth development priority: 
a modern social state and higher employment
The purpose of the proposed measures is to create an environment, in which 
citizens will be able to find employment more rapidly and more easily and at the 
same time enjoy the necessary level of social protection. The main change is 
aimed at motivating unemployed people and recipients of social transfers to 
actively seek employment, develop their skills, and accept occasional and 
temporary jobs. In this respect, the state will assist them by amending the 
employment policy and introducing incentives for investment in education and 
training. At the same time, the changes made in the labour market will help 
employers adjust the extent of employment and thus encourage them to increase 
recruitment. Based on a better use of human resources, the planned set of 
measures will ensure faster economic growth and employment, without 
undermining the foundations of the social state.
Thefifth development priority:
integration o f measures to achieve sustainable development 
This aim of this priority is to ensure that the measures adopted within the 
sectoral policies are not only directed to achieving their specific objectives but 
that they also contribute to Slovenia's sustainable development. Many measures 
in this area have a predominantly national character and are not directly linked to 
the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy. They will, however, by all means be 
aligned with Slovenia's Development Strategy. Among other things, they 
include measures to achieve sustainable popu-lation growth, to improve the 
population's health and to develop the national identity and culture. Measures 
here, among others, include spatial planning, culture, regional development and 
the environment.
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Social dialogue
Public debate in Slovenia didn't finish with the adoption of Slovenia's 
Development Strategy. It's an ongoing process and among others, includes a 
debate over the reform programme for achieving Lisbon Strategy goals, nego­
tiations on a new social agreement among social partners and an agreement 
between political parties with the adopted Partnership for Development.
Public debate held prior to drafting the Reform Programme 
for Achieving the Lisbon Strategy Goals
In 2005 several public discussions related to the Lisbon Strategy took place. 
Aside from that, the revised Lisbon Strategy was discussed at the regular 
sessions of the working bodies at the National Assembly and the Social 
Economic Council. In April, the Slovenian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
organised a public debate during its third annual event called “Slovenian 
Business Week” and contributed concrete proposals and views on specific areas 
of the NRP. The key message was that the programme should focus on priority 
measures aimed at a swift and efficient increase in the competitiveness of 
Slovenia's business environment. During European Week in May, the Lisbon 
Strategy was also publicly debated in the National Assembly where 
representatives of the government, science, business sector and civil society 
presented their positions.
Even before drafting of the document began, the social partners were 
requested to formulate specific proposals concerning the programme. The 
Reform Programme for Achieving the Lisbon Strategy Goals was based on 
Slovenia's Development Strategy and departmental programmes and plans 
prepared by the responsible ministries. It also included the specific proposals 
and recommendations provided by the enterprise and research sectors and other 
stakeholders.
Consultations on the Reform Programme 
for Achieving the Lisbon Strategy Goals
The programme was due to be discussed at the beginning of September 2005. 
However, at that time the planned discussion did not take place due to a lack of 
time. The delay occurred because of the planned harmonisation of the reform 
programme with the proposals of the Reform Committee, which were still not 
finalised by then. Therefore, the first discussion of the Reform Committee's 
draft proposal was held at the Social Economic Council in October. At that 
meeting, the social partners made several proposals. These proposals are partly
107
Matevz Hribemik
incorporated in the Reform Programme for Achieving the Lisbon Strategy 
Goals; however, those proposals to which trade unions explicitly objected were 
not included in the programme.
The social partners discussed the programme in December. Both employers 
and trade unions emphasised that they were not directly involved in preparing 
the document. The social partners underlined that all social partners should 
participate in the drafting of such a document in constructive social dialogue, or 
else it may be difficult to carry the tasks out. Therefore, the Social Economic 
Council did not adopt ajoint view on the reform programme. It proposed to the 
government to equally involve the social partners in all further activities already 
in the initial stages of preparing strategies, policies and action plans.
As an important step forward, the social partners3 are involved in the 
preparation of the legal changes required for the implementation of the planned 
reforms through social dialogue and negotiations on the new social agreement.
Partnership for Development
For the government it was also important to get nation-wide political support for 
the reforms. In April, six parliamentary parties and the representatives of the 
Hungarian and the Italian minorities signed the Partnership for Development 
Agreement, and thus committed themselves to fruitful collaboration in seeking 
the best responses to future challenges, and to reaching consensus in adopting 
and promoting reforms. The only party not to sign the agreement was the Liberal 
Democracy of Slovenia, the largest opposition party.
Process of implementation and monitoring of 
the Lisbon Strategy in Slovenia
Government Office for Growth
As a continuation of the Committee for Reforms, in January 2006, new Govern­
ment Office for Growth was established. The Government Office for Growth is 
responsible for coordinating and monitoring implementation of Slovenia's 
Development Strategy and performs tasks related to economic and social 
reforms and development. The Government Office for Growth consists of the 
Department for Economic Reforms and Development and the Department for 
Social Reforms and Development.
3. Through the Social Economic Committee which is the central body for tripartite cooperation in 
Slovenia.
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The main tasks of the new office are in the following areas:
• coordination of the comprehensive planning of Slovenia's development;
• coordination and monitoring of the implementation of Slovenia's Develop­
ment Strategy and the economic and social reforms aimed at increasing the 
welfare of Slovenia;
• expert assistance and collaboration with the ministries in drafting the acts, 
implementing regulations and other acts needed for the implementation of 
Slovenia's Development Strategy and reforms;
• coordination of the government ministries and offices in effecting the 
reforms in the economic and social areas;
• coordination of preparation of the development documents and setting up of 
institutional structures for implementing all the development documents 
incorporated in the National Development Plan of the Republic of Slovenia 
2007-2013.
The Department for Economic Reforms and Development performs the tasks 
related to coordination of government ministries and offices in the pursuing of 
reforms in the economic area, in particular regarding the restructuring of public 
finances and the taxation system, promotion of competition, research activities, 
innovation and education, privatisation and financial sector development, 
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy and regulation of public utilities, 
coordination of the comprehensive planning of Slovenia's development as 
reflected in the contents, implementing structures and financial sources of the 
development plans incorporated in the National Development Plan 2007-2013, 
with an emphasis on the coordination of government reforms related to efficient 
use of EU funds.
The Department for Social Reforms and Development performs the tasks 
related to coordination of government ministries and offices in the pursuing of 
reforms in the social area, in particular regarding the measures aimed at 
establishing a more flexible labour market and higher employment, a more 
equitable and motivating system of social transfers, a more quality and efficient 
health care, as well as regarding the adjustments of the pension system and other 
changes aimed at meeting the social development goals of Slovenia's 
Development Strategy.
Monitoring
Efficient monitoring procedures are an essential part of the implementation. 
Monitoring of the reforms will actually be twofold:
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• The Government. Office for Growth will be preparing a regular implemen­
tation report which is based on a clear timetable for reforms.
• The Institute for Macroeconomic Development and Analysis will be 
preparing a yearly development report, based on around 70 indicators and 
measuring progress and lags in all areas of sustainable development, not only 
the Lisbon Strategy. The first report was already published in May 2006 and 
presents the development level and developmental trends in five develop­
ment areas set out in Slovenia's Development Strategy and other documents. 
However, the 2006 report does not evaluate the implementation of the 
adopted two-year measures defined in the Slovenia's Development Strategy 
or any other measures defined in the Reform Programme for Achieving the 
Lisbon Strategy Goals or the Framework of Economic and Social Reforms.
According to the renewed Lisbon Process, all governments must present 
yearly progress reports. The Slovenian Government will present this report in 
mid-October, after the public debate with the National Assembly and social 
partners.
The report will show the current implementation of proposed measures and 
reforms and will be done on the basis of the legislation timetable compiled by 
the Government Office for Growth. Each ministry will also present a list of their 
adopted measures and there will be a possibility for trade unions and chambers 
of commerce to present their actions and views on implementation. Inside the 
progress report, the Reform Programme for Achieving the Lisbon Strategy 
Goals will also be further developed. Several of the measures that contribute 
significantly to growth andjobs and were adopted later and included in other 
strategic documents (as for example the “Framework for Economic and Social 
Reforms” and the national research and development programme) couldn't be 
included in the text. The outcome of the new social agreement negotiations 
should also be included.
Linking the reform programme with cohesion policy
The success of reforms cannot, be guaranteed without appropriate financial 
backing from both the national and EU budget. The budget memorandum for
2006-2007 is the basic framework for preparation of the national budget for the 
next two years. It also defines the guidelines for the government's management 
of public finances and its conduct of economic and development policy. In 
realising the measures, the European cohesion policy (structural and cohesion
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funds) will also play a significant role. Therefore, several measures4 have been 
proposed to improve Slovenia's administrative and absorption capacity for EU 
funds.
Cohesion policy in Slovenia will pursue its current course over the next 
programme period, focusing on the objectives of employment growth. The 
Lisbon-orientation of cohesion policy is reflected in the substantial financial 
resources allocated by Slovenia for the European Social Fund programmes and 
support of programmes promoting competitiveness and innovation. In the next 
programme period, Slovenia will elaborate these programmes and increase its 
expenditure on them. The reforms in the area of education and employment will 
provide the regulatory conditions for the efficient use of funds and the required 
increase in absorption capacity. Slovenia will extend the current group of 
programme implementers and connect them more closely with the needs of the 
business sector.
The second area where the Lisbon goals can be integrated with cohesion 
policy is by complementing measures to boost economic growth and 
employment with measures from various other areas that can produce catalytic 
effects. The Lisbon Strategy goals are thus also included in, for example, 
measures of the rural development programme (entrepreneurial revamping of 
rural areas, forming producer partnerships for a joint market presence and 
measures for the commercial activation of nature and cultural heritage).
Cohesion policy in Slovenia focuses on ensuring the conditions for economic 
growth and national competitiveness. Its task is to build development- 
conducive infrastructure and generate the required labour potential and a 
creative mindset in society.
CONCLUSIONS
The essence of the original and renewed Lisbon Strategy is structural reform. 
The main question on all governments' political agenda is not whether to reform
4. Measures: (i) designate one central body for the planning and harmonisation of national 
development policies; (ii) appoint one managing authority in the area of structural funds; the 
areas of the cohesion fund and environmental and transport infrastructure will be assigned one 
managing authority each; for cohesion policy as a whole (structural funds and Cohesion Fund) 
there will be onejoint payment authority; (iii) the strategic governance of cohesion policy will 
be centralised in one body, which will be ensured by the preparation and monitoring of the 
National Strategic Reference Framework; and (iv) cohesion policy funds must be itemised 
under one budgetary heading.
I l l
Matevz Hribemik
or not, but when and how. Slovenia started with gradual transition to the market 
economy at the beginning of the 1990s and then pursued further structural 
reforms when entering the EU. As new challenges arise we have to tackle them 
with further changes and reforms.
The overloaded Lisbon Agenda and unclear objectives and priorities, in 
addition to the inactivity of some member states, have led to an unclear approach 
and lack of delivery. The renewed Lisbon 2005 tried to tackle the main 
drawbacks of the original Lisbon Strategy and the absence of structural reforms, 
with the improved focus on growth and jobs and higher degree of political 
ownership. Some questions still remain open: how to make coordination of 
reforms more effective or how and whether to set an improved benchmarking 
framework. The possibility to set their own national priorities and the 
introduction of NRPs was also very welcome, though comparison between 
programmes is quite difficult due to lack of uniformity.
From Slovenia's case we can draw the following conclusions:
Better focus and prioritisation: Focus on proper priorities is a key to the 
success of every development, also Slovenia's. The EU should allow its member 
states a certain flexibility and independence in defining priorities according to 
their national preferences and developmental goals. Slovenia also argued for an 
integrated approach that places emphasis on all three aspects of sustainable 
development - its economic, social and environmental components. The key to 
success is to act on good intentions and according to priorities needed, in spite of 
pressure from special interests and in spite of the political risks associated with a 
less cautious approach to reform.
Improved ownership: Lack of national ownership was one of the shortcomings 
of the original Lisbon Strategy. The renewed Lisbon Strategy has put the 
ownership and NRPs at the centre of the process. Preparation of strategic 
documents in Slovenia shows that involvement of stakeholders in the process of 
preparation of strategic documents and goals is crucial. For the best organisation 
of that involvement, special institutional arrangements need to be established. 
The tripartite body, the Social and Economic Council, where employers, 
employees and the government meet, was established several years ago. 
Another opportunity to talk with interested stakeholders is through the Council 
for Sustainable Development. The success of the national strategies cannot, be 
guaranteed without the involvement and participation of interested 
stakeholders. Without national ownership for reforms, every government will 
have problems in implementation of the measures.
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Better communication with citizens: Far more emphasis must be placed on 
engaging citizens with improved understanding of why reforms and the Lisbon 
Strategy are relevant to every person in every household in Slovenia. The 
government should undertake the reforms because of the improved welfare for 
all citizens in the long run, not only because of the obligations to the 
international community, for example the EU. Problems in obtaining political 
support for the reforms arise from the uneven distribution of costs and benefits 
of reforms across the economy and time. The long-term effects of reforms 
should be positive for all, though some ultimately lose in the short term. With 
this in mind it is important to present a cost-benefit analysis with all the positive 
andnegative consequences ofreforms overtime.
Best use o f the EU. The EU does not only mean a free and open internal 
market, as especially in the area of services the trade is not yet liberalised. The 
EU also means substantial financial support for the countries that are seeking to 
develop. Both at the time of EU accession and EU membership a country must 
make the best use of its support mechanism, pre-accession and structural and 
cohesion funds. Therefore it is essential to improve administrative and 
absorption capacity for EU funds. From the EU view, greater emphasis should 
be laid on promoting real convergence and economic cohesion of all member 
states. The selection of measures aimed at promoting growth, productivity and 
employment should therefore place special attention on those member states 
that lag behind most markedly, while the measures intended to increase 
economic cohesion should prioritise those that are also aimed at achieving the 
Lisbon goals. The implementation of the Lisbon Strategy through carefully 
selected measures can increase economic convergence and cohesion between 
old and new member states.
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SUMMARY
The National (Lisbon) Reform Programme (NRP) is not the only mid-term 
economic programme in the EU member states, but one o f the partially 
overlapping and potentially conflicting programmes, being different in their 
final objectives as well as in their financing. In Hungary, the priorities and 
planned measures o f the NRP have been elaborated in a period where the 
catching-up process o f the economy (through the National Strategic Reference 
Framework) and the stabilisation o f some o f the main macroeconomic 
indicators (through the Convergence Programme) enjoy priority. Until there 
are no conflicts between the NRP and the two other programmes, the NRP 
objectives will probably be consistentlyfollowed. Strong coordination between 
the programmes and broad public (professional) debate increases the chance o f  
success fo r  the NRP; nevertheless, in the present situation, logically, it is the 
other two programmes that enjoy priority - in other words, it is not Lisbon that 
mattersfirst.
INTRODUCTION
“Programming” is one of the key words of European integration. In a general 
sense, it means that actions should not be initiated ad hoc, but as part of a 
process. The notion of programming is most well-known in the field of 
structural operations, where it has been one of the fundamental principles since 
1988. However, as empirical evidence shows, programming is present in 
practically any field of European integration: long-term programmes (plans) are 
more or less regularly elaborated (on regional, national and/or supra-national 
level) in order to promote development in the field in question.
117
Tamas Szemler
The National (Lisbon) Reform Programmes (NRPs) of the member states of 
the European Union (EU) fit well into this logic. In order to cope with the 
challenges of global competition, member states had to elaborate mid-term 
reform programmes, containing an analysis of their actual situation as well as a 
plan of measures to be taken in the fields concerned (macroeconomic issues, 
microeconomic issues, employment issues). Despite their novelty, it is very 
difficult to see them alone, because they contain a lot of aspects which are 
already present in other programmes orplans.
This is also true for the case of Hungary. In this paper, we will have an over­
view of the NRP of Hungary, bearing in mind its overlaps with two other pro­
grammes: the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), designed for 
identifying the main development objectives and for the efficient use of (EU and 
national) financial resources, and the Convergence Programme (CP), the fulfil­
ment of which is crucial for getting closer to the introduction of the euro. On the 
basis of the analysis, the reader can identify the main points where these pro­
grammes can be strengthened and also those where they can be opposed to each 
other.
The structure of the paper is the following: in the first part, we will discuss the 
connections between the above-mentioned three issues and the three related 
programmes. Then, we put the Lisbon Agenda, and the NRP into the foreground, 
and present the situation and the priorities in Hungary - according to the logic of 
the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (IGs) - in the field of macroeco­
nomic policy, microeconomics and employment issues. Finally, we discuss the 
NRP's success chances in Hungary, with special regard to its “environment.” 
(institutional background as well as consistency vs. conflicts with other pro­
grammes or policy areas); these remarks can also be relevant for other new or 
future EU member states.
THREE ISSUES - THREE PROGRAMMES
Hungarian economic policy objectives are in many aspects closely linked to the
conditions the country has to fulfil in order to comply with EU requirements.
These links can be best summarised in the case of three issues:
. The main overall economic objective of the country is to catch up to the EU 
average development level. EU funds (the Structural Funds and the Cohesi­
on Fund) play a very important role in this process, especially with regard to 
the increase of funds available from 2007 (on average, between 2007-2013,
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•yearly around 3.2 billion euro will be available from these funds for Hun-gary; 
this is roughly three times the yearly average in the period 2004-2006).
• Hungary is committed to replacing its national currency by the euro as soon 
as the country is ready for it. To arrive at that point, Hungary has to make 
efforts in order to fulfil the Maastricht criteria.
• Hungary, like all the member states of the EU, is part of the Lisbon Process. 
The years 2005-2008 constitute the first mid-term period for introducing 
measures in order to realise progress in the fields of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic performance, as well as of employment.
The above three objectives overlap considerably in time; regarding the con­
tents, there are overlaps (even synergies) which can help the realisation of the 
objectives, but in some aspects, these objectives - at least in the short term - also 
contradict each other. Most contradictions concern financing, and it is the task of 
the elaborated mid-term programmes to coordinate the policies in a way that 
enables them to make ends meet. The three programmes mentioned above are 
the following:
. National development objectives, priorities and the use of EU funds are 
integrated in the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF). Due to 
its nature, this programme has a solid financial background for the period
2007-20131. The NSRF contains a detailed evaluation of the situation, the 
description of development objectives, priorities and measures, as well as an 
overall plan for financing these measures.
• The way towards fulfilling the Maastricht criteria is laid down in the Con­
vergence Programme (CP). Due to the fact that Hungary did not reach the 
targets laid down in its CP, a new version of it will be prepared by September 
2006. This new version will establish target values for the next years and an 
official target date (actually still 2010) for the introduction of the euro.
. The National (Lisbon) Reform Programme2 outlines the main tasks related to 
the EU's Lisbon Strategy in Hungary in the period 2005-2008. This pro­
gramme - similarly to the NSRF - also contains an evaluation of the present 
situation and mid-term prospects of the economy, and proposes measures in 
the fields already mentioned. The big difference from the NSRF is that the 
role of EU financing is minimal in Lisbon-related actions.
1. The first NSRF (generally referred to in Hungary as the National Development Plan) was 
prepared for the period 2004-2006.




Overlaps between the programmes are relatively easy to identify. All the three 
programmes have to take into account the actual situation and the mid-term 
prospects of the economy. No wonder that the evaluation parts of the program­
mes are very similar to each other; in part, they have been produced by the same 
institutions and the same people. This, of course, helps the programmes to be 
coherent, and reduces the risks of containing contradictory evaluations and 
expectations.
However, there are important differences between the programmes. The CP is 
very different from the other two programmes: its objectives are very clear, and 
the measures it requires, generally reduce the room for manoeuvre of both other 
programmes (especially of the NRP, which has to be realised mainly from 
domestic financial resources, but also making co-financing potentially more 
difficult in the case of the NSRF). We have to note, anyway, that even the CP can 
have effects which strengthen both other programmes: e.g. if a public sector 
reform, including the reform of the territorial units (a concrete example of the 
reform plans of the new government) is successfully managed, it can also help to 
make the use of EU funds more efficient as well as enabling a change of the 
business environment, pointing to the direction set in Lisbon.
This is, of course, easy to say, and much more difficult to reach in practice. As 
Hungary is still relatively at the beginning of all three programmes (in the case 
of the CP, the new version will probably also mean a new beginning, as can be 
seen from the government's reform plans), we cannot, speak about clear results. 
Instead, in the following sections, we concentrate on our main topic - the NRP - 
and refer to possible synergies and conflicts with both other programmes. As a 
result, in the end we will be able tojudge whether the Lisbon Process really plays 
an important role in the ongoing reforms in Hungary or it is more likely to be 
pushed into the background.
Macroeconomic outlook and measures
Macroeconomic stability and financial balance are fundamental for the achieve­
ment of the objectives set in the NRP.
According to the projections of the NRP, real GDP growth in Hungary is 
expected to remain around or above 4% in the next years. Exports are expected 
to increase more than twice as fast as GDP, thus they remain a driving force of 
growth. The optimism of the NRP in this respect can bejustified by the experi­
ences of the previous years (Hungarian exports grew 3 to 4 percentage points 
higher than external demand even in recession).
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However, the NRP also considers the role of domestic use important for GDP 
growth. Consumption is also expected to grow dynamically, but at a slower pace 
(3-3.5% per year) than GDP; this means a positive change on the demand side 
structure of Hungarian GDP. Private consumption is expected to grow yearly by 
between 3% and 3.5%, while public consumption is estimated to stagnate 
throughout the period until 2008. Inflation is expected to decelerate gradually, 
and to be around 2% to 3% in 2008.
Table 1. GDP components in Hungary (change compared to previous year, in %)
2005 2006 2007 2008
Household consumption app. 3 app. 3.5 3-3.5 3-3.5
Public consumption -1-0 -1-0 app. 0 0-1
Investments 6-8 6-8 6-8 6-8
Domestic use 2-3 app. 4 4-4.5 4-4.5
Export (goods and services) 9-11 10-12 9-11 8-10
Import (goods and services) 7-9 10-12 9-11 8-10
GDP 3.5-4 app. 4 4-4.5 4-4.5
Source: National Reform Programmefor Growth and Employment (2005),p. 9.
The estimated yearly growth rate of investments is between 6% and 8% An 
important underlying factor of this dynamism is the continuously increasing 
presence of foreign capital; the attractiveness of the country for foreign 
investors has to be further increased. Firms with foreign capital play a very 
important role in the export performance of Hungary, as well.
Dynamic and sustainable growth is expected to have positive effects on 
employment. Until 2008, the NRP estimates a slow increase in the number of 
employees (see the data in Table 2). The unemployment rate is expected to 
decline again, and while the decrease is expected to be relatively small, it is 
calculated for slightly increasing activity rates, thus the real improvement can be 
better, if the figures come true.
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Table 2. Employment and growth in Hungary (change in %)
2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of employees app. 0 0-1 0.5-1 0.5-1
Unemployment rate, % 6.5-7 6.3-6.8 6.2-6.4 6.1-6.3
Activity rate, % 60.5-61 app. 61 61-61.5 61.5-62
GDP 3.5-4 app. 4 4-4.5 4-4.5
Source: National Reform Programmefor Growth and Employment (2005),p. 7.
Indicators concerning stability have been problematic for Hungary for a long 
time. In the case of price stability, the tendency of improvement is expected to 
continue: the inflation rate is estimated to continue to decelerate gradually, and 
to be around 2% to 3% in 2008. However, external factors3 (e.g. high oil prices) 
as well as (at least partly) internal problems (e.g. doubts about the strength of the 
national currency) and measures (e.g. increasing tax rates) can endanger this 
path.
Table 3. Inflation (%)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
annual average 6.8 3.5-4 app. 2 app. 3 2-3
Source: National Reform Programmefor Growth and Employment (2005),p. 9.
Most of the above-mentioned potential internal dangers for the NRP are 
related to the high level of public deficit. As can be seen from the data in Table 4, 
due to the sharp divergence of the public deficit from the original plans, the 2004 
version of the CP had to be modified in December 2005. The increase in general 
government net lending also led to a divergence in the gross debt figures.
3. Differences from basic assumptions of the CP (see Government of the Republic of Hungary, 
2005, p. 38) can considerably modify the prospects. Apart from fully external factors, the 
HUF/EUR exchange rate (estimated to be at 252.5 in 2006 (annual average), but being around 
280 at the beginning of July 2006) can cause important changes.
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Table 4. General government net lending and general government gross debt 
(% of GDP) figures in the Convergence Programme, and actual values
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General government net lending
CP 2004 4.5 3.8 3.1 2.4 1.8
CP 2005 5.4 6.1 4.7 3.3 1.9
Difference 0.9 2.3 1.6 0.9 0.1
Actual value 5.4 6.1
General government gross debt
CP 2004 57.3 55.3 53.0 50.6 48.3
CP 2005 57.2 57.7 58.4 57.9 56.2
Difference -0.1 2.4 5.4 7.3 7.9
Actual value 57.2 58.4
Source: Government o f  the Republic ofHungary (2005),p. 36, Gazdasâgi és Kôzlekedési Mini- 
sztérium (2006), p. 6, Vida (2006), p. 144.
However, it is not by chance that the European Commission decided to request 
a new version of the CP from Hungary up till September 2006. The diverging 
trend of public deficit continued in 2006, and in the period January to June, the 
accumulated deficit has reached 72.7% of the (already modified) value planned 
for the whole year, which is (in the first six months of the year!) 5.6% of the 
planned yearly GDP (Penzugyminiszterium, 2006, p.l). Analysts estimate the 
general government/debt ratio to be around 8-10% - this range covers figures 
about twice as much as the figure in the 2005 version of the CP. Of course, this 
also has a negative effect on the trend of the gross government debt/GDP ratio, 
and makes potential conflicts between the CP and the NRP more probable.
Priorities and measures listed in the NRP in the macroeconomic field are 
related to the above aspects, and try to contribute to the changes which can 
support macroeconomic stability. Structural changes are foreseen in order to 
secure economic stability (a pre-condition for sustainable growth). In order to 
reach long-term sustainability of the general government, inter-related steps are 
necessary: to continue the pension reform, to begin the reform of healthcare, to 
take measures targeted at the increase of employment, and to achieve a 
budgetary balance ensuring the appropriate rate of decrease of government debt.
Decentralisation of income is an important objective of fiscal policy. The most 
important instruments planned in this field are the reform of the tax regime and 
that of the contribution system. As increasing price stability creates a more
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predictable economic environment, in 2005 the government has proposed to 
contribute to greater predictability by launching the debate on a more 
predictable wage policy. This, in principle, can also contribute to the objective of 
making macroeconomic, structural and employment policies more coherent.
Microeconomic outlook and measures
The microeconomic situation and development is also crucial for Lisbon-related 
reforms. In Hungary, though there is an improving trend, and the country 
performs better than some of its Central European competitors (see Figure 1), 
productivity is still much lower than in the EU. This situation is due to a number 
of structural characteristics, to the problems in the availability of capital (both 
physical and human), the inequalities in the competitiveness of the business 
sector and the relatively low average efficiency of public services.
Figure 1. Productivity of labour in selected countries 
(per employee, EU-25=100)












1 1 1 I 1 1 — . - Slovakia
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Source: National Reform Programmefor Growth and Employment (2005),p. 55.
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Innovation expenditure in the business sector is low: innovation capabilities, 
as well as demand for innovation are limited. R&D expenditure approximates 
only 1% of GDP (instead of 3% defined among the Lisbon objectives), and there 
is no clear trend forthe increase ofthis ratio (see Figure 2). The structure ofR&D 
expenditure is also problematic: the share of the business sector is only about 
30%. Concerning the information society, despite recent dynamic development, 
Hungary lags far behind the EU average.
Figure 2. Ratio of the Hungarian R&D expenditure to GDP (%)
Source: National Reform Programmefor Growth and Employment (2005), p. 56.
The main objective of the NRP in this field is to improve competitiveness. In 
order to reach this objective, the NRP emphasises the following priorities:
• The spread of new (production) technologies.
• The training of flexible and adaptive labour.
• The development of intense R&D and innovation activities as well as ope­
rations creating ICT assets.
• The modem physical infrastructure serving the economy.
The measures foreseen include direct market developing steps (in order to 
extend competitiveness) encouraging the private sector to participate more 
actively in the R&D activity, and to facilitate the spread and utilisation of ICT. 
As in Hungary, the quality of physical capital is a crucial problem, the deve­
lopment of infrastructure is a basic pre-condition of improving competitiveness.
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This has special importance in the case of transport infrastructure, but other 
segments (R&D, innovation infrastructure, broadband etc.), as well as the im­
provement of the business environment, and the intensification of competition 
are also important.
Employment situation and measures
As has already been mentioned, the Hungarian labour market is characterised by 
a relatively low level of employment (56.8% in 2004), coupled with a low rate of 
unemployment (6.1% in 2004, slightly over 7% in 2005). The main challenge 
for labour market policy is the high rate of inactivity in the working-age 
population. In particular, older age groups and men show a low employment 
rate.
For highly skilled people, labour market prospects are similar or better, but for 
low-skilled people, these prospects are poorer than in other EU member states. 
There is a specific feature of the Hungarian labour market: the clear disad­
vantage of the Roma population. Disadvantages, however, also hit disabled 
people. Last, but not least, regional inequalities regarding employment and 
unemployment figures are significant (with employment rates about 62% and 
unemployment rates under 5% in Central Hungary and Western Transdanubia, 
and employment rates about 50% and unemployment rates above 7% in the 
poorer southern and eastern regions; regarding smaller units, disparities are 
much more important).
The NRP's prospects are based on the employment targets set in 2004. The 
data in Table 5 show clearly that regarding figures concerning employment - and 
unlike in the case of unemployment figures - Hungary is lagging behind the EU 
average. In recent years, there have been some slight positive changes regarding 
activity and employment, but even the mid-term targets are quite cautious. For 
2010, the national objective for the employment rate is 63%, which is 6 
percentage points more than the baseline (2003) data, but 4 percentage points 
less than the EU datain2005, and 7 percentage points less than the EU objective 
set for 2010. Nevertheless, increasing activity and employment is a priority for 
the NRP, and the realisation of the mid-term plan figures would be a success.
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Table 5. Employment targets set in 2004 (%)

















Total 64.3 62.9 67 70 57.0 59 63
Women 56.0 55.0 57 60 50.9 53 57
Men 72.5 70.8 - - 63.4 64 69
55+ 41.7 40.2 - 50 29.0 33 37
Source: National Reform Programmefor Growth and Employment (2005),p. 35.
In order to reach the employment targets, the NRP (in line with the Hungarian
Employment Strategy re-drafted and adjusted to the period 2005-2008 in 2005):
• “supports the elaboration and introduction of programmes furthering the 
acquisition of basic skills and key competences in school education and 
training;
• ensures rapid adaptation to the ever changing labour market demands in 
professional training both from the aspect of content and organisation;
• strengthens the role of education and training systems in the fight against 
discrimination, in the creation of equal social opportunities and regional 
realignment;
• helps the general introduction of practice oriented courses reacting better to 
economic demands in higher education - as part of the Bologna Process - and 
improves the physical, personal and organisational conditions for an enhanc­
ed innovative participation of the sector” (National Reform Programme for 
Growth and Employment, 2005, pp. 5-6).
THE “ENVIRONMENT” AND THE CHANCES OF THE NRP
As has been said earlier, the Hungarian NRP is embedded into a set of
programmes with partly overlapping priorities and time periods. As has also
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been said, it has - by its nature - a very close and organic connection to the NSRF. 
This connection makes the two programmes not simply overlapping (which, in 
itself, could also be a disadvantage, as it could be evaluated as a duplication of 
programmes), but - due to the difference in the time frames - potential 
divergences from NRP objectives (until 2008) can help actions initiated to 
correct the same aspects (if they are relevant) in the NSRF (lasting until 2013).
Thus, the NRP contributes to the exercise of “continuous planning”; different 
programmes are built on each other, and provide several reference points and 
benchmarks, in order to check their success. This is very important in a country - 
and this is valid not only for Hungary, but for all the new and future EU members 
from Central and Eastern Europe - where “planning” was something 
“suspicious”, and thus quite pushed into the background in the 1990s, and it 
came into fashion again only by the end of that decade, due to the prospect and 
the pre-conditions forEU accession4.
An interesting question - also related not especially to Hungary, but for all 
member states - is whether EU structural policy will be “Lisbonised” in the 
future (in the sense that Lisbon objectives will have an increasingly important 
place in structural operations, and thus they can menace traditional structural 
policy objectives). There can be such fears within the European Commission 
and in the member states, as well, but if NSRF priorities reflect the real needs of 
a country, it is not necessarily a problem for the given member state. Problems 
can arise if objectives and measures are not coordinated; in such a case, due to 
the very limited available EU financing, it will be very probably in the case of 
the NRP that measures and success can be endangered.
In the case of Hungary, such a situation seems to be unlikely at the moment. 
Although financial constraints are important, and they are expected to remain so 
for some time, the high degree of coordination between the NSRF and the NRP 
provides a solid background (potential changes in the public administration, 
however, can endanger this situation, but at the moment, there is no experience 
about how the reorganisation of ministries will affect this coordination in 
practice).
4. This was only partly a consequence of the rejection of (even the rhetorical) heritage of the 
centrally planned economic system; due to the very rapid changes (creation of fundamental 
market economy institutes, opening up of the economy, structural and geographical 
reorientation of trade, etc.), “strategies” in the early 1990s served mainly to manage these 
changes. Mid-term strategies (industrial policy concepts) appeared in Hungary again from the 
secondhalfofthe 1990s.
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There has been broad public debate launched about the NSRF and the NRP in 
Hungary. The number of different professional and civil organisations that 
commented both programmes is very high, and this process contributes to the 
credibility of the programmes. The NRP, and Lisbon in general, however, is still 
in the background for the broad public, while the NSRF, and recently the CP 
(and the related restrictive measures) get much more attention.
Although the time span (2005-2008) coincides with the rapid increase of EU 
transfers, and, as a result of the elections in April 2006, there was no delay due to 
the national political cycle in this period5, the fact that the time span also 
coincides with the need for budgetary consolidation, is very important for the 
success or failure of the NRP. We will see only later whether there will be only 
restrictive measures or real budgetary/public sector reform, and what role under 
these circumstances there can be for development, and especially for the Lisbon 
objectives.
What we can see already today is that while the Lisbon objectives - 
concretised for Hungary in the NRP - are important to the country, the primary 
objectives are the possible most efficient use of available development transfers 
(at programme level, this is the task of the NSRF), and the change towards a 
credible and successful stabilisation of the public finances (at programme level, 
this is the task of the CP). Until there are no conflicts between the NRP and the 
two other programmes, the NRP objectives will probably be consistently 
followed, but it is not the NRP that has the lead - to answer the question in the 
title, it is not Lisbon in the first place that really matters. As similar situations can 
occur in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well, the Hungarian 
experiences of the actual period can also be interesting for new and future EU 
members.
EPILOGUE FROM SIX MONTHS LATER
This paper was first prepared for a conference dealing with actual questions 
concerning the Lisbon agenda, organised in May 2006, then finalised in the first
5. It has to be remarked that even in the case of a political change as a result of the general 
elections, no substantial changes regarding the content of the NRP could be expected (Szemler, 
2006). Despite the victory of the governing coalition, as part of the restructuring of the public 
administration, there have been changes in the institutional structure (the National 
Development Office has been replaced by the National Development Agency) as well as in the 
person responsible forthe NSRF.
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days of July 2006. Since then, some important changes regarding actual 
macroeconomic data6, and, as a consequence, the mid-term macroeconomic 
outlook in Hungary have taken place: the new version of the CP (mentioned in 
the text in the future tense) was prepared by the Government of the Republic of 
Hungary for 1 September 2006, and approved later on by the competent EU 
authorities. The new convergence programme outlines slower growth for the 
years 2007-2008, and it has consequences on consumption, investment, 
employment and unemployment figures, as well. As the amounts for co­
financing are continuing to be assured according to the new figures, the potential 
conflict between the CP and the NSRF (mentioned in the paper) does not seem to 
threaten their use. On the other hand, the changes in the growth path have clear 
consequences for the realisation of the NRP In line with the new version of the 
CP, the revised version of the NRP (approved by the Government of the 
Republic of Hungary on 11 October 2006) reflects the above changes, and the 
timetable of the plans to realise some important objectives (among them 
employment and unemployment rate targets) had to be modified. This new 
version of the NRP is expected to be evaluated by the European Commission in 
December 2006.
While the concrete figures and timetables have gone through changes7, the 
main qualitative mid-term objectives of the three programmes remain 
unchanged. Of course, in the present situation (these lines are written at the end 
of November 2006) the CP has come even more to the foreground, while 
catching-up remains an important priority. As a consequence, it is (still) not 
Lisbon that matters first.
6. It has become clear that the actual budget deficit (general government net lending) figure will be 
considerably higher than the one foreseen in the 2005 version of the CP. Even with some 
corrective measures introduced in 2006, the deficit is now estimated to reach 10.1% of the GDP 
in 2006 (the figure in the 2005 version of the CP (“actual value” in Table 4 of this paper) was 
6 .1% ).
7. Including the timetable for the introduction of the euro: contrary to earlier scenarios setting 
target dates (the last one, mentioned as “actual” in the point discussing the relations between the 
three programmes, being 2010), the new version of the CP does not establish a new target date. 
On the basis of the figures of the new CP, however, the introduction of the euro in Hungary is 
now very likely to happen years later than the previous target dates.
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DOES THE LISBON STRATEGY MATTER: 
THE CZECH EXPERIENCE
Martin Potûcek




The Lisbon Strategy developed under the auspices o f the old member states and 
had no relevance to the accession process as such. Nevertheless, between 2002 
and 2004 this strategy became an inspiration fo r  the creation o f national 
political programmes. The paper analyses the role o f the Lisbon Strategy in the 
preparation o f the Czech Republic to enter the European Union - and within the 
first two years o f the country'sfull EU membership. It tries to identify the place 
o f the Lisbon Strategy among other external and internalfactors influencing the 
Czech Republic's economic and social development, including the capacity o f 
the country to apply the Open Method o f Coordination (OMC), in various policy 
fields. The real impact o f the OMC in governance at the national level has been 
dramatically below its potential influence. In the new member states there is an 
urgent need to solve the discrepancy between the enormous public tasks and 
insufficient social, economic and administrative implementation capacities.
THE LISBON STRATEGYAS ONE OF THE FACTORS 
OF POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION
In general, the European Union has played an active role in supporting and 
mediating modernisation in the new member states. Its positive influence can be 
identified in various fields. Well worth noting is the EU's assistance to insti­
tution and capacity building (e.g. PHARE projects), specifically designed 
modernisation efforts - a reform of public administration, regulatory reform, 
training of professionals (including civil servants), implementation of new
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methods of public management and administration, collaboration in the field of 
education, etc.
The history of systematic preparation of the post-communist candidate coun­
tries1 for accession started with the launching of the Copenhagen criteria of 
accession (1993). These criteria have been designed more as a technical (eco­
nomic and political) instrument, from above than as an appropriate tool to steer 
peoples' living conditions in the candidate countries. Legal, economic and 
political issues prevailed.
First, candidate countries were asked to reform their national economies to be 
able to compete - and be compatible - with market economies of the old member 
states.
They had to build robust and reliable institutions of political democracy. They 
were asked to adjust their legal and administrative systems to the acquis 
communautaire. These tasks were (at least in the formation of the corresponding 
institutional framework) successfully fulfilled by the beginning of the 21st 
century. The fast progress in both economic and political adjustment to these 
requirements has been astonishing and deserves high evaluation.
On the other hand, genuine social goals were at the very bottom of the then list 
of priorities - limited to the preservation of individual human rights and the 
building of a loosely defined framework for social policy making. The 
containment or reduction of poverty and income inequalities, labour rights, a 
living wage and the alleviation of the fate of the marginalised groups, in other 
words, the fight against social exclusion, did not form an integral part of the 
Copenhagen criteria reform agendas. Most national social policies in the 
candidate countries in the beginning and the middle of the 1990s “consisted of 
the withdrawal of the state and the improvement of efficiency by the 
privatisation and marketisation of the services. These steps were to be 
completed by the reduction of the coverage and standards of all social benefits 
except social assistance, a well-targeted safety net for the poor” (Ferge, 2001).
The European Council launched the economic nucleus of the Lisbon Strategy 
in March 2000, and enriched it by its social dimension in Nice in December 
2000. Very soon, the environmental dimension followed suit (Gothenburg 
Summit, June 2001). It was the stream of new political initiatives, stressing the 
importance of human resources, quality of life, social cohesion, in short, the 
“social fabric” of contemporary societies. The Czech Republic was asked to
1. Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
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take part in the Lisbon Strategy negotiations only after the 2002 Barcelona 
Summit, when the preparation of the new member states to enter the EU - until 
then organised within the logic of the Copenhagen criteria - had just been 
completed. Fully fledged participation in the Lisbon Strategy started only with 
the country's accession to the EU in May 2004. Thus, social policy moved to the 
top of the EU political agenda of enlargement as late as one decade after setting 
up the Copenhagen criteria of accession.
Thus the Lisbon Strategy, developed under the auspices of the old member 
states, had no relevance to the accession process as such. Nevertheless, between 
2002 and 2004 it became an inspiration for the creation of national political 
programmes. A new coalition government under Prime Minister Vladimir 
Spidla, leader of the Czech Social Democratic Party, came to power in July 
2002. The coalition agreement and the new government's declaration comprised 
all the Lisbon Strategy goals. The Office of the Government's Department for 
European Integration2, which had existed since 1998, was re-named the 
Department for EU Issues, in May 20 033. Along with the Inter-ministerial 
Commission for the Implementation of the Lisbon Strategy Goals4 it supervises 
its implementation in the Czech Republic.
The original Lisbon Strategy was amended by its environmental dimension at 
the Gothenburg Summit, in 2001. It conceptualised sustainable development as 
consisting of three pillars: economic, social and environmental. A Strategy of 
Sustainable Development was approved by the Czech government in 2004 
(Strategie udrzitelneho rozvoje, 2004). The New European Commission 
redefined the Lisbon Strategy by prioritising economic growth, education, 
research and development, and fighting unemployment in 2005. In the 
meantime, Vladimir Spidla resigned as Prime Minister. His successor, Stanislav 
Gross, installed a new deputy prime minister for the economy, Martin Jahn. One 
of his tasks was to prepare a Strategy of Economic Growth (Strategie 
hospodarskeho rustu, 2005) and a National Lisbon Programme 2005-20085 
(Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, 2005). Both documents were 
approved by the government in 2005 and submitted to the European 
Commission. Typically, the Czech National Lisbon Programme 2005-2008 
consists of three parts: macroeconomic (notably continuing public finances 
reform), microeconomic (measures to strengthen and increase competitiveness)
2. Odborproevropskouintegraci.
3. OdborprozalezitostiEU.
4. Meziresortni komise Uradu vlady CR pro naplnovani cilu Lisabonske strategie.
5. Narodni Lisabonsky program 2005-2008.
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and employment (labour market flexibility, inclusion in the labour market, 
and education). Thus the 2005 programmatic shift at European Union level 
found a favourable response in the Czech Republic.
The Czech scholarly community has discussed the nature and implementation 
potential of the Lisbon Strategy in general and in the Czech Republic in 
particular. The whole spectrum of positions has occurred. Some economists 
challenged the inclusion of social cohesion, environmental goals and the 
sustainable development concept as such. Even the scholars, who in principle 
agreed with the structure of the Lisbon Strategy goals and the usefulness of such 
a programmatic effort, have found it quite difficult to see it as a realistic 
document, namely its ambitious part that endeavours to make the EU “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010”.
By the same token, neither the governments of the candidate countries nor the 
EU institutions were able to prevent the rent-seeking institutions of the global 
financial market, inspired by the influential ideology of the Washington 
Consensus and the corresponding policies of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank in the 1990s, from seizing the opportunity and trying to 
implement radical changes in various fields of social policy. The World Bank 
was indeed seen as the major agenda-setting actor in economic and social policy 
making in the region, prioritising narrowly defined economic rationing using 
the regulatory power of the market over broader societal aims achieved by the 
balanced influence of the state, market and civic sector (Potucek, 1999; 
Orenstein and Haas, 2002; Ferge, 2001)6.
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC)
In terms of technique and procedure, the Czech Republic has had no problems 
with the application of the OMC. It was used several times for the preparation of 
National Employment Action Plans; it was applied in the process of the 
preparation of the first National Action Plan on Social Inclusion, etc. The serious 
problem lies not with formal application but with the administrative and 
political context in which it is being applied. To cut a long story short:
• Czech public administration does not possess specific organisational struc­
tures that would have the capacity to deal with strategic issues;
6. The most important example is the reform of the national old age pension system, which opened 
doors forprivate insurance funds by introducing compulsory private (co-)insurance.
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• Czech civil servants are not trained and experienced in dealing with strategic 
issues in their professional life;
• Czech politicians in general do not appreciate the importance of strategic 
thinking and decision making for the realisation of their political missions.
As a result, the real impact of OMC in governance at the national level has 
been dramatically below its potential influence. In other words, operative and 
tactical tasks, short-term interests, lack of time and professional blindness 
severely limit the effects of the OMC's application. At the same time, clear 
positive effects can be recognised in raising the level of general awareness of 
civil servants about EUproblems.
Genuine national programmatic initiative
An interesting example of an original national initiative was the elaboration of 
The Social Doctrine o f the Czech Republic (Socialni doktrina Ceske republiky, 
2002). Its aim was to build a broad national consensus concerning the future 
orientation, goals, priorities and corresponding instruments of Czech social 
policy. Five preparatory conferences in 1998-2000 were a “joint venture” of the 
academic community concentrated around the non-profit Socioklub, the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Senate (the upper house of the 
Czech Parliament). The document, elaborated by a group of experts from 
various fields and with various political affiliations, got mentioned in the 
coalition agreement statement of political parties in power in July 2002, as the 
starting point for the further development of government social policy and its 
priorities and approaches for the period till 2006. Nevertheless, until its 
resignation in 2004, the government failed to find sufficient capacity and 
motivation for consequent steps: real social policy decisions mostly stemmed 
from either urgent problems or strong demands articulated by various pressure 
groups.
CHANGING PUBLIC POLICIES
What has been the specific impact of this interplay of various influences on 
specific policy fields in the Czech Republic?
Social inclusion
The European Commission has asked all the candidate countries' governments 
to elaborate Joint Inclusion Memoranda in order to identify key problems and
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policy measures to combat poverty and social exclusion in 2002. The agenda of 
social inclusion was formally set up with the preparation and approval of this 
document by the representatives of the European Commission and the Czech 
Government in 2004 (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2004). The 
preparation and approval of the National Action Plan of Social Inclusion 2004­
2006 followed suit (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2005). The document 
sums up other valid and prepared policies, action plans, strategies, programmes 
and governmental decrees that have some relevance to the issue of social 
inclusion. The soft spot of the document is the lack of explicit goals, a poorly 
defined responsibility for implementation, and missing links to the budgetary 
process. Significantly, the Ministry of Finance did not participate in the 
preparation of this document. (Atkinson et al., 2005; Potucek, 2005).
Active and passive labour market policies
The Employment Act came into force as of the start of 1991. The state 
employment policy, in accordance with this Act, is towards achieving a balance 
between labour supply and demand, towards the productive utilisation of the 
workforce resources, and towards securing the rights of citizens to employment. 
This is interpreted as the right of those who want and are able to work and are 
actually engaged in the process of seeking employment. These people have the 
right to have work brokered for them in suitable positions, the right to re­
qualification as needed for such work, and to material security before starting a 
job and in the event of losing employment. By 1990 a network of regional 
Labour Offices was created to administrate state employment policy in the 
regions.
The relevance of the EU as a partner in employment policy making became 
visible only with the innovation of domestic employment policy making, which 
started at the end of the 1990s: the annual elaboration and implementation of the 
National Employment Action Plans, guided by the European Employment 
Strategy (Ministerstvo prace a socialnich veci, 2004). Inspired by and in 
consultation with the Commission and applying various schemes proved to be 
effective in other countries, this EU activity represents an added value - even if 
the country, along with the other member states, still faces an unacceptably high 
level of unemployment. The state of preparation and implementation of the 
national documents' standards is not advanced, either: poorly defined goals and 
responsibilities, lack of programme evaluation, poor inter-sectoral 
coordination, and missing links to budgetary resources leave enough room for 
further improvements (Jaburkova andMatl, 2006).
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Family policy
The EU green paper on “Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity 
between the generations” is very topical for the Czech Republic, which has one 
of the lowest birth rates in Europe and a rapidly ageing population7. The Minister 
of Labour and Social Affairs, Zdenek Skromach, welcomed it at the conference 
“Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the generations” 
(Brussels, 11-12 July 2005), and pointed out that the Czech government sees the 
family as a legitimate subject of public interest. The contribution of the Czech 
Republic to this document was elaborated by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs and the Ministry of Health, submitted to public discussion, and finally 
approved by the Committee for the EU8 and passed to the European Commission 
by the end of 2005. The upper chamber of the Czech Parliament, the Senate, 
organised a public hearing on the EU green paper on demographic change on 29 
June 2005, and passed a resolution on 6 October 2005. Being composed mostly 
of right-wing political parties, it has condemned the open coordination and all 
other non-legislative procedures applied by the EU in the member states, and 
rejected any intervention of the state into the privacy of family life (such as 
division of household chores). The Green Paper positively influenced the 
process of preparation and approval of The Conception of Family Policy that 
was articulated and approved in the Czech Republic as late as in 2005 
(Ministerstvo prace a socialni politiky, 2005). Domestic factors were decisive, 
though: a persistent very low fertility rate (at about 1.2), and ideological 
orientation of policy makers (Christian and Social Democrats in power as 
governmental coalitionpartners).
Pension reform
After minor changes in old age pension legislation in the early 1990s, there was a 
significant legislative change in the framework of the compulsory structure of 
social insurance with the passing of a new law on old-age pensions in 1995. An 
increase in the statutory retirement age limit was approved to be introduced 
incrementally up until 2007. The statutory retirement age for women, originally 
53-57 was raised to 57-61 (the actual limit, depends on the number of children), 
while for men it increased from 60 to 62. The law on base pension insurance
7. The national programme on preparation for ageing for 2003-2007 was approved by the Czech 
government as soon as 15 May 2002 (Ministerstvo prace a socialni politiky, 2002).
8. Vybor pro EU. It is the main coordinating body of the Czech public administration toward the 
EU. Its Chairman is the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
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conceives the old-age pension as of two-components made up of a fixed amount 
paid to all and one that is dependent on the number of years worked and the 
working income received. The law is built on the principle of substantial 
redistribution of accumulated finances towards persons with a lower level of 
earnings. Old-age pensions for persons with higher working incomes are 
affected by a regressively acting calculation formula.
Since 1995 there has been a public discussion about the reform of the whole 
concept of the old-age pension system. It was initiated by experts from 
international financial institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank, who strongly recommended that the country opt for 
compulsory private co-insurance. This new type of old-age insurance would 
complement the pay-as-you-go public scheme that would gradually lose its 
importance in the total amount of redistributed resources. It was argued that this 
change would be inevitable due to demographic trends (ageing of the 
population) and the demand for investment in the national economy that would 
be satisfied by the newly established and privately run for-profit pension funds. 
In contrast to Poland, Hungary, and recently also Slovakia, who had introduced 
this model, the Czech Republic resisted the pressure. There were two main 
factors that could explain this significant difference:
• The country was not in as deep a fiscal crisis as other Central and Eastern 
European countries and was less dependent on loans provided by these 
organisations.
• There were strong political opponents of this idea, namely the consecutive 
Social Democrat-led governments and the trade unions that stressed the risks 
of such a reform due to the fragility of financial markets and institutions and 
the huge demand for additional financial inputs over a couple of decades 
within introducing such a reform.
One of the stimuli for the establishment and operation of the cross-party task 
force for pension reform in 2004-2005 was, once again, the EU green paper on 
“Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the generations”. 
The government has established this force in order to simulate the consequences 
of alternative pension reform options and thus contribute to rational discussion 
of the representatives of different ideological views.
Social policy agenda
No comprehensive national policy inspired by the new EU Social Agenda 
launched in the beginning of 2005 has been developed. Nevertheless, there is
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apparent piecemeal progress on a majority of its issues:
• The establishment of the above-mentioned cross-party task force for pension 
reform.
• The new Labour Code was prepared and approvedby Parliament in 2006.
• The tripartite body has matured, gained legitimacy, and due to its relatively 
smooth functioning there have been minimal strikes and other forms of open 
protest.
• The issue of gender equality has been discussed and new approaches were 
taken to close the gender gap in job opportunities, wages and other living 
conditions.
• The promotion of families (especially those with children), and young 
people (potential parents) became the core issue of a new Conception of 
Family Policy (Ministerstvo prace a socialni politiky, 2005).
• There were other partial agendas (such as the broad issue of social inclusion, 
etc.) considered and realised as mentioned through this paper.
European economic and monetary union
The Czech authorities (government, Ministry of Finance and the Czech 
National Bank) have officially declared their intent to join the euro zone by 
2010. In view of positive economic developments, this plan seems to be 
realistic. Nevertheless, debate (namely among social scientists) is still on 
whether this move will be productive as some nationally sensitive and effective 
economic and social policy instruments will be lost on a country which has not 
yet fully recovered from the legacy of its Communist past.
Enlargement - free movement of labour and goods, socio-political chapters
The Czech authorities are generally well aware of the positive impact of 
implementation of the core European Union principles and goals on the future 
socio-economic development of the country, a country extremely dependent on 
foreign trade and foreign investment, technology and experience, and 
neighboured exclusively by EU member states. Thus the Czech government 
often encounters delays in the full application of these principles by some old 
member states, typically in the free movement of labour. This is a paradoxical 
situation as the Czech Republic has for several years been a net importer of 
labour from the other member states. Even Czech politicians who are genuine
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supporters of Europeanisation have found it difficult to sell this paradox at 
home.
CONCLUSIONS
The EU's role in shaping certain domestic policy fields, namely social policy, 
should not be overestimated; the obvious discrepancy between the Copenhagen 
criteria of accession, covering a very limited part of the social welfare agenda 
and installed in 1993, and the Lisbon Strategy, laid out as an explicit and 
balanced public policy programme for the candidate countries as late as in 2002 
and politically and administratively executed only since 2004, opened a 
considerable space for other, more active and influential international actors, 
namely the World Bank and International Monetary Fund led by the 
Washington Consensus' neo-liberal ideology of the 1990s (Potucek, 2004). 
This institutional weakness created a sharp socio-political tension: The new 
member states entered the European Union with their health, social, and 
employment policies not developed enough to cope with the legitimate 
demands of this strategic policy document. There is an urgent need to solve the 
discrepancy between the enormous public tasks of high employment, capacity 
building in health and social services, alleviation of poverty, and strengthening 
social cohesion in the new member states, and their insufficient social, 
economic, and administrative implementation capacities.
The situation has been slowly changing only from the beginning of this 
century: the European Union has helped with pushing the social policy issues 
higher up the political agenda ladder, with institution building, and the transfer 
of skills and money from the old member states. Nevertheless, the Open 
Method of Coordination proved to be too weak an instrument in this respect.
National initiatives within the new member states would be an added value to 
this EU-centred effort. Aprogrammatic document called The Social Doctrine o f  
the Czech Republic, developed by a group of scholars for this purpose in the 
Czech Republic, might become an inspiration for other countries, even if it 
failed to directly influence the social policy making in the country (Socialni 
doktrina Ceske republiky, 2002).
All in all, only the institutions of the enlarged EU have the potential to become 
the main - if not the only - institutional umbrella against the pressures of 
economic globalisation in preventing further widening of the gap between 
those who work and those who are unemployed, those who have and those who 
have not, those included and those excluded in the member states.
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The social dimension of the Lisbon Strategy is the - even if somewhat virtual - 
blueprint for the future.
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SUMMARY1
The article approaches the Lisbon Strategy by viewing it as a toolfor addressing 
economic hardships produced by relocation o f economic activities. The rising 
incidence o f relocation o f resources abroad by production and service 
companies - often from more developed countries to countries with a more 
favourable cost structure in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe - has 
become a major political issue especially in Western Europe, and notably in 
countries with high unemployment. Relocation may however, at least 
temporarily, lead to considerable individual and social hardship and suffering. 
It is therefore essential toproperly assist those affected by thisprocess. In this 
regard, policies to promote and encourage employability have shown 
themselves to be more efficient than those serving merely to protect employment.
The answer should be to engage in bold structural reform in all sectors 
including labour, products, services and education, so as to increase 
competition and thereby competitiveness and put countries in a position to 
attract foreign investment and become as much recipients as “senders ” o f 
relocation.
The social and economic consequences o f relocation are to be brought in a 
close connection with the Lisbon Agenda. Success in implementing the Lisbon 
goals seems to be crucialfor addressing and rectifying the negative impacts o f 
relocation on outsourcing economies. Morejobs and more growth, i f  achieved
1. The article is based on my paper “Relocation of economic activities abroad and European 




under the Lisbon Agenda, would definitely ease social and political hardships 
that the transfer o f production would bring to a certain country or region.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The notion of relocation as such is a very wide one that generally describes the 
practice of firms to subcontract business functions to outside suppliers. In 
practice, this can take many forms, and research papers and media publications 
refer to different types in their arguments. The UNCTAD World Investment 
Report 2004 provides a helpful structure for classifying different outsourcing 
and offshoring activities. There are two main distinctions to make in order to 
define outsourcing: whether a good or service is produced inside or outside a 
company; or whether it is produced inside or outside a country. Outsourcing 
takes place if the production of a good or service is contracted out to another 
company, regardless as to whether this company is domestic or foreign.
Looking at the international dimension, outsourcing is often used 
synonymously with offshoring and refers to the practice of importing goods or 
services for the production process from outside the home country. This can take 
two forms. For “intra-firm offshoring” or “captive offshoring”, firms establish 
affiliates abroad but are essentially still performing the function in-house. A 
prominent example is DHL's decision to relocate its data centre from the United 
Kingdom to Prague to track shipments, customer queries and billing activities 
(You're Speaking to Prague, 2003). The term offshore outsourcing or 
international outsourcing, to the contrary, is used when stages of the production 
process are performed abroad and by third parties.
The vehicle for captive offshoring is mainly foreign direct investment (FDI), 
which is defined as “an investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity in one economy 
(foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an 
economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate 
enterprise or foreign affiliate)” (UNCTAD, 2004).
AN UPWARD RELOCATION TREND IN THE SERVICES SECTOR
Whereas the phenomenon of international outsourcing in the manufacturing 
sector is not new, it recently also arose in the services sector and for service
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activities within manufacturing. With the expansion of information and 
communication technologies, it is now possible to outsource business processes 
such as customer service, telemarketing, and document management but also 
financial services and IT services such as software development. The number of 
services that require geographical proximity (so called face-to-face services) 
might well shrink even further.
The recent withdrawal for revision within the EU of the so-called Bolkestein 
draft directive on “services in the internal market” reflects different, even 
conflicting, views on the further liberalisation of international trade in services. 
Especially to the new EU member states, the withdrawal signifies the 
abandonment of one of the basic principles of the EU's Internal Market, that is, 
the free movement of services. To some of the older member states, by contrast, 
it means a similar abandonment of social and economic rights and guarantees 
hard fought for and achieved over decades. In view of this, there is a clear need to 
observe a difficult middle road between ensuring regular provision of services in 
public utilities and avoiding any semblance of social dumping in the service 
sector.
The fairly recent phenomenon of service outsourcing is the main driver of 
renewed political attention to the issue. Whereas traditional outsourcing in the 
manufacturing sector affected low-skilled, blue collar workers, service 
outsourcing is seen as a threat to well paid, white collar jobs. This has 
considerably increased lobbying efforts. Arecent study in the US has shown that 
among individuals with an annual income above $100,000, the percentage of 
those actively supporting free trade slipped from 57% to 28% between 1999 and 
2004 (Amiti and Wei, 2004).
Having attracted manufacturing relocation and investments in the early 
1990s, CSEE countries are increasingly successful in attracting service sector 
contracts and investments. They offer a large pool of college graduates with 
technical and language skills, especially in German and English that make them 
attractive locations for service and business process outsourcing. The Czech 
Republic is so far the most prominent host country for service sector 
outsourcing and the number of call centres is set to rise about 70% to more than 
500 by 2007 (Central Europe Leads Growth in Call Centres, 2003). CSEE 
countries increasingly compete for contracts in the IT sector with India and 
benefit from their geographical and cultural closeness to Western Europe.
A survey found that nearly half of European companies were planning to move 
more services offshore. Among these, UK companies accounted for 61% of the 
total ofjobs moved, followed by Germany and the Benelux countries with 14%
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each (A Loss of Jobs or a Gain in Profits, 2004). Compared to US firms, most 
European firms have until now been reluctant to outsource business processing 
and IT.
In Germany, manufacturing outsourcing accounts for 50% of total 
outsourcing and, apart from a few prominent examples (Deutsche Bank's 
decision in 2002 to outsource a large part of its European IT operations to IBM in 
a contract worth about $2.5 billion over its 10-year lifespan), firms are hesitant 
to engage in business process outsourcing (When Push Comes to Shove, 2004). 
In Italy, outsourcing is relatively low, due to the structure of its industry with 
relatively few large corporations and due to strong political and cultural 
constraints. Nordic telecommunication companies are slowly moving service 
centres to the Baltics. In Spain, there is a growing trend for outsourcing mainly 
to Latin America and northern Africa. A major constraint for outsourcing in the 
service and communications sector is a natural one, that is, language skills. 
German and English are widely spoken in Eastern Europe where it is not 
surprising to find a rise in service activities relocated from German- and 
English-speaking source countries.
Figure 1. Top ten recipients of FDI inflows in 2002 and 2003 
(in billions of dollars)
* Ranked on the basis o f  the magnitude o f2003 FDI inflows.
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNCdatabase (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
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The size of international service outsourcing and offshoring is difficult to 
establish. From an FDI point of view, service sector investments are increasing 
more rapidly than FDI in other sectors. Between 2002 and 2003, the share of 
service sector projects in the total number of related FDI projects rose from 37% 
to 51% for all developing and transition countries. Their share in the number of 
jobs created by such projects reached 57%. India's exports of software and IT- 
driven services, for example, grew from less than $0.5 billion in the early 1990s 
to around $12 billion in 2003-2004 (UNCTAD, 2004). Table 1 shows the major 
recipients of FDI for services projects in CSEE. The Russian Federation, 
Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic are the largest recipients each with 
between 11% and 15% of total service FDI.
Emphasis should be given to the increasing market share of services in the 
economies of OECD countries, as well as to the potential for such activities to be 
outsourced to low-cost countries. Whereas the share of agriculture has 
decreased over the last 20 years in the OECD area and that of industry is also 
falling in rich countries (while increasing slowly in poor countries), the share of 
services is rising in all three categories of countries - that is, the rich, the 
developing countries and those in transition, and poor countries. Services now 
represent two thirds of global economic production: 70% in rich countries, 50% 
in medium-income and 44% in low-income countries. The general trend is thus 
towards an extension of the service sector throughout the world. Productivity in 
the service sector is therefore a key issue when it comes to raising overall 
competitiveness in a given country. Another trend is towards jobs requiring 
higher skills levels. The reason for this is less the development of trade than 
technological change as such.
Furthermore, it becomes clear that countries that take the greatest recourse to 
outsourcing - the United States and the United Kingdom - are also the prime 
suppliers of outsourced services. This being said, there are many activities such 




Table 1. Largest CSEE recipients of services FDI projects, 2002-2003 
(Number of projects and percentage)
Country
Number of projects
Total Greenfield FDI“ Cross-border M&As Share (per cent)
Russian Federation 126 81 45 15
Hungary 121 72 49 14
Poland 116 37 79 14
Czech Republic 95 31 64 11
Romania 77 57 20 9
Bulgaria 53 31 22 6
Slovakia 43 18 25 5
Serbia and Montenegro 31 21 10 4
Total 852 439 413 100
Source: UNCTAD, based on information provided by OCO Consulting and UNCTAD, cross­
border M&A database.
‘ Based on projects monitored in five key services areas: financial services, telecommunications 
services, headquarters and distribution centres, R&D and shared services/call centres.
IMPACTS 
Impacts on economic welfare and labour markets of source countries
International trade is widely accepted to have beneficial effects on aggregate 
economic welfare through the exploitation of gains from trade. However, when 
it comes to effects on the sector level and micro level of the economy, the results 
are not as clear cut. Traditional economic theory, based on the notion of 
comparative advantage, predicts that in Western Europe high-skilled workers 
gain whereas low-skilled workers lose and vice versa for developing and 
transition countries (because European countries are relatively well endowed 
with high-skilled workers and transition countries are relatively well endowed 
with low-skilled workers). As a result, inequality within countries rises. As 
production processes that require low-skilled workers are relocated abroad, 
those that involve higher skilled labour remain in the country. Relative demand 
for high-skilled workers increases and wages increase. The inverse is true for 
low-skilled workers. As relative demand in the source country labour markets
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decreases, their wages go down and workers are displaced in the restructuring 
process.
The overall effect on the labour market then depends on the magnitude of the 
gains from relocation and on the structure of the labour market. When 
companies relocate stages of the production process or outsource them to lower- 
cost or more efficient suppliers, they should be able to expand production and 
employment in stages where they are strong. The overall effect of outsourcing 
depends on whether firms could and did create morejobs than were lost before. 
This argument assumes that workers are perfectly flexible and can easily move 
betweenjobs and sectors. In reality, this depends on the structure of the labour 
markets and the profiles of qualification.
Empirical evidence is difficult to obtain since it has proven difficult to 
disentangle the interlinked effects of technology, trade and relocation on wage 
and employment levels (Morrison-Paul and Siegel, 2001). There are numerous 
studies on the US manufacturing sector that show that there is an effect of 
outsourcing onjobs but that it has been exaggerated in the political debate. A 
major part of the decline in wages of low-skilled workers and the loss of 
manufacturing are attributable to technological change with computers and 
machines replacing manufacturing workers, rather than foreign workers 
replacing domestic workers. A study by Alliance Capital Management found 
that the United States saw an 11% decrease in manufacturing employment 
between 1995 and 2002 while manufacturingjobs decreased by 15% in China 
and by 20% in Brazil. The US number corresponds to the global average of 11% 
while global manufacturing output increased by 30%. This gives reason to 
conclude that jobs are not lost because of outsourcing but because of 
technological change (Drezner, 2004). A widely quoted empirical study by 
Feenstra and Hanson on the reasons for the decline of the cost share of US 
manufacturing labour in the production process found that 11% to 15% of the 
decline in wages between 1979 and 1990 can be attributed to outsourcing 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1996).
A growing number of studies examine the effects of international relocation 
on European labour markets. For Germany, various studies find similar results 
as for the US. Imports of intermediate goods have a negative effect on wages of 
low-skilled workers and on the demand for low-skilled labour (Geishecker and 
Goerg, 2004). The exact nature of the effect depends on the structure of the 
labour market. In flexible labour markets (e.g. the United Kingdom), relative 
wages of unskilled workers decreased. In more rigid labour markets (e.g. 
Sweden, Italy), the effect translates into a decrease in employment of low-
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skilled labour as wages are less flexible due to the strong position of trade 
unions (Anderton, Brenton and Oscarsson, 2002).
While the above reasoning focuses on the notion of comparative advantage, 
there is a second mechanism that shapes international trade. When countries 
become more and more equal, they increasingly engage in intra-industry trade, 
that is, trade with similar products of similar quality. Gains from trade then arise 
from economies of scale, specialisation and diversification. Intra-industry trade 
is largely neutral in its effect on wages and employment of the workforce 
involved in the production process. Already today, trade by “pre-enlargement” 
European Union countries with new member countries and accession 
candidates is largely intra-industry trade, and fears ofjob losses from trade need 
to be revisited (Aturupane, Djanov and Hoekman, 1997).
When it comes to the highly disputed topic of service relocation, data analysis 
for business services until 2002 gives a mixed picture. The UK was a clear net 
outsourcer, Germany slightly so. France was a net insourcer. In absolute terms, 
France, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands are among the top ten outsourcers 
but were also among the top five recipients of global outsourcing (Amiti and 
Wei, 2004). Service relocation is still a very small percentage of the total 
phenomenon but it is increasing at a much faster pace (Amiti and Wei, 2004).
As far as intra-firm offshoring is concerned, popular concerns address both the 
fear of investment diversion from source countries to new host countries and the 
consequences on source country labour markets. One often gets the impression 
that FDI is a one-way street from developed to developing and transition 
economies. However, based on their actual GDPs, developing countries export 
more FDI than developed countries and the largest recipients of FDI are still the 
US, Germany, and the UK (UNCTAD, 2004).
Whereas generally countries are assumed to benefit from increased 
competitiveness of their firms, real effects also depend on the structure of the 
labour markets. Inflexible and sticky labour markets are a major reason why 
offshoring can have negative effects on the home economy. Whereas every 
dollar of corporate spending shifted offshore can generate up to $1.14 in US 
wealth, the same dollar spent by a German company leaves its home economy 
on average 20 cents worse off (McKinsey Global Institute). In France, every 
outsourced dollar spent on investment abroad by French companies left the 
French economy with a loss of 15 cents.
Policy makers in Europe and other developed economies cannot, remain idle. 
Institutional reform and sound labour market policies are needed, as is an
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unemployment insurance genuinely oriented toward a return to employment. 
Other essential factors are a flexible salary system and an education and training 
system that facilitates labour mobility.
By contrast, some trade unions argue that far too much fault has been laid at 
the door to what was generally called “too rigid” labour markets in Europe. For 
them, adaptation is possible also with existing labour market policies where 
there is effective social protection and substantial social regulations that give the 
state a clear role. The labour force needs to be sufficiently flexible and capable 
of retraining. Lifelong training is needed but that was nothing new. The ILO has 
pronounced itself in favour of a flexible and permanently learning workforce for 
decades. Furthermore, the European Union has structural funds at its disposal 
and these should be used more widely. The trade unions' view is that it is wrong 
to say that wages are not flexible when in fact they have been so for the last 
decade.
Policy makers should be engaged in a discussion as to how to assist people 
who lose theirjobs. The classic solution has been to organise untargeted social 
protection so as not to favour any particular category of the unemployed. 
Experience shows, however, that countries where policies have been more 
precisely targeted have fared better.
It is, however, very difficult to identify any one miracle solution. Rather, 
several policies will have to be conducted jointly so that people that are 
disadvantaged by a policy in one field can find compensation in another. It is 
also important to reach synergy between macro-economic policies and 
employment policies that help capital and labour to transfer from declining 
sectors to up-coming ones.
The volume of the benefits to the source country and company resulting from 
relocatingjobs to more favourable foreign destinations depends principally on 
the following factors: the level of cost savings, the level of profits repatriated 
from the outsourced investment, the number of workers that can be re-employed 
in newjobs created in the source country with the aid of the increased profits, 
and the increase in sales to the outsourced production outlet. A comparison by 
McKinsey Global Institute of off-shoring investment made by US and French 
companies revealed that the reasons behind the lower gains made by French 
companies were related to the fact that French companies invested more heavily 
in North Africa and Eastern Europe, where cost savings were less than was the 
case in India, where US companies invested relatively more. Moreover, French 
companies did not reap as much profit from investing in off-shoring centres 
abroad as did US companies, and they sold less of their intermediate products to
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the outsourced companies. But the biggest difference with the US resulted 
from the inflexibility of France's labour market, as unemployed workers in 
France had much greater difficulties in finding a new job than did their US 
counterparts. Only 60% of unemployed French workers had found a new job 
within a year, whereas the more vibrant labour market in the US enabled 70% of 
unemployed workers there to find a newjob within three months.
It would be misleading to argue that firms base their production decision 
solely on wage costs, as is often implied in media articles. What counts is labour 
productivity, which is reflected in wages. More qualified and more efficient 
workers receive higher wages but create more added value than less productive, 
less well-paid workers. Productivity in CSEE countries has risen sharply. In the 
new EU member countries the productivity/wage level is by now similar to or 
above the EU average (see table 2). This implies that the real issue at stake for the 
EU countries is not absolute wage rates, but rather labour productivity. 
McKinsey Global Institute found only a small impact of outsourcing but a 
strong decline in competitiveness.
There is clear evidence that the general level of competitiveness of the 
economy of the source country determines the level of outsourcing activities of 
companies on its soil. The lower the home economy's competitiveness, the 
higher the outsourcing investments of the home companies will be. Similarly, 
the inward investment into a source country by investors abroad is a clear 
indication how these perceive the competitiveness level of the country in 
question. Foreign investment in France and Germany fell sharply in 2004, 
reinforcing concerns that inflexible labour practices, weak domestic demand 
and an expensive domestic currency might be driving investors elsewhere. 
OECD figures indicated that inward investment in France almost halved from 
$43 billion in 2003 to $24 billion in 2004, while in Germany foreign investment 
decreased from $66 billion in 2003 to $27 billion in 2004. However, the 
weakness of the continental European economy did not affect the UK and the 
US. The US remained the biggest foreign investor as US companies almost, 
doubled their overseas spending in 2004, with foreign direct investment 
outflows jumping to $252 billion from $141 billion in 2003. Foreign direct 
inflows into the clearly competitive UK market more than trebled in 2004, 
reaching $78 billion. At the same time, the UK is one of the countries in the 
world that accounts for the most direct investment abroad, thereby showing that 
a competitive economy can manage both to be a large recipient of investment 
and a big investor overseas.
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Table 2. Wage rates and productivity in Europe
Country Gross monthly average salary Productivity“ Productivity/salary
(EU-15=100%)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2000 2000
Average for the EU-15b 
O f which:
1 845 1 923 2 127 2 191 - 42.5 100
Greece 1 101 1 160 1 227 1 286 1 357 19.4 79
Portugal - - 1 052 1 112 - 10 48
Spain - 1 297 1 326 1 372 1 425 26.1 98
New EU members from CEE0 
O f which:
- 381 410 460 - 11.7 117
Czech Republic - 343 379 430 510 10.9 144
Estonia - 282 303 328 - 8.3 137
Hungary 307 314 348 408 489 11.1 160
Latvia - 257 277 280 - - -
Lithuania 233 251 270 300 - - -
Poland 346 442 471 626 598 9.3 99
Slovakia 274 260 299 320 382 9.2 154
Slovenia - 895 935 988 1 041 21.3 114
EU candidates 
O f which:
- 115 132 146 153 - -
Bulgaria 101 111 120 127 132 - -
Romania - 120 144 165 174 - -
Source: UNCTAD, based on http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/; www.dree.org/elargissement 
(data in italics); and Stephan 2003, p. 10 (for productivity data)
‘ Value addedper€ 1.000 labour costs,national average 
b EUROSTAT estimate. Data for Austria, Ireland and Italy are not available.
‘Average productivity is based on data for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia only.
An answer to the question to what extent have the EU15 fears of relocation of 
activities and consequent job losses due to the fifth EU enlargement been 
justified was given in the study prepared by the EU Commission two years after 
enlargement (European Commission, 2006). Namely, the evidence indicates
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that FDI flows to the new member states, while relevant for the recipient 
countries, have in fact been only a minor part of overall FDI outflows of the EU- 
15: within the latter, in 2004 the share of outflows to new member states was 4% 
against a corresponding share of 53% for outflows to other member states in the 
EU-15 and a 12% share for flows to the US. In addition, a large part of the FDI by 
the EU-15 in the new member states, particularly in the services sector where 
most of FDI is invested, has occurred in the context of privatisation programmes 
to capture fast-growing markets and does not involve the substitution of 
activities previously carried out in the home country.
Furthermore, different studies have tried to identify the impact of relocation 
on non employment. Recent research for some EU-15 countries suggests that a 
mere 1% to 1.5% of the annualjob turnover can be attributed to relocation, and 
that only a part concerns relocation to the new member states. In Germany and 
Austria, for example, two countries which figure among the largest investors in 
the EU-10, it is calculated that such investment has led over the past fifteen years 
to a lower employment creation, in cumulative terms, in the range of 0.3% to 
0.7%, which is a very small percentage in particular if one also considers the 
overall job creation which took place over the same period. Moreover, in many 
instances, outsourcing part of the production process to the new member states 
has allowed firms in the EU-15 to strengthen their competitive position with a 
net favourable impact on employment (European Commission, 2006).
Impact on economic development of recipient countries
Relocation of economic activity, through, for instance, foreign direct 
investment is usually regarded as beneficial to the recipient country and has 
come to be regarded as an important tool for development. It provides 
investment capital that is lacking domestically and thus fosters economic 
development. Compared to other international capital flows, FDI is thought to 
be less volatile because of the long-term orientation of investors. In the context 
of developing and transition economies, FDI is expected to have spill-over 
effects to local industry and disseminate managerial and technological 
knowledge.
Spill-over can take four different directions: (i) through competition with 
foreign controlled plants, local companies strive to become more efficient and 
competitive; (ii) through cooperation of foreign owned enterprises with up­
stream suppliers and downstream clients technological and managerial 
knowledge is transferred; (iii) technology spill-overs occur through imitation,
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or (iv) through movements of human capital from technology intensive 
foreign affiliates to domestic enterprises (UN/ECE Economic Analysis 
Division, 2000).
Reliable empirical studies of actual spill-overs are scarce and the few that exist 
show a mixed picture. For most of the new member countries of the EU, positive 
effects of FDI can be seen in the rise in productivity and in the increase in 
technology-intensive production, whereas the beginning of the transition 
process is dominated by labour-intensive and resource-intensive production. 
This becomes evident for example in trade flows from the accession countries. 
For German imports from the accession countries, the share of labour intensive 
textiles, clothing and leather goods dropped from 24% to 10%, whereas the 
share of high-tech products doubled to 55% from 1993 to 2001 (The Eastern 
Enlargement of the European Union, 2004).
Experience shows that it is much easier to attract FDI than to reap its benefits. 
Whether and to what extent spill-over effects occur will largely depend on 
country conditions. In particular, educational levels and institutional conditions 
are key determinants for successful use of FDI for economic growth. Countries 
that have been successful in developing domestic capital and high value-added 
industries as a result of FDI are also those which have engaged in far-reaching 
market reforms.
Investor confidence in a stable and beneficial institutional framework has 
been enhanced by the 2004 EU enlargement. The ten new EU members have so 
far received considerably more FDI flows than South-East European countries. 
For countries that are at the beginning of the accession negotiation process, 
future FDI inflows are of special importance. While investors gain confidence in 
these markets, the benefits from FDI also help these countries carry out 
necessary market reforms, improve infrastructure and liberalise trade.
It is evident that FDI is an important ingredient in development but not the 
only one. As a consequence of increased demand for low-skilled labour, wages 
in this segment rise (Egger and Stehrer, 2003). Indeed, many countries have 
already seen rising wage levels and a loss in manufacturing jobs in favour of 
countries with cheaper labour. Hungary's wage levels, for example, have risen 
by 20% between 2001 and 2003 and the country lost thousands ofjobs when 
companies such as IBM, Philips and Flextronics shifted production to China 
(Central Europe Leads Growth in Call Centres, 2003). In 2003, the same number 
of Japanese firms that shifted capital abroad also repatriated capital to Japan, as 
wages in other Asian countries rose and concerns for the protection of 
intellectual property rights became stronger (Faut-il craindre les
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Since, therefore, the low-cost advantage cannot form any stable basis for 
sustained economic prosperity in the region, domestic capital formation and 
creation of enterprises will have to be a priority for the countries in Central, 
South-Eastern and Eastern Europe (CSEE). The next wave of investment in the 
higher-skilled service sector is important for the diversification of many 
economies in Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe.
To better compete for IT outsourcing with countries like India and Ireland, the 
institutional framework is crucial. It is especially important for CSEE countries 
to improve their reputation for IT security and for protecting intellectual 
property. The rating agency, Gartner, rates Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
Republic as “fair” for IT security issues. This means that these countries are 
ahead of Russiajudged by the agency as “poor” but behind India - “good” and 
Ireland - “excellent” (A Growing Opportunity to Close the Cultural Gap: 
Eastern Europe, 2003).
Amajor challenge for CSEE economies is the still high unemployment rates in 
most countries2. FDI has so far been concentrated on large corporations, and on 
capital cities or highly urbanised areas. Disparities within countries remain 
high. The main motors forjob creation, however, are small and medium-sized 
enterprises. A policy that aims at fostering job growth thus has to set the 
appropriate incentives for the creation of small and medium-sized businesses 
along with FDI inflows.
It is natural and important for countries to engage in competition for FDI 
inflows. Tax reductions for corporations are one possible instrument that is 
increasingly being criticised by some governments in Western Europe, as they 
feel that low corporate taxes in the East are made possible by EU funding 
financed by Western European members. Company taxation rates are mostly 
below the pre-enlargement EU average of 32.5% - such as for instance 19% in 
Poland, 16% in Hungary and 25% in Slovenia. However, they do by far not 
reach Ireland's rate of 12.5%. This criticism aside, there are intrinsic motivations 
for countries in the transition process to avoid a downward spiral of tax 
reductions. CSEE countries still face major challenges, for example in 
infrastructure development. If infrastructure investments have to be reduced 
due to reduced government budgets, this could have negative consequences as 
regards the country's attractiveness to investors.
2. For example top FDI host countries like Poland with 19.1%, or Slovakia with 17.1%
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OUTSOURCING, FDI AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The economies of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are expected to 
experience a surge in FDI in the years to come. The UNCTAD World Investment 
Report 2004 expects FDI to increase steadily in the EU accession countries as 
well as in other CSEE countries. The lion's share of global and European FDI, 
however, is expected to flow to India and China. Given this, it would seem 
inappropriate for policy makers to focus their concerns over outsourcing mainly 
on the CSEE countries and thereby risk jeopardising their economic 
development and transition.
Indeed, FDI flows to these countries will enhance their economic integration 
with other parts of Europe and the world economy as a whole - a process 
accelerated, as the case may be, through EU accession, ongoing or expected 
accession negotiations, or other arrangements with the EU such as its 
“Neighbourhood Policy”. This in turn means increased trade and potential 
capital flows in the opposite direction, that is, from the CSEE to Western 
European countries. As we have seen, companies in many CSEE countries 
already engage in FDI in Europe and globally. When seen in proportion to the 
economic size of countries, it turns out that developed countries are not the 
major source of FDI, but that indeed developing countries engage in more FDI 
as a share of their GDP (Mann, 2003).
As has been shown above, relocation is complementary to increased trade, 
which fosters economic integration between Western European and CSEE 
countries, eventually leading to an even better functioning European market. 
The road to global competitiveness starts with competition at home. The best 
way to improve the competitiveness of the European economy on a global scale 
is to allow competition within and between the European countries. Relocation, 
being a corporate phenomenon, could contribute to that goal, as well as to a more 
balanced economic development across Europe, via indirect, non- 
govemmentally driven, development assistance to less developed European 
economies.
Sometimes multinationals are seen as wanting to play out one work side in one 
country against another located in a different country. For example, General 
Motors recently announced that 10,000 jobs would be cut in Europe over the 
next six months. Following that, however, workers in Germany, Poland and 
Sweden showed a remarkable degree of solidarity, leading the company to 
abandon any plans for imminent layoffs.
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The relocation of some productive functions could increase economic welfare 
in both the investor's home country and the recipient country. But to reap the full 
benefits of this, the advanced European economies will have to implement some 
necessary reforms, foremost in the liberalisation of the markets for labour and 
products, and as regards social and economic policies. These reforms have been 
on the European agenda for quite some time, but since most tend to be quite 
unpopular, few countries have had the determination to implement them. 
Relocation has demonstrated that the recipient countries have been able to 
embark on similar reforms at home, thus creating competitive and appealing 
conditions for attracting investments, while simultaneously prompting 
developed economies to finally follow the reform path in creating the basic 
environment, for improved competitiveness.
FDI contributed significantly to the high economic growth of Spain and 
Ireland in the late 1980s and the 1990s. These countries thereby managed to 
reduce unemployment, and especially Ireland successfully developed a high­
tech sector. These developments also enhanced the overall attractiveness of the 
EU for investors from overseas and led to FDI inflows notably from the US and 
Japan. CSEE countries are now seeking to catch up and emulate these successful 
models.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
One of the aims of this paper is to place relocation of economic activities abroad 
within the broader context of its potential contribution to rectifying problems 
that occurred in the recipient countries' labour market due to losses sustained 
through brain drain and the emigration of skilled workers. Furthermore, 
worrying aspects of relocation for the recipient countries are to be taken into 
account, such as having trade and economic relations with the source countries 
too dependent on the relocation phenomenon (for instance, 70% ofRomania's 
trade with the EU is derived from outsourced facilities). Other aspects include 
the risk of unpredictable further relocation towards Asian countries; the 
unfavourable impact of competition with Asian countries based on cheaper 
labour, in that these may discourage wage increases in the European countries 
receiving investments; and the still limited scope for the transfer of technology 
and marketing capacities following the relocation of capital to many recipient 
countries.
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The effects of international outsourcing and offshoring activities by European 
firms on their domestic labour markets are considerable. There is increasing 
evidence of at least short- and medium-term losses for low-skilled workers and 
the lower wage segments of the labour force. There are, however, by the same 
token major benefits to be derived, such as increased competitiveness of firms 
across Europe and the world, stronger economic growth resulting from 
increased continent-wide integration, political dividends as greater wealth in the 
CSEE result in greater political stability and a stronger democracy, and wealth 
gains for citizens as prices are kept lower than they otherwise would have been 
(due to increased competition and lower costs of production), also resulting in 
lower inflation.
In order to meet these effects, reforms of labour markets are needed. With 
more flexible labour markets, displaced workers may more easily move to more 
competitive sectors. Clearly this represents a significant challenge for many 
European countries which are already coping with high unemployment. By the 
same token, social policies are needed to palliate the effects. If disadvantaged 
and displaced workers do not receive support it will be difficult to maintain a 
societal consensus on economic openness, which as we have seen is an 
important drive of economic growth.
Liberalisation of trade in services, including through an increase in 
competition in the services sector within countries, could considerably raise 
economic growth and allow European citizens better value for money. It could 
be done either via WTO agreements, within the EU or by individual nations. 
Indeed, the OECD has found that countries that liberalise their services sector 
regardless of whether other countries do so show persistently higher economic 
growth. The potential benefits for all sides from a rise in global purchasing 
power are obvious. If the latter increases significantly, then everyone will be 
able to trade and invest more in an increasingly intertwined world economy. The 
biggest export market for the Italian car maker Ferrari is not the US or Italy, but 
China. We are back to where this paper began, namely the view that the 
relocation of economic activities - if pursued with due attention to the social and 
economic consequences resulting from it and closely monitored by the 
international community as a whole - is likely, as Europe's own experience with 
its economic integration has shown so clearly, to be “win-win” rather than “win- 
lose” or, even more pessimistically, “lose-lose”.
Furthermore, FDI and international relocation can be important sources of 
lasting economic growth in recipient countries, provided they manage to create 
a favourable institutional framework, ensure good governance and encourage
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inflows into knowledge intensive sectors from where new knowledge can be 
diffused throughout the overall economy.
Economic development in all parts of Europe must be a top priority for policy 
makers across the continent, as this will enhance overall economic integration 
and prosperity. Relocation forms part of that process and will in due course be 
seen for what it is, namely as highly beneficial for the realisation of the ideals of 
an integrated Europe as a whole.
Social and economic consequences of relocation are to be brought into close 
connection with the Lisbon Agenda. Success in implementing the Lisbon goals 
seems to be crucial for addressing and rectifying negative impacts of relocation 
on outsourcing economies. Morejobs and more growth, if achieved under the 
Lisbon Agenda, would definitely ease social and political hardships that the 
transfer of production would bring to a certain country or region.
Richer European countries with higher wage levels, more elaborate social 
protection and often a more established labour market, complain of domestic 
companies moving all or part of their production to countries with lower wages, 
less social protection and less regulated labour markets. Relocation may, at least 
temporarily, lead to considerable individual and social hardship and suffering, 
as a town or region may lose a vital source of employment and income. This 
social aspect of the relocation process must never be neglected. Solidarity in 
coping with negative social impacts of globalisation and relocation must be 
further promoted not only at the national economic policy level, but also at the 
multilateral level of the EU. A proposal of the European Commission to set up a 
“globalisation adjustment fund” goes along these lines.
New EU members and candidate countries are certainly interested in 
continuation of relocation flows, because they regard it as an additional 
corporate-based development assistance that makes European economic 
cohesion easier. They perceive relocation as an important contribution to their 
overall development and catching up with developed countries. And indeed, the 
attractiveness of their economies was created by implementing some harsh 
reforms that must be sustained.
Though relocation could be considered a concrete manifestation of 
globalisation, technological restructuring, and the almost natural tendency for 
companies to allocate their investments optimally, governments have to find a 
proper answer to the macroeconomic and microeconomic challenges opened up 
by relocation. The answer to the relocation hardships of sending countries 
should not be an administrative ban on this genuinely unstoppable process.
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The Lisbon Strategy seems to be part of a solution, because if implemented 
properly, it could prompt governments of developed EU members to pursue 
bold structural reforms in all sectors including labour, products, services and 
education, in order to increase competitiveness and put their countries into a 
position to attract foreign investments and become as much senders as recipients 
of relocation. In that regard, the policy of promoting employability turns out to 
be more efficient than the policy that just protects employment. The road to 
global competitiveness begins with competition at home.
Croatia is a candidate country for EU accession. We have already undergone 
comprehensive and demanding reforms that brought us to the stage of 
negotiating terms of our accession to the EU. From a candidate country's point 
of view, Lisbon might look quite remote, compared to a series of various 
transition and accession challenges that are to be overcome and mastered 
beforehand. But, it is important that economic policies discourage all those who 
would try to undermine and delay Lisbon Agenda implementation in respective 
co-candidate countries.
In fulfilling the Copenhagen economic criteria Croatia has already made 
significant progress. Croatia is a functional market economy, but we still need a 
mid-term period in order to be capable of resisting competitive pressures 
coming from the EU market. Implementing the Lisbon Strategy and its goals for 
Croatia is of at least threefold advantage. It means for us - overcoming transition 
hardships, assisting in meeting Copenhagen accession criteria, and catching up 
with the EU competitiveness level that would bring long-term prosperity. 
Therefore, upgrading our engagement in all activities related to the Lisbon 
Agenda is needed. It will not be a process of sequencing, but rather a parallel 
process to our accession negotiations. This includes embarking on Lisbon 
implementation even before Croatia becomes an EU member, though we do not 
expect it to constitute additional criteria or economic objectives for accession.
All candidate countries are presented with a unique opportunity to combine 
their efforts to meet Copenhagen economic criteria in full with the efforts to 
meet the goals of the Lisbon Agenda. In this interrelated endeavour they have 
substantially increased their interest, contribution and understanding of the 
Lisbon Process. It is no longerjust a member state's business. It is becoming a 
substantial part of the economic policy of the candidate countries themselves.
Croatia has recently adopted a Strategic Development Framework. This 
document is part and parcel of our pre-accession commitments. It is based on the 
Lisbon Strategy, encompassing its goals and methods. Immediately afterwards,
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Croatian authorities should start preparing an Action Plan aimed at 
implementing specific Lisbon reforms. The Croatian Parliament will maintain 
high level of public awareness of this matter and will hold the Government 
accountable for engaging all relevant stakeholders in preparing the future 
national reform programme.
We in Croatia are aware of the challenges, backlogs and delays the member 
states are facing when dealing with the Lisbon Agenda, especially after the most 
recent big enlargement wave. We are interested in closely monitoring their 
experience and practice. This enormous goal is to be achieved not only by 
utilising joint EU funds and policies, but primarily by challenging the best 
national capacities.
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Annual Progress Report (APR) / European Commission's Annual Progress 
Report on Growth and Jobs
The Annual Progress Report (APR) also known as the European Commission's 
Annual Progress Report on Growth and Jobs is part of a new monitoring system 
created within the framework of the revised Lisbon Strategy. The first APR was 
issued in January 2006. In the framework of the APR every year starting from 
autumn 2006, member states have to prepare National Progress Reports (NPRs) 
on follow-up to the Lisbon Strategy. After submission of NPRs and their 
analysis by the Council and the Commission, the European Commission issues 
the APR assessing the National Reform Programmes (NRPs). The APR may 
contain a country specific recommendation. Based on the Commission's 
assessment, the European Council reviews progress every spring in order to 
decide on necessary adjustments to the Integrated Guidelines on Growth and 
Jobs (IGs). In 2008, as the final year of the current three-year governance cycle 
the APR will be renamed into Strategic Report, which will provide a more “in­
depth” review. Apart from being based onNational Progress Reports (NPRs) the 
APRs and the Strategic Report also build upon progress reports on the 
implementation of the Community Lisbon Programme (CLP).
Benchmarks, benchmarking
The benchmarks are points of reference, defined as a result of evaluation 
(benchmarking) in relation to best practices. They are a tool for promoting 
convergence towards best practice. The term benchmarking is usually used in 
management and strategic management. Benchmarking provides an 
understanding of the processes that lead towards superior performance. It first 
identifies the key areas that need to be benchmarked and the appropriate criteria 
on which to evaluate that area. It then identifies best practice to measure how 
those results have been achieved. In the EU jargon, benchmarking is used to 
assess the relative performance of a member country in implementation of EU 
policy against defined targets (e.g. the Lisbon Strategy goals) and of a non­
member country against meeting various EU standards (e.g. in alignment with 
the EU acquis for candidate countries). Benchmarking is used as a reference in
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developing national plans on how to adopt best practice, usually with the aim of 
increasing some aspect of performance.
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)
The BEPGs are the central instruments for coordination of member states' 
economic policies. They ensure multilateral surveillance of economic trends in 
the member states and demonstrate a formal commitment to respecting the 
provisions of the treaty in terms of surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies. The legal basis for the BEPGs is Article 99 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a 
recommendation from the Commission, produces a draft for the BEPGs and 
reports its findings to the European Council, which adopts a conclusion. On the 
basis of this conclusion, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, adopts a 
recommendation setting out these broad guidelines. The European Parliament is 
informed of this recommendation. Since 2003, the BEPGs have been published 
for a period of three consecutive years, while earlier they were published 
annually. The revised Lisbon Strategy in 2005 decided to integrate the BEPGs 
together with the Employment Guidelines (EGs) forming the Integrated 
Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (IGs) which are set for a three-year period.
Community Lisbon Programme (CLP)
The Community Lisbon Programme is the major tool for achieving the Lisbon 
Strategy goals at the EU level. As one of the key instruments in the revised 
Lisbon Strategy it was introduced in 2005. The CLP sets priorities for action at 
the Union level and forms a complement to the National Reform Programmes 
(NRPs) for growth andjobs that member states had to finalise before October 
2005. The CLP outlines actions to be taken at the EU level under three key policy 
areas: making Europe a more attractive place to invest and work; knowledge 
innovation for growth; and creating more and better jobs. The programme 
consists of 50 initiatives (regulatory actions, financing actions and policy 
development) which have been or will be taken at EU level to refocus the EU's 
economic reforms agenda on growth andjobs. Initiatives in the CLP concentrate 
on key actions, such as the support of knowledge and innovation in Europe, the 
reform of the state aid policy, better regulation, the internal market for services, 
the completion of the Doha round, the removal of obstacles to mobility, 
economic migration, and the social consequences of economic restructuring. In 
the current three-year governance cycle (2005-2008) the Commission will issue
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three progress reports on the CLP implementation. At the end of the current 
three-year governance cycle the CLP will be renewed.
Copenhagen criteria
The Copenhagen criteria are accession criteria defined by the Copenhagen 
European Council in June 1993. They relate to the candidate countries and the 
EU. According to the Copenhagen criteria, accession will take place as soon as 
an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by 
satisfying the economic and political conditions required. Membership requires 
that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 
Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union. The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while 
maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important 
consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate 
countries.
Employment Guidelines (EGs)
The Employment Guidelines (EGs) present common priorities to the member 
states national employment policies. They are proposed by the Commission and 
approved by the Council. The EGs were initially introduced in 1997 as part of 
the European Employment Strategy (EES), and they are among key instruments 
for realisation of goals set down in the Lisbon Strategy. The EGs lay down the 
priorities for structural reforms to be implemented in order to achieve the main 
economic objectives of the European Union. Their legal basis is Article 128 of 
the EC Treaty. They provide a policy framework to focus action on full 
employment, productivity, quality at work and social and territorial cohesion, as 
principle objectives of the EES. The EGs focus on these priorities by attracting 
and retaining more people in employment, increasing labour supply and 
modernising the social protection system, improving the adaptability of workers 
and enterprises, and increasing investment in human capital through better 
education and skills. Since 2003, the EGs have been published for a period of 
three consecutive years, while earlier they ware published annually. The revised 
Lisbon Strategy in 2005 decided to integrate the EGs together with the Broad
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Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) forming the Integrated Guidelines for 
Growth and Jobs (IGs) which are set for a three-year period.
European Employment Strategy (EES) / Luxembourg Process
The European Employment Strategy (EES) also known as the Luxembourg 
Process represents an action and development plan launched in 1997 at the 
Luxembourg Jobs Summit, on the basis of the new provisions in the employment 
title of the Amsterdam Treaty. The EES represents an employment pillar of the 
Lisbon Strategy. Its ambition was to achieve decisive progress within five years. 
An extensive evaluation of the first five years was carried out in 2002 
emphasising the need to revamp the EES with a view to aligning it more closely 
to the Lisbon goals which occurred with new simpler guidelines in 2003. The 
EES is an annual programme of planning, monitoring, examination and 
readjustment of policies put in place by member states to coordinate the 
instruments they use to tackle unemployment. Until the re-launch of the Lisbon 
Strategy in 2005 the EES was based on four components: Employment 
Guidelines (EGs) - common priorities for member states' employment policies 
drawn up by the Commission; National Action Plans (NAPs) for employment - 
implementation of the EGs at national level; Joint Employment Report - 
summary of the NAPs for employment to be used as a basis for drawing up the 
following year's EGs; and recom m endations - country-specific 
recommendations adopted by the Council by a qualified majority. The relaunch 
of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005 led to a thorough review of the EES. Since then 
the EES is based on four components: the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and 
Jobs (IGs) - the guidelines for employment are now presentedjointly with the 
guidelines for the EU's macroeconomic and microeconomic policies; the 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs) for each country; the Commission's 
Annual Progress Report on Growth and Jobs; and any recommendations 
adopted by the Council.
Flexicurity
Flexicurity (originating from flexibility and security) is a welfare state model, a 
mix of flexibility and social security, combiningjob security, an active labour 
market, and the social policies and skills needed for a knowledge economy. The 
model is a combination of easy hiring and dismal (flexibility for employers) and 
high benefits for the unemployed (security for the employees). It was first 
implemented in Denmark by the social democratic Prime Minister Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen in the 1990s. In context of the Lisbon Strategy flexicurity is a case of
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good practice, bearing in mind the fact that social protection must be given high 
importance. It is a model aiming to enhance flexibility of labour markets, work 
organisation and social security. The EU is investigating flexicurity as a possible 
future European model, mainly because it has contributed to almost, full 
employment in Denmark with fewer than 4% of the population unemployed, 
according to the OECD. An unemployed person in Denmark is required to 
constantly seek employment or further education in order to receive full 
benefits.
EU Sustainable Development Strategy (EU SDS) / Gothenburg Strategy
The EU Sustainable Development Strategy (EU SDS) also known as the 
Gothenburg Strategy is an action and development plan adopted at the 
Gothenburg Summit, in June 2001. This strategy adds a third dimension - the 
environment. - to the twin social and economic pillars EU leaders identified at 
the Lisbon European Council Summit, in March 2000 as key factors in the 
creation of an internationally competitive and socially inclusive European 
Union. In line with this, the EU SDS is based on the idea that in the longer run 
economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection must go hand 
in hand. This entails a process in which a wide variety of actors, including 
European and national policy makers, the business community and civil society, 
bear a shared responsibility. The EU SDS has important implications for policy­
making at all levels. It requires a truly integrated, coherent and balanced 
approach, which maximises synergies between relevant economic, social and 
environmental aspects where possible, and mitigates trade-offs where these are 
unavoidable. Following the review of the EU SDS launched by the Commission 
in 2004 and on the basis of contributions from the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and others, in June 
2006 the European Council adopted an ambitious and comprehensive revised 
EU SDS for an enlarged European Union. This document reaffirms the need for 
global solidarity and recognises the importance of working with partners 
outside the EU, including those rapidly developing countries which will have a 
significant impact on global sustainable development. The overall aim of the 
revised EU SDS is to support and promote actions to enable the EU to achieve 
continuous improvement of quality of life for both current and future 
generations, through the creation of sustainable communities able to manage 
and use resources efficiently and to tap the ecological and social innovation 





The Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (IGs) are the central policy­
making instrument for the development and implementation of the revised 
Lisbon Strategy. In 2005, following the Commission's adoption of the IGs they 
were later endorsed by the European Council and formally adopted by the 
Council after that. The IGs constituting the beginning of a new three-year 
governance cycle (the first one was 2005-2008), brought together the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs, Treaty art. 99) and the Employment 
Guidelines (EGs; Treaty art. 128). They simplified implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy by integrating different policy guidelines, targets and reporting 
processes. The IGs foresee a three-year period of reforms (the period is to be 
revised annually). They provide the basic structure for presentation of the 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs), but they also leave sufficient space for 
member states to set national priorities according to their specific situations. The 
IGs deal with macroeconomic, microeconomic and employment issues and they 
are mainly based on the priority action areas as identified in the Kok Report. 
Like the earlier BEPGs and EGs, the IGs represent the soft law, i.e. they are not 
legally binding. Therefore peer pressure and financial incentives represent their 
main enforcement instruments. At the end of the current three-year governance 
cycle the IGs will be renewed.
Kok Report
The Kok Report is a short name for a document “Facing the Challenge - The 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment” drawn up between April and 
November 2004 under the chairmanship of the former Dutch Prime Minister 
Wim Kok. The report was presented to the European Commission and it 
suggested how to give new impetus to the Lisbon Process. Wim Kok was head of 
the review group established by the European Commission which consisted of 
12 individuals representing different stakeholder groups. The remit of the report 
was to identify measures which together form a consistent strategy for the 
European economies to achieve the Lisbon objectives and targets. The report 
showed that the indicators used in the OMC had caused the Lisbon Strategy 
objectives to become muddled and that the results achieved had been 
unconvincing. The scenario for more growth andjobs was envisaged through 
urgent action across five policy areas: the knowledge society, the internal 
market, the business climate, the labour market and environmental 
sustainability. It was concluded that individual member states have made 
progress in one or more of these policy priority areas, but none has succeeded
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consistently across a broad front. Therefore, the report recommended 
developing national policies in each member state, supported by an appropriate 
European wide framework. The Kok Report represented the base for the mid­
term review of the Lisbon Strategy which took place at the following year's 
spring European Council.
Lisbon Strategy
The Lisbon Strategy, also known as the Lisbon Agenda or Lisbon Process, is a 
comprehensive action and development plan for the European Union. It was set 
out by the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000. This strategy, developed 
at subsequent meetings of the European Council, rests on three pillars: an 
economic pillar preparing the ground for transition to a competitive, dynamic, 
knowledge-based economy; a social pillar designed to modernise the European 
social model by investing in human resources and combating social exclusion; 
and an environmental pillar (added at the Gothenburg European Council 
meeting in June 2001) which draws attention to the fact that economic growth 
must be decoupled from the use of natural resources. In the Lisbon Strategy the 
EU set itself the strategic goal to become “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010, capable o f sustainable 
economic growth with more and betterjobs and greater social cohesion”. A list 
of targets has been drawn up with a view to attaining the goals set in 2000. Given 
that the policies in question fall almost, exclusively within the sphere of 
competence of the member states, an Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
entailing the development of National Action Plans (NAPs) for employment 
under the European Employment Strategy (EES) has been introduced. Between 
2000 and 2005 the Lisbon Strategy relied on two principal instruments for the 
realisation of its goals: the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and the 
Employment Guidelines (EGs). The Lisbon Strategy also provided for the 
adaptation and strengthening of existing coordination mechanisms: the 
Luxembourg process for employment, the Cardiff process for the functioning of 
markets (goods, services and capital) and the Cologne process on 
macroeconomic dialogue. The thorough revision of the Lisbon Strategy was 
agreed upon in 2005 at the spring Council meeting (see the revised Lisbon 
Strategy/mid-term review).
National Action Plans (NAPs)
The National Action Plans (NAPs) for employment were the major reporting 
tools on employment measures for achieving the Lisbon Strategy goals in 2000-
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2005. They were written annually by the member states to the Commission and 
they were developed as part of the European Employment Strategy (EES) - the 
employment pillar of the Lisbon Strategy. The NAPs for employment ware 
detailed plans covering over 20 employment guidelines (EGs) grouped under 
four pillars: employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal 
opportunities. Alongside the NAPs for employment in 2001, member states 
started publishing the NAPs for inclusion. Unlike the NAPs for employment, 
the NAPs for inclusion ware based on very broad general objectives. They were 
published biannually (2001-2003; 2003-2005) with the intention to develop 
common indicators. The NAPs for inclusion appeared in wide diversity both in 
form and in degree of compliance with European priorities; they were not 
formally part of the European Employment Strategy (EES). The relaunch of the 
Lisbon Strategy in 2005 revoked both the NAPs for employment and the NAPs 
for inclusion. The NAPs for employment ware replaced with National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs) covering both employment and economic measures (see 
theNational Reform Programmes).
National Reform Programmes (NRPs)
The National Reform Programmes (NRPs) are major reporting tools on 
economic and employment measures for achievement of the Lisbon Strategy 
goals by the member states. Together with the Community Lisbon Programme 
(CLP) they are among the key instruments of the revised Lisbon Strategy. They 
are expected to be national reform strategies to be implemented by 
governments. The NRPs are based on a partnership between the Commission 
and the individual member state and between member state authorities and 
domestic stakeholders. The NRPs are expected to be relatively short political 
documents having up to 30-40 pages, plus annexes. Member states prepared 
NRPs by October 2005 for the three-year governance cycle (2005-2008) on the 
basis of the 23 integrated policy guidelines (IGs). The main body of the NRPs 
consists of the policy actions related to the identified domestic challenges, as 
well as addressing the IGs. The NRPs should principally consist of three major 
parts related to three kinds of guidelines: macroeconomic policy, 
microeconomic policy (replacing the earlier Cardiff reports) and employment 
policy (replacing the National Action Plans (NAPs for employment)). Member 
states in their NRPs identified different challenges and policy responses 
reflecting their different starting positions and political preferences. Starting 
positions and the pace of reform are monitored by a number of benchmarks, 
which should, at a later stage, help identify best practices, and name and shame
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the laggards. At the end of the current three-year governance cycle requirements 
for the NRPs will be renewed.
Open Method of Coordination (OMC)
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is a relatively new and 
intergovernmental method of governance in the European Union, based on the 
voluntary cooperation of its member states. The OMC was first applied in EU 
employment policy, as defined in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, although it was 
not called by this name at the time. It was officially named, defined and endorsed 
in 2000 at the Lisbon Council as an instrument of the Lisbon Strategy in the 
realm of social policy. The OMC takes place in areas which fall within the 
competence of the member states and it is based on their voluntary cooperation. 
It rests on soft law mechanisms such as guidelines, indicators, benchmarking, 
sharing of best practice and peer review and it takes place in areas such as 
employment, social protection, social inclusion, education, youth and training. 
The OMC provides a new framework for cooperation between the member 
states, whose national policies can thus be directed towards certain common 
objectives. Generally, the OMC works in stages. First, the Council agrees on 
policy goals. Member states then translate guidelines into national and regional 
policies. Thirdly, specific benchmarks and indicators to measure best practice 
are agreed upon. Finally, results are monitored and evaluated by the 
Commission. Under this intergovernmental method, the member states are 
evaluated by one another (peer pressure), with the Commission's role being 
limited to surveillance. The European Parliament and the Court of Justice play 
virtually no part in the OMC process. In the context of the Lisbon Strategy, the 
OMC requires member states to draw up National Action Plans (NAPs) for 
employment (after the mid-term review the National Reform Programmes 
NRPs) and to forward them to the Commission.
Revised Lisbon Strategy/mid-term review
The revised Lisbon Strategy also known as the mid-term review refers to the 
revision of the original Lisbon Strategy that was agreed at the spring Council in 
2005. The revision closely followed the conclusions of the Kok Report which 
suggested how to give new impetus to the Lisbon Process. It did not change the 
original intentions of the Lisbon Strategy but it decided that the future 
orientation of the strategy should be focused on growth andjobs. This revised 
strategy is no longer based on all the targets set in 2000, and only the figure of 
3% of GDP for research and development is being retained. The Commission
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proposed partnership with member states on growth andjobs and introduced a 
Community Lisbon Programme (CLP) that outlines actions to be taken at the 
EU level under three key policy areas: making Europe a more attractive place to 
invest and work; knowledge innovation for growth; and creating more and 
better jobs. On the level of the member states National Reform Programmes 
(NRPs) have been introduced as a major reporting tool on economic and 
employment measures for the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy goals by the 
member states. Furthermore, the spring Council in 2005 decided on a new 
policy-making instrument, for the development and implementation of the 
revised Lisbon Strategy involving the adoption by the Council of Integrated 
Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (IGs). These IGs become the basis for member 
states to produce their NRPs.
Sapir Report
The Sapir Report “An Agenda for a Growing Europe - Making the EU Economic 
System Deliver”, is a document drawn up in 2003 by a group of independent 
experts under the chairmanship of André Sapir. The Sapir Report examines all 
facets of the EU economic system: homogenous market and related 
microeconomic policies as well as macroeconomic policy (monetary union and 
EU budget). The report has the status of an agenda-setter. It proposed a six-point 
agenda with a view to achieving the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy and 
making enlargement a success: to make a single market more dynamic; to boost 
investment in knowledge; to improve the macroeconomic policy framework; to 
redesign policies for convergence and restructuring; to achieve effectiveness in 
decision-taking and regulation; and to refocus the EU budget.
Stability and Growth Pact
The Stability and Growth Pact is an agreement by European Union member 
states related to the conduct of fiscal policy. The Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) pertains to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
which began on 1 January 1999. It strengthened the EC Treaty provisions on 
fiscal discipline in the EMU foreseen by the Treaty art. 99 and 104 with the 
intention to ensure that the member states maintain budgetary discipline after 
the single currency has been introduced. In formal terms, the pact consists of a 
European Council resolution (adopted at Amsterdam on 17 June 1997) and two 
Council regulations of 7 July 1997 laying down detailed technical arrangements 
(one on the surveillance of budgetary positions and the coordination of 
economic policies and the other on implementing the excessive deficit
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procedure). Following discussions on operation of the SGP, the two regulations 
were amended in June 2005. In the medium term, the member states undertook 
to pursue the goal of a balanced or nearly balanced budget and to provide the 
Council and Commission with a stability programme by 1 March 1999 (and 
update it annually thereafter). Similarly, states not taking part in the third stage 
of EMU, i.e. those that have not (yet) introduced the euro, are required to submit 
a convergence programme. The SGP opens the way for the Council to penalise 
any participating member state that fails to take appropriate measures to end an 
excessive deficit (the “excessive deficit procedure”). Initially, the penalty would 
take the form of a non-interest-bearing deposit with the Community, but it could 
be converted into a fine if the excessive deficit is not corrected within two years. 
However, there is no fixed rule concerning these penalties; they are subject to an 
assessment of circumstances by the Council.
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